North Macedonia: the never-ending road to EU accession

North Macedonia has had a troubled history since it gained independence from Yugoslavia in 1991. Disputes with Greece have been settled only recently, and tensions between the ethnic groups in the country, mainly between ethnic Macedonians and a large Albanian minority, regularly come to a head. Like many countries in the Western Balkans, North Macedonia is riddled with problems arising from corruption, nationalism and little prospects for GDP growth.

REUTERS/Marko Djurica

Yet despite this, the Macedonia of today demonstrates a real vigour for reform, with a clear contrast between the current left-leaning government under Prime Minister Zoran Zaev and the nationalist right-wing government, which was in power from 2006 until 2017. It seems that the country is doing much in order to heed to the demands of the EU in order for accession talks to commence, but one could say that Brussels does not share the same enthusiasm.

Accession talks were blocked in 2017 and again in 2020, much to the disappointment of North Macedonia. Why is the country’s accession stalling and what are the sticking points that must be tackled in order for the country to join the bloc?

Since the formation of the current government under Prime Minister Zaev, progress made in all levels of society is something worthy of praise, and the country is doing much to fulfil the demands of the Venice Commission for European integration. The most profound changes can be witnessed in the societal sphere, with the current government focussing on curbing ethnic tensions between ethnic Macedonians and the Albanian minority. The country recently amended its constitution in order to include ethnic groups and to secure their rights as well as passed a decree which increases the use of the Albanian language at the national level and extends its use to all state-level institutions (RadioFreeEurope 2019). In addition, the gap between men and women in the country is also lower than that of other Western Balkan countries. In some areas, such as the participation of women in government, North Macedonia is actually ahead of some Western European countries (European Commission 2020). Another key area where the country has made good progress is in the implementation of reforms associated with the judiciary, which has resulted in enhanced judicial freedom and independence, bringing its framework closer to that of the EU acquis. Prime Minister Zaev has also pledged for greater reforms to the media, which would make the national broadcaster, the MRT, more independent to ultimately strengthen its credibility (Apostolov 2020).

However, Macedonia is still haunted by its past, and it is clear that ethnic tensions are still very much in the limelight. These tensions came to a head in 2017 when a nationalist mob stormed the Macedonian parliament, attacking Prime Minister Zaev, with the main reason being the election of Macedonia’s first ethnic-Albanian speaker since the country’s independence and separation from Yugoslavia (Hopkins 2017). This was coupled with the storming of the building of around two hundred supporters of the right-leaning VMRO-DPMNE party. Another similar incident played out in 2015 when 18 people were killed in violent clashes between the police and Albanian extremists in the north of the country (Al Jazeera 2015). Of course, these recent spats are nowhere near the same level as of the 2001 ethnic insurgency in the country, in which an estimated 250 people lost their lives (Congressional Research Service 2002), but a stark parallel can be drawn between the two events—that of violence along ethnic lines.

Although the country should certainly receive praise in terms of its democratic progress, it is clear that if accession into the EU is the county’s ultimate goal, then much still needs to be done in order for this to become a reality. Corruption and independence of the judiciary/media present the main obstacles to good governance in the country. In terms of the judiciary, although many reforms have been implemented in this area, many of them were implemented quickly and without much insight. In fact, the new appointees in the Judicial Council were found to have links to political parties, which ultimately results in the continuation of political appointments in the country (Trpevska & Micevski 2017). In addition, the recent arrest and conviction of the Chief Special Prosecutor in June 2020 due to her acceptation of bribes and misuse of office, does not paint a positive picture of North Macedonia’s reforms (European Commission 2020). As in many countries in the Western Balkans, corruption in North Macedonia continues to be a serious problem, especially within the public administration itself, with a recent minister of the interior sentenced to six years imprisonment and 82 cases opened in March 2020 due to allegations of nepotism within the public administration (European Commission 2020).

Furthermore, freedom of the media and intimidation of journalists remains a problem, and in this regard little progress has been made to conform to OSCE standards. The country’s media still seem to be operating under the same channels that were in place before the election of the SDSM coalition in 2017 (Trpevska & Micevski 2017). It should be noted that before this date North Macedonia had one of the most apparent forms of state capture of the media in Europe. Since January 2019 there have been 10 cases of intimidation of journalists, marking an increase from the previous year, while the most serious cases involving physical abuse have still not been resolved. However, the current government has managed to destabilise the previous system, and there is significantly more plurality in the country’s media landscape.

North Macedonia’s reform efforts may be in vain if the country does not sort out its problems with its neighbours. In 2019, the country signed the Prespa agreement with Greece which officially put an end to the 27-year long dispute with Greece over the country’s name. However, as mentioned previously, Bulgaria is now the new obstacle hindering the country’s EU aspirations by refusing to open accession talks until North Macedonia complies with the demands which Bulgaria set upon the country at the opening of said talks in November 2020. These include, among other requirements, the acknowledgment of the Bulgarian roots of the Macedonian language and reversing the claim that there is a North Macedonian minority in Bulgaria. Despite pressure from the EU concerning the Bulgarian veto and with many MEPs asking for Bulgaria to officially withdraw its veto (Nikolova 2020), Sofia is digging in its heels. For many, Bulgaria’s veto is seen as a desperate attempt by the populist government to draw attention from the corruption scandals and political crisis which is currently unfolding in the country—hoping that populist rhetoric will help increase the number of supporters for GERB, Bulgaria’s incumbent party, especially as the recent elections showed that many have lost faith in the party with its vote share having decreased from 33.5% in 2017 to 25.9% in the first round of this year’s elections (Reuters 2021).

A legal scapegoat for Bulgaria’s actions against North Macedonia can be witnessed in the former’s implementation of the 2017 Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourliness signed between Skopje and Sofia. According to Sofia, there were over 10,000 instances of hate speech against Bulgaria (Telarico 2020). However, this seems incomparable to the Bulgarian treatment of the Macedonian character, which is both hostile and scandalous among politicians and diplomats, with North Macedonia having been referred to as “a made-up nation” and having “a made-up language” in the mass media (Kolov 2020).

It is clear that North Macedonia’s future lies in Europe. The country has made consistent progress and shows a commitment for reform. MEPs continue to stress their willingness to start accession talks. Of course, problems persist in the country and it still needs to reform further and bring its legislature in line with the EU acquis but it is only a matter of time before this is achieved. Sadly, history often repeats itself, and neighbourly relations continue to be a thorn in North Macedonia’s back. Having resolved the 27-year-old stand-off with Greece, Bulgaria is now raising its voice.

Five months after the Bulgarian veto, no progress has been made concerning Bulgaria’s ultimatum—and despite pressure from the EU, the Bulgarian position has not changed. The new government in Sofia may indeed change its rhetoric, but it remains to be seen how the elections will play out. Until then, it seems that North Macedonia will remain in its current state of limbo with its European dreams on hold.

Bibliography

· Al Jazeera, (2015). ‘Macedonia blames Kosovans for deadly clash’, Al Jazeera, 10 May, Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/5/10/macedonia-blames-kosovans-for-deadly-clash

· Apostolov, V. (2020). ‘North Macedonia’s Media Awaits Reforms Under New Govt’, BalkanInsight, 3 September, Available at: https://balkaninsight.com/2020/09/03/north-macedonias-media-awaits-reforms-under-new-govt/

· Congressional Research Service, (2002). Macedonia: Country Background and Recent Conflict, University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department, 28 March 2002. Available at: https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL30900.html

· European Commission (2020). North Macedonia 2020 Report, Brussels: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/north_macedonia_report_2020.pdf

· Hopkins, V. (2017). ‘What Happened in Macedonia, and Why’, The Atlantic, 28 April, Available at: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/macedonia-parliament-zaev-nationalist-violence-eu-europe/524733/

· Kolov, B. (2020). ‘North Macedonia’s EU challenges: the Bulgarian ego and mechanisms of defence’, New Eastern Europe, December 14, Available at: https://neweasterneurope.eu/2020/12/14/north-macedonias-eu-challenges-the-bulgarian-ego-and-mechanisms-of-defence/

· Nikolova, M. (2020). ‘Bulgaria’s North Macedonia U-turn’, Emerging Europe, 21 December, Available at: https://emerging-europe.com/news/bulgarias-north-macedonia-u-turn/

· RadioFreeEurope, (2019). ‘Macedonia's Albanian-Language Bill Becomes Law’, RadioFreeEurope, 15 January, Available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/macedonia-s-albanian-language-bill-becomes-law/29711502.html

· Reuters. (2021). ‘Bulgaria PM seen losing quarter of seats, no clear path to hold power’. Reuters, 5 April, Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bulgaria-election-idUSKBN2BS17S

· Telarico, F. (2020). ‘Small-Country Diplomacy: What if Bulgaria Prevents Further EU enlargement?’, Global Risk Insights, 17 December, Available at: https://globalriskinsights.com/2020/12/small-country-diplomacy-what-if-bulgaria-prevents-further-eu-enlargement/

· Trpevska, S & Micevski, I, (2017). Monitoring Media Pluralism in Europe: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor 2017 in the European Union, FYROM, Serbia & Turkey, Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom, Available at: https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/61140/2018_FYRoM_EN.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y