The Strategic Impact of Expanding AUKUS in the Indo-Pacific

China’s rise as a great power is the most important geopolitical challenge confronting the US today. Washington remains concerned over Beijing’s expanding economic and strategic influence around three maritime zones in the Indo-Pacific region, including the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. Thus, the Indo-Pacific region remains a defining area in the new era of contention between China and US, signifying an impending tussle for global and regional primacy and competing postures between the two states. The US 2022 National Security Strategy notes that besides Moscow’s “imperialist foreign policy”, Beijing’s attempt to “reshape the international order” compels Washington to reinvigorate and deepen its alliance network in the Indo-Pacific. Among the most noteworthy of these alliances is AUKUS, a crucial and developing security pact. Originally, it was signed by the US, the United Kingdom, and Australia in 2021. Now, member states aim to expand its membership to include Japan. This triggers serious debate over the expansion of AUKUS and how it can potentially shape the evolving dynamics of the highly uncertain security environment in the Indo-Pacific region.

Source: ac.news

AUKUS primarily aims to enhance Australia’s military capabilities by providing it with nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) and other advanced military capabilities in artificial intelligence, hypersonic missile capabilities, quantum technologies, and cyber warfare. The enhancement process is based on a four-phase plan that involves capacity building of Australian personnel, selling US submarines to Australia, and the development of a new SSN-AUKUS submarine in next two decades. The main types of nuclear submarines include SSNs, nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and guided missile submarines (SSGNs). SSBNs are designed to carry and launch nuclear ballistic missiles, hence contributing to nuclear deterrence. SSGNs are capable of carrying guided cruise missiles and are used for land-attack and anti-ship operations. On the other hand, SSNs are equipped with nuclear propulsion and may not necessarily carry nuclear delivery systems. SSNs are also known as hunter-killer submarines, as they are designed to attack enemy ships and submarines. AUKUS focuses on the development of SSNs and aims to assist Australia in acquiring up to eight SSNs in next two to three decades.

It is generally argued that this security arrangement is launched as a strategic response to Beijing’s expanding influence in the Indo-Pacific region. Since this military alliance specifically targets a single adversary, it depicts the prevailing Cold War mentality that consumes Washington. As US jealously guards its global dominance by reasserting its military influence to retain hegemony in the international system, AUKUS as a military pact brings adverse implications for the regional security architecture in the Indo-Pacific. It creates political and strategic divergences through alliance polarization, further aggravating the risks of a potential arms race and the proliferation of nuclear technology. The long history of the countless European wars, US – Japanese World War II rivalry, and Cold War indicate that a strong naval presence in maritime domain plays a crucial role in shaping the outcome of any conflict. The US recognizes that ensuring naval superiority in the Indo-Pacific ensures a strategic advantage in the case of a possible conflict with China. Through enhanced cooperation and interoperability among the three navies, AUKUS provides its member states with the ability to maneuver freely in the Indo-Pacific region.

Here, a crucial question remains: despite its deep economic interdependence with Beijing, why does Canberra choose to become a part of the US-led anti-China security arrangement? The imperative behind this decision to join AUKUS are multifold. First, it considerably adds to the strategic value of Australia, which has so far possessed a limited ability to influence Indo-Pacific strategic affairs. It also enhances Canberra’s relevance within the US-led alliance system, even at the cost of severing ties with France when it scrapped its submarine deal with the latter. Further, in addition to its membership in the Quad, the security alliance with UK and US bolsters Australia’s status and influence in the region.  This makes Australia the seventh nation to operate a nuclear-powered submarine and only second, after the UK, to receive nuclear propulsion technology from the US. With the assistance of the other two states, Australia also aims to fill the potential gap in its subsurface capabilities. Australia’s ageing fleet of six Collins-class diesel-electric submarines has limited range and endurance, which undermines their ability to operate in distant waters.

In the wake of China’s growing naval power, Canberra feels the necessity to equip its navy with nuclear-powered submarines to effectively conduct sustained naval operations at longer distances. Because of their robust cruising ability and enhanced navigational speed, SSNs enable the Royal Australian Navy to effectively complement US naval operations in the Indian Ocean, South Pacific, and South China Sea. By remaining on patrol for longer durations, SSNs increase Australian Navy’s situational awareness and response time. Relatively advanced sensors and communication systems will further augment its ability to detect, track and engage Chinese vessels when required. Since these submarines will have vertical launch missile capabilities, more missiles can be deployed, making them more effective. In addition, being equipped with torpedoes and conventional land attack capable cruise missiles, SSNs not only influence the naval battlespace in the Indo-Pacific, but also shape outcomes on land. These aspects can support any imposed blockades on major sea lanes, thus hampering freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific region.

The recent debate on Japan possibly joining AUKUS hints towards the expansion of this security pact. Tokyo's prospective participation in AUKUS is being referred to as “Pillar Two” of the agreement, as it will not involve delivering nuclear-powered attack submarines to Japan at this stage and is confined to jointly developing quantum computing and technology in the cyber sphere, artificial intelligence, hypersonic systems, etc. Nevertheless, it still raises significant concerns in Beijing, who views these developments as “bloc-to-bloc confrontation”. The expansion of AUKUS could potentially turn this security arrangement into an “Asian NATO” that seeks to contain China from different sides. The US, UK, and Australia already cover the Pacific region and aim to strengthen their presence in the Indian Ocean, while Japan is capable of fortifying the East China Sea, raising further concerns for China’s strategic leadership. The expansion of AUKUS and Japan's inclusion in this arrangement adds a significant dimension to the materialization of the US; the Indo-Pacific strategy militarily contains China's expanding influence. Japan, being a technologically advanced country, can use its military capabilities to strengthen US influence in the region. With a closer proximity to critical maritime routes, Japan can enhance maritime surveillance in disputed areas, like the Senkaku Islands.

AUKUS exacerbates the risks for a potential arms race among major powers and politics that are fueled by bloc-thinking, thus having a direct impact on the region’s overall growth and prosperity. As the US-led alliance continues to unfold, other states in the sub-regions of the Indo-Pacific feel compelled to choose sides between the US and China. Lastly, the provision of nuclear propulsion technology to a non-nuclear weapon state undermines the spirit of the international non-proliferation regime. Given that US and the UK use highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear propulsion in submarines, experts worry that AUKUS may lead to the proliferation of fissile material that is necessary to produce nuclear weapons. Despite growing concerns over the risks of nuclear proliferation – due to the provision on nuclear submarine-related technologies to non-nuclear weapons states like Australia – AUKUS member states consistently signal a further expansion of this security arrangement that, in turn, can escalate into a regional arms race. It also leads to the possibility of the Quad following suit, in which India and Japan may also aspire to acquire nuclear submarine technology from the US. This possible scenario proves detrimental to the peculiar strategic environment in South Asia, as India continuously attempts to establish its strategic supremacy in the region. As a result, this can lead adversarial states to elevate their own military capabilities to ensure deterrence stability. Pakistan has already expressed concern over AUKUS, as it instigates a bloc-like mentality in the region. Therefore, despite the stated claims of AUKUS member states, this military alliance will have far-reaching adversarial implications for the security architecture in Indo-Pacific region.