Banning Nuclear Tests in South Asia

Global effort to put ban on nuclear tests remains one of the oldest yet the hardest fought item on so-called non-proliferation and disarmament agenda of nuclear-haves. This quest to ban is considered a step to eventually eliminate nuclear weapons. Enforcing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is like untying the Gordian Knot because even its strongest proponents firmly believe in deterrence power of nuclear weapons and sell CTBT half-measure in a hope that others will buy their idea “its good for us and bad for you.” The ideal and realist schools of thought have carried their perennial fight to view the development of nuclear weapons as either the cause of unending arms race or a lynchpin of mutual deterrence that rules out the possibility of direct military confrontation among adversaries. There is a third clever group that hides amongst the two, which is realist in essence but sells idealism as a placebo.These diametrically opposing camps appear to have found some common ground regarding the need for nuclear disarmament albeit differences on mutually agreeable mechanism to pursue it and consider putting a ban on nuclear testing a step towards chasing this wild goose, which is why there is considerable confusion whether pursuit of CTBT is a non-proliferation or disarmament measure. This view from the Pakistan-India subcontinent is an examination of CTBT in disarmament context. Indian Approach towards Nuclear Test BanThe quest for nuclear disarmament dates back to 1940s. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru proposed the idea of standstill agreement on nuclear testing in 1954. While this novel proposal helped India acquire a higher moral ground, the country steadily carried out preparations for its first nuclear explosion in 1974 that irreversibly changed the strategic environment in its neighborhood, especially with Pakistan. Once India tested its first nuclear device in 1974, its tremors were felt globally, shaped the non-proliferation regime and the quest for disarmament. The nuclear-haves of global north – especially the U.S – were aware that India was harboring ambitions to revise global and regional order through possession of the most potent weapon of all times but looked the other way because it suited their design to build a regionally barrier to contain China’s rise. They masked this core interest by initiating a set of non-proliferation half-measures that would allow them to maintain monopoly over nuclear weapons and constrain the States at the bottom of food chain in maximizing their security. The non-proliferation regime selectively chose who to target and who to let go once it suited their short-term and long-term interests. Half Hearted Efforts towards Nuclear Test BanNew arrangements to prevent horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons were explored. As a safeguard against these measures and in order to retain the option of further testing, India blocked consensus towards disarmament in Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament arguing that the nuclear weapons States bounded by the Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should commit in a fixed time-line for giving up nuclear weapons. This spanner in global non-proliferation wheel has allowed New Delhi sufficient time and rationale to vertically proliferate and the West finds it a useful measure to counterweight China in the region. By linking its position to the stance of other major powers, India thus secured the opportunity to develop nuclear deterrent capability that was to provide it with a decisive advantage vis-à-vis its relatively weaker neighbor–Pakistan. The pursuit to enforce CTBT should be seen in above geopolitical context. After the U.S. had conducted more than a thousand tests to validate different weapon designs, the Treaty was opened for signatures in 1996. Unlike the Partial Test Ban Treaty or the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the comprehensive treaty prohibits nuclear tests in all spheres including the atmosphere, earth’s surface, underwater and underground. Since then, 183 States have signed the treaty and 164 have ratified it. However, for the treaty to enter into force, Annex 2 States – which include those forty-four countries that formally participated in the 1996 session of the CD and possessed nuclear power or research reactors at the time – must ratify the CTBT. Of these forty-four Annex 2 States, eight countries have not signed or ratified CTBT. These include the U.S., China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, India, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Pakistan. Given perceived security interests and diverging nuclear ambitions, these States continue to point fingers at each other for not being politically sincere towards treaty’s entry into force.Pakistan’s Position on CTBTPakistan’s position on the issue of test ban is driven by multiple factors. It's third war with India in 1971 over Kashmir and Indian nuclear test of 1974 intensified Pakistan’s security dilemma, and forced it to develop a nuclear deterrent but Pakistan did not test nuclear weapons till India forced its hand in 1998 by a series of tests, which included a thermo-nuclear device. Pakistan’s choice to develop nuclear weapons was not voluntary, or driven by an ambition to change global order. Likewise, Islamabad determines its engagement with the multilateral arms control and disarmament initiatives by its security paradigm and the threat that it faces from India. Interestingly, despite undiminished threat from India, Pakistan has always espoused and supported disarmament ideal in an uncomplicated approach.During the negotiations on CTBT in 1996, Islamabad supported the treaty in principle and voted in favor. However, India’s opposition to the treaty forced it to look at the matter differently. Despite declaring unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, India refuses to adopt any legal obligations in this regard. It is worth recalling that Pakistan’s Foreign Affairs Advisor recently renewed country’s proposal for simultaneous adherence to CTBT with India. This proposal of converting their respective unilateral moratorium into bilateral arrangement on non-testing of nuclear weapons is reflective of positive intent towards promoting restraint in South Asia.However, India still does not support the treaty and resolves to retain the option of nuclear testing, as stated in 2009 by the then Indian foreign minister. Two leading explanations for playing this double-game are New Delhi’s need to test a thermonuclear device and test other weapon designs that it would need for the massive triad of nuclear forces that it is building. As per some recent reports, the country has enough fissile material to make nuclear weapons within 480 and 2600 range. This would make it world’s third largest nuclear-armed State, while retaining the unenviable title of sporting the largest conventional forces in the third world. Unfortunately, the weight of such unchecked ambition is brought to bear only on Pakistan, as most of other nuclear-armed States do not see Indian nuclear weapons as a threat to their interests – at least not yet. India’s current nuclear posture follows an aggressive trajectory whereby the production of advanced weaponry directly affects the strategic stability in South Asia. India’s plans to produce newer type of delivery systems—including submarine-launched ballistic and cruise missiles, inter-continental ballistic missiles, multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles — necessitate testing for validation of different warhead designs for these different and diverse delivery means.India has also not been committing to provide any legal guarantees on non-testing to any of its nuclear suppliers. It must be realized that the discriminatory approach that gives India access to global nuclear market indirectly strains the prospects for nuclear test ban treaty in Asia. In the recently held CTBT Science & Technology 2017 Conference, many participants emphasized that the bigger interests of non-proliferation and disarmament be given priority over respective strategic objectives. It was also argued that as India aspires to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), it must at minimum commit to sign and ratify the CTBT. This suggests that disarmament and non-proliferation machinery should bark up the right tree to create conditions suitable for disarmament and its half measures.In conclusion, New Delhi holds the entire non-proliferation and disarmament architecture hostage to its ambitious designs. While the CTBT is seen as one of the most widely supported treaties, its future in Asia remains bleak owing to one State’s unwillingness to exercise restraint. Pakistan has done what it can to influence Indian behavior, the rest of the world should do what it must. In the Subcontinent, the way forward is to raise the level of mutual trust between Pakistan and India to an extent where the two sides may develop a bilateral mechanism to address their outstanding disputes and build regional stability. Pakistan’s proposed strategic restraint regime that has been gathering dust on Indian table since 1998 merits a fresh reconsideration.