Dr. Shoaib Khan about South Asia and India-Russia cooperation in the region

Respondent: Dr. Shoaib Khan. Visiting Faculty, Centre for Central Eurasian Studies, University of Mumbai; Founder and President, ALFAAZ Education and Cultural Society, Mumbai.

Interviewer: Dr. Liudmila A. Pechishcheva. Associate professor, Senior Researcher at Institute of China and Contemporary Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

 

Source: Unsplash   

Liudmila A. Pechishcheva: Dear Dr. Shoaib Khan! I appreciate your interest in my questions on a live issue related to South Asia in the global geopolitical landscape as well as India-Russia cooperation in this region. Moreover, I would like to thank you for your time. What are South Asia’s role and place both in today’s global and regional order?

 

Dr. Khan: The world is passing through a crossroad, as the multipolarity in the world order is now a distinctive possibility in the 21st century. In that emergence, the center of global economic gravity is seemingly moving toward the Asia Pacific zone. The USA, the sole superpower in the present order, is increasingly facing challenges from China, Russia and other rising powers like Brazil, the EU and India.

The success of the EU as an economic and political experiment will determine its role in the future context. Analysts have observed a place for South Asia as a unit in the 21^st century global order but with a number of persisting problems like poverty, overpopulation, corruption and red tapes, poor quality of education, disruptive political discourse, weak democratic governance, and indiscipline, religious and ethnic tensions that impede their future progress. At the same time, it has been analyzed on the immense potential for South with their growing economies, demographics, persity, diasporas, IT knowledge, and dynamism.

Due to its economic prosperity and geopolitical location, South Asia remains linchpin for global powers for a long period, whether it is pre-cold war period or during cold war or post-cold war, countries like India, Pakistan and Bangladesh got independence entered into the international era that totally changed the internal politics of South Asia. Moreover, competition for securing national security between states creates the situation of war and peace. Therefore, states with different capabilities set up the situation of asymmetric balance of power.

In South Asia, India is the largest economic and military power. However, under the shadow of China, Pakistan has been challenging Indian security in the region. The US had also been tried to use Pakistan for its presence in the region and India to contain China’s power, resulted in new great game in the area. On the other hand, China looks South Asia as an economic corridor for its trade relations not only to South Asia but also with South East Asia and West Asia. In this way, South Asia suffers from internal conflicts as well as the misadventure of external powers that needs comprehensive framework of regional security.

The now-weakened Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) had safeguarded, at some level, sovereignty and independent foreign policy in South Asia during the Cold War. It also calmed tensions between the erstwhile superpowers and helped prevent World War 3. Despite its many shortcomings, NAM gave marginalised nations a collective identity and voice without having to align with any power blocs. South Asia is now on the threshold of a new cold war between China, the United States, and their respective allies, putting pressure on countries to choose sides, threatening the harmony and stability of the region.

Several South Asian nations are grappling with political upheaval and economic turmoil. Political instability has been more common in the region, from Afghanistan to Sri Lanka, the Malpes, and most recently, Bangladesh. Like in the Cold War era, overthrowing unfriendly governments and installing puppet leaders has become a strategic instrument for powerful nations to shape regional politics and safeguard their interests. In the post-Cold War period, the dynamics of regime change have evolved to include more covert and sophisticated tactics. These tactics often involve several direct and indirect methods, including cyber warfare, economic sanctions and disinformation campaigns to achieve the desired outcome.

Rapid changes have taken place in the structure of the global economy, and experts have looked at how South Asia can take advantage of these changes. There have been arguments  that the developing global economy will be more complex than originally thought, that instead of a bipolar model with two countries, the US and China, at the centre, it will be multipolar with eight centres of economic activity, including India.

Analysts have suggested that in the context of such a model, there should be regional cooperation between India and its immediate neighbouring countries for South Asia to advance as an economic region. They argued that South Asia will need to look at its history, and that changes in attitudes, particularly in Pakistan and India, are necessary. The possible benefits to the region, in terms of increases in the rates of economic growth if the regional approach is about to be adopted.  

The world is undergoing significant geopolitical transformations, shifting from a unipolar order dominated by the United States to a multipolar system where emerging powers like China, India, and Brazil are reshaping global politics. At the same time, globalization is facing setbacks, nationalism is on the rise, and countries are redefining their identities based on civilizational and cultural narratives. These developments have significant implications for South Asia, where regional stability is influenced by global power shifts, economic realignments, and security concerns. The return of Donald Trump as the President of the United States in 2025 has further added uncertainty to international relations, with his America First approach affecting traditional alliances and global trade policies.

To navigate this evolving environment, South Asian nations must adopt a balanced approach—engaging with major global powers while preserving their strategic autonomy. Strengthening regional cooperation, investing in economic resilience, and addressing common challenges such as climate change will be crucial in ensuring stability and prosperity in the years ahead. As the world moves towards an era of geopolitical realignment, the choices made by South Asian leaders today will determine the region’s future trajectory.

 

Liudmila A. Pechishcheva: what do you think about Russia’s position in South Asia?

Dr. Khan: The end of the cold war and the disintegration of the USSR destroyed the whole fabric of post-war security arrangements on the periphery of the USSR in Europe as well as in Asia. Russia, steeped in the legacy of the former Soviet Union, by inertia continued to regard itself as the post-cold war incarnation of the USSR, especially in repairing and re-forging its relations with the West and its immediate European neighbours, but in the initial period failed to identify its national interests in the vast Central and South Asian regions.

The shrinking of the strategic space, the emergence of several fledgling buffer states incapable of reliably separating it from the frontiers of the Muslim world, and the withdrawal of Russian troops to several thousand kilometres north of the turbulent borders in Central Asia did not add to Russia’s national security. On the contrary, they presented new challenges and triggered a realignment of forces, both local and foreign, in the region and in its immediate neighbourhood.

Today South Asia is perhaps one of the most challenging regions for Russia. From the point of view not only of security in its traditional meaning but also of Russia’s prospects of emerging as an economic power able to act as a bridge between the developed ‘North’ and the developing ‘South’ in such a way as to assure its vital economic security interests in the emerging world order. The most notable point about South Asia is that it has been free from interstate wars for over a quarter of a century. Apocalyptic predictions of a fourth Pakistan-India war, over Kashmir, quickly escalating into a nuclear exchange, have been belied. The two countries have not taken their disputes and differences to the battlefield since December 1971.

A proxy war in Kashmir has, of course, gone on for about 10 years because the insurgency there is backed by a constant supply of arms and infiltration of trained militants across the border, but the military stand-off is generally limited to sporadic exchanges of fire across the Line of Control. A positive element of great importance is the readiness of India and Pakistan to continue their dialogue to patch up their relations, which have been strained ever since Partition in 1947, although with periodic interruptions resulting from domestic political developments.

Forced by the unprecedented isolation from the West, Russia has embarked on a course of outreach to the global South. South Asia is a region where Moscow has been a dormant player for a long time, showing little interest in developing ties with regional partners beyond India. However, this is now changing as South Asia is being reconsidered as a junction of Russian geostrategic and economic interests, so Moscow’s growing involvement in India’s immediate neighbourhood requires further examination.

Bangladesh has twice supported the United Nations (UN) resolutions condemning Russian actions in Ukraine and has been meticulous in following the Western sanctions against Russia. Nepal has denounced Moscow’s ‘special military operation’ and has approved most of the UN resolutions against Russia. Kathmandu was also forced to stop issuing labour permits to its citizens for Russia and Ukraine following reports of Nepali soldiers serving in both warring armies. Sri Lanka, albeit facing the dramatic impact of the war in Ukraine on its economy, has refused to take any sides. Pakistan’s approach to the conflict has been most controversial as compared to other regional states. Islamabad has consistently abstained on the issue at the global level in attempt to follow ‘strict neutrality’, but the Pakistani Army reportedly supplied ammunition to Ukraine.

While Russia has faced varying responses to its war in Ukraine throughout South Asia, it has recently stepped up its presence in the region, as evidenced from official visits and efforts to revive economic ties. An obscure part of Russia’s regional policy is its relationship with Pakistan, which has been moving forward against all odds. Despite the political imbroglio in Islamabad and Pakistan’s military support to Ukraine, the bilateral dialogue has survived intact and has recently seen high-level talks on strategic stability in Moscow. A visit to Islamabad by the Russian Federation Council’s the upper house of parliament delegation, which, apart from meetings with Pakistan’s Senate and caretaker government representatives, acted as international observers at the country’s general elections.

In an interesting turn of events, Russia is now marketing itself as a shield for fragile democracies of the region against external criticism. While Bangladesh and Pakistan’s Western partners express reservations about their elections, Moscow hails the electoral processes in these countries. This stance seemingly pursues two objectives: first is to debunk external interference and drive a wedge between a criticized country and the West, and second is to secure the backing of the region in the future elections in Russia.

Complex and dynamic intra- and inter-regional interactions have shaped Soviet, and post-Soviet Russia's calculation of strategic objectives in the geographical space occupied by Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan. It was examined that the concatenation of three developments in the 21st century that have introduced strategic ambiguities in Moscow's South Asia policy a protracted and inchoate US-China global power transition, a Russia-China alliance, and a globally resurgent Russia. Unmoored from the certainties of Cold War geopolitics, Russian objectives are not reducible to a structural logic: strategic hedging explains Moscow's simultaneous attempt to safeguard the special and privileged relationship with India while carving out space for meaningful ties with Pakistan. Russia's engagement with Islamabad stems from dual objectives to blunt the effects of India's drift into the US orbit and to preserve and strengthen pathways for influence in Afghanistan.

In the current scenario for instance, despite India’s intentions of building an enduring partnership with the US, the country remains sensitive and vigilant towards any lack of certainty and predictability in Washington’s geopolitical maneuvers, thus continuing to cater to its relationship with Moscow. Similarly, Russia is at present acting in the need of the hour by building bridges with all the major players in South Asia, thinking ahead and seeking rapprochement in order to establish itself as a leading regional power. Kremlin is aware that juggling with multiple balls cannot hold forever, hence, it is prepared to drop one when is the right time. Russia’s decade-long cordial relationship with India is projected to remain unaltered in the face of those alliances, and Moscow and Delhi will continue to put their mutual interests first.

 

Liudmila A. Pechishcheva: what are the key aspects of today’s India-Russia cooperation in South Asia?

Dr. Khan: India’s message to the international community is reminiscent of 2009, when Indian leadership participated in the BRICS meeting and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Ekaterinburg, Russia, for the first time, shortly after the Indo-United States (US) civil nuclear agreement was signed in 2008. By reaffirming its commitment this year, India also placed the onus on Russian leadership, with 2025 slated to be the year of a reciprocal visit from Russia's President, Vladimir Putin. Although the scope of future proposals is still unknown, the early announcements about Putin’s upcoming visit, in stark contrast to the unexpected trip of Narendra Modi, may indicate that the Russian side is preparing well in advance for the meeting.

India’s commitment to its traditional ties with Russia remains resilient and not prone to sudden shifts. However, it also brought to light the challenges that need to be addressed in the coming years. Many of these, particularly in the military and political spheres, are speculative. In areas like trade and investment, despite record performances, both countries will require structural reforms. To further strengthen their ties, India and Russia have to address these challenges swiftly and effectively in 2025. However, success will hinge on shifts in Russia’s approach to the West, as well as the stability of India’s positioning.

Russia appears to have finally reverted to the Soviet policy of assigning a central place to India in its South Asia policy. A commonality of broad geo–political interests between India and Russia has contributed to further cementing of ties. It may be said by way of conclusion that considerations of global balance of power largely determine Russia’s policy towards India. Faced with the increasing pressure of the US–led Western military–political bloc, Moscow has adopted a twin policy of avoiding confrontation and seeking accommodation with the former, but at the same time, moving closer to India and China to counter–balance it.

India and Russia have a common interest in maintaining their respective strategic autonomy and contributing to the emergence of a polycentric or multipolar world.  Both India and Russia occupy important geo–political location. India in South Asia astride the Indian Ocean and on the cross–junction of important trade and communications routes that link important regions inhabited by vast multitudes of humanity, and Russia in the huge Eurasian land mass from Europe to the Far East and from the Arctic circle to the Caspian and Black Sea regions.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the power and reach of Moscow have declined, but Russia still contains immense energy and other natural resources, and its scientific potential and resources cannot be ignored. A compatibility of basic geo–political interests bind India and Russia together. However, in the post–Cold War world politics, Indo–Russian friendship is not exclusive, nor does it need to be so.

Due to its geographical location and close nexus with the Islamic elements and drugs and arms traffickers, Pakistan seems important to Russia in the context of maintaining peace and stability in the volatile region of Central Asia, Afghanistan, and the Caucasus on the sensitive southern underbelly of the country.

It is not easy to predict what course the future developments in the region are likely to take. One can envisage two different scenarios. One, all the major players in the region–both state and non–state actors–pursue cooperative geo–politics in the interest of peace and development. In that case, Pakistan can be an important link in a system of important trade and transport routes and gas and oil pipelines running across Central Asia to the Arabian Sea ports and onwards to the large Indian market. However, in case the region continues to be rocked by religious extremism, attempts at new map–making and cross–border terrorism–connived at and supported by Pakistan–Russia, the Central Asian Countries.

The evolving partnership between Russia and India can also be highly beneficial for both countries. While Russia’s strategic engagements in Southeast Asia are mostly concentrated in Vietnam, Myanmar, and Laos, India’s broader reach can complement the scope of their partnership. In addition, Russia’s continuous presence in the region will also provide India with more friendly powers in the geographic space. Furthermore, while Russia has been reluctant to inpidually enhance its presence in Southeast Asia amid the escalating Sino-U.S. power competition, a collective engagement between Russia and India will seem less controversial, and this will allow them to focus more on other levels of engagement in the economic, political, health, and defense spheres beyond the China-U.S. dynamics.

 

Интервью с индийским экспертом доктором Шоаибом Ханом (Dr. Shoaib Khan) подготовлено для Секции исследований Южной Азии Института Китая и современной Азии РАН.