The recent impasses in the UNSC is another proof for the shakiness of attempts to build a centralized powerful institution`for conflict prevention. In other words, Security Council keeps failing to act in the sense of common good, it fails even in bargaining. My concern here is to show that a reform of the UNSC wouldn't make any difference, in fact, that it is not a desirable option at all.

I begin with an assupmtion that the type of delegation in the UN in general and in the SC in particular inevitably leads to acting in terms of national interest; proceed with an argument that changes in voting mechanisms do not change power patterns in international organizations. I finally suggest that the SC should look beyond traditional issues of peace enforcement or humanitarian interventions.

Delegation of power

The term 'representative' suggest that there is a principal-agent relationship. It does not matter whether delegates to the SC really represent their people's preferences or the ones of the small elites, but the fact is that a nation expect its own delegate to act as its leader would act. It does not follow that nations cannot find common ground and that one big power should always reject the position of another. They can instead converge on some non-conflictual issue or on any other as a result of bargaining. In the consequence it does not matter how power is shared, who is a veto player and what procedures are if men and women in the UN have strongly defined 'constituencies', so to speak.

Voting mechanisms

If we agree that the 'inflation' of the SC is not a viable option, then we should consider alternatives for how voting power is shared across members. First, voting can proceed according to the consensus principle. If so, impasses seem very likely. Second, any sort of majority voting increases the likelihood of manipulation of voting process. In fact, rent-seeking leaders of least developed states - if they happen to be in the SC - can be easily 'bribed' by powerful nations (i.a., promises of investment or threats of withdrawing investment and capital).

Good news is that big players can be outvoted. Bad news is that if the veto right would belong only to a tandem of the President and Secretary General, it may rather lead to a more fierce quest for power. Besides, if we look further into the future the UN in general will increasingly face legitimacy problems. The proposals the UN should end up in the two-chamber parlament will raise a question of direct representation. It is not at all clear how global elections could possibly be organized since there is a number of states which are suspicious of electoral mechanisms.

A more viable option might be an 'outreach' to NGOs and civil society but, again, authoritarian governments are very suspicious of 'civil societarianism'.

Beyond war and peace

Notwithstanding impasses and gridlocks in the UNSC, failures in conflict prevention are not necessary a 'red card' for the Council. It is a very onerous task to prevent or intervene in intra-state conflicts. Even if we live in a 'post-national constellation', states preserve the monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Even if the UN forces cannot freely intervene, the international community can provide resources for post-war reconstruction, for education programms for the poorest or whatever may be of importance for a sustainable peace-building process.

The Security Council emerged at the time when states were considered the only actors in international politics. So were the term 'security' reduced to the possibility of military agression from outside. Nowadays, security refers to ecology (climate change, desertification etc.), energy, food and water provision as well. The UNSC is well-advised to take a firmer stance on these issues, to be a General Assembly 'with teeth' since peace and security depend not only on weapons and malign intentions of terrorists.

The discussion above does not suggest that the United Nations and the Security Council are not important. Nor does it call into question the usefulness of these institutions.  The UN are, without any doubt, the main agenda-setter in international politics. And since power is also attached to discourses according to which we think and act the activities of the General Assembly and diverse UN institutions are of paramount importance.

My argument was merely that it will not change much, if anything, for conflict prevention, if we change the institutional design of the Security Council since the states would operate in terms of national interests and weaker states would be susceptible to influence of more powerful. Moreover, despite interdependence, the world growing together and diminished steering capacity of states the monopoly on the legitimate use of force of the latter is not seriously contested.