Syria’s Changing Tide: The Collapse of the Assad Regime and the Emergence of a Sunni Revolutionary Regime

Among all the Arab states affected by the waves of the Arab Spring, Syria stands out as the most Arab state where the struggle for power among domestic groups has escalated into a regional and international conflict. It is in this context that the regionalization and/or internationalization of a domestic struggle, as demonstrated by Christopher Phillips, has transformed Syria into a relentless conflict in which no side has been able to gain the upper hand. As the tide shifted toward one bloc, Phillips illustrated that the opposing bloc was willing to allocate more resources to prevent its domestic ally from being annihilated.

At least until 2016, the time of Christopher Phillips' publication of his book, this is what indeed happened in Syria. Taking advantage of the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia and the United States saw the moment as ripe to get rid of the Bashar regime in Syria – the main ally of Iran in the region. Qatar and Turkey initially strived to find a compromise with the Bashar regime. Nevertheless, after failing to persuade Bashar al-Assad to enter into a process of political negotiations with the opposition, Turkey and Qatar sided with Saudi Arabia and adopted a hawkish regime-change policy in Syria. Iran and Hezbollah, on the other hand, perceiving that the Syrian armed forces lacked the manpower and resources necessary to eliminate the insurgency, started to send Shia fighters from Lebanon, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and even from Iran, along with advisers and military equipment, to sustain the Bashar regime

What started as domestic protests evolved, due to geopolitical interests, into a proxy war in Syria. And in the Arab world, Arab identity and the struggle for narrative to legitimize the policy of states and non-state actors is fundamental. It is evident that the elites in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar relied on their Sunni identity and launched a massive propaganda campaign to mobilize the majority of the Syrians, who are Sunni, against the Shia-Alawite-controlled regime in Syria. Aware of its minority status in Syria and the region, the Bashar regime leaned toward its decades-old  moral justification and narrative  of his and his father’s rule – struggling against imperialism, Zionism, and now against their Sunni jihadist puppets.

When it comes to Israel, although it has perceived Iran, the main ally of the Bashar regime, as an existential threat, it saw both opportunities and risks for the toppling of the Bashar regime in Syria. After all, with all the rhetoric of resistance, Al-Assad has yet provided Israel with calm borders since the Disengagement Agreement between Israel and Syria, and ever since, Hafez and his son never broke any real Israeli red lines.

The refusal of the Obama administration to provide large military strikes against the Syrian armed forces, the significant assistance given by Al-Assad's regional allies, and the problems of coordination between Saudi Arabia and the UAE on one hand, and Turkey and Qatar on the other, allowed the Bashar regime, although struggling, able to survive. But it was the coming of Russia that completely changed the Syrian, and partially the regional, configurations. The Russians did not forget or forgive the American betrayal in Libya, where what started as a humanitarian operation ended in regime change. Likewise, the Russian elites were skeptical about any violent attempts to overthrow regimes, as they saw similar events in Eastern Europe, where the newly established regimes turned those states into Western allies—in Russia' s backyard. Furthermore, since the Soviet Union, Russia has had special relations with Syria and established military bases there. All these elements made Russia skeptical about the current events in Syria, perceiving that the West was once again striving to implement a revisionist policy in the region to gain more influence at the expense of Russia.

The Russian intervention changed the power configurations in Syria. Seeing the Russians coming, the UAE changed its priorities and strove to roll back the Sunni Islamist gains in Syria, which, along with Russia, it viewed as the main root of terrorism in Syria and the region. Turkey, aware that the assistance provided by Iran and its Shia militias to the Bashar regime, coupled with the Russian intervention and the increasing influence of the Kurds in Syria—with all its security implications on Turkey's territorial integrity—led to a détente with Iran and Russia in Syria in 2016, known as the Astana Process.

The Astana Process revealed two fundamental conclusions: first, the survival of the Syrian regime was guaranteed, and second, the limited influence of the Arab states in Syria. Notably, no Arab state, not even Saudi Arabia, participated in the deal—despite the Arab identity of the Syrian state and the tens of billions of dollars that some Arab states had spent during the ongoing five years of struggle.

Nevertheless, although Turkey accepted the survival of the Bashar regime in Syria to address the increasing Kurdish influence, it managed to become the main and unchallenged patron of the Syrian rebels/opposition—primarily the Syrian National Army and Sunni Islamist organizations controlling Idlib, a Syrian territory sharing borders with Turkey. Meanwhile, Iran and Hezbollah gained unprecedented freedom of action in Syria. Due to the weakening of the Syrian authorities caused by the civil war, Iran succeeded in establishing its own proxies in Syria, directly controlled by Tehran. Likewise, Hezbollah gained unprecedented autonomy in Syria, operating independently of the Syrian authorities.

From the Astana Process to the spillover effect of the Hamas-Israel War

Israel, perceiving the growing influence of Iran and its proxies in Syria and relying on the United States as a deterrent against any Iranian retaliation, began launching multiple airstrikes on Iranian forces and their proxies in Syria to limit their influence in Syrian territory. Likewise, the United States implemented the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 to cripple the already devastated Syrian economy. And through their assistance to the Syrian Democratic Forces—a U.S. client and Kurdish-led organization—they gained control over northeastern Syrian provinces, where the majority of Syria's natural resources are located, depriving the Syrian authorities of much-needed oil, gas revenues, and wheat.

The UAE, followed by Saudi Arabia, strived to make a rapprochement with the Bashar regime in the hope that the latter would decrease Iranian influence in the two-thirds of Syrian territory under his control. Turkey, on the other hand, with its unparalleled land military power—at least in the region—and through its Syrian National Army client, launched three military operations to downgrade the Kurdish growing influence in Syria.

The Hamas-Israel war provided an opportunity for the Arab states to roll back Iranian influence in Syria. Watching Israel deliver a devastating blow to Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iranian proxies in Syria, Iran was forced to reduce its presence in Syria to limit its losses, which, at least for a short period of time, allowed the Bashar regime to gain more maneuvering room in his territory. The Arab states, particularly the UAE, sought to capitalize on this situation by first warning the Bashar regime not to intervene in the regional conflict—first between Hamas and Israel, and then between Israel and Iran and its proxies. Simultaneously, the United States and the UAE offered the Bashar regime a deal to reduce Iranian influence in Syria in exchange for lifting US sanctions.

 It is in this vein that the relations between Iran and its Bashar regime ally started to significantly deteriorate. Indeed, the Iranians were furious, and some of the Iranian elites perceived that the Bashar regime in Syria was leaning toward the Arab states, as they promised him their readiness to provide billions of dollars for Syria's post-war reconstruction in exchange for distancing Syria from Iran. Likewise, the Iranians were extremely angered, as they perceived that the Syrian authorities did little to protect the Iranians and their allies from the Israeli airstrikes in Syria.

The AKP of Turkey sought to find a compromise with the Bashar regime, as the former began to feel threatened by its economic deterioration and the growing issue of Syrian immigrants in Turkey, which its political opposition took advantage of to criticize the AKP party. Indeed, Erdogan sought to make a détente with the Bashar regime in order to bring back the Syrian refugees, while the Syrian authorities abstained from any negotiations unless the Turks left Syrian territory. Likewise, Turkey was getting tired of the Kurdish influence in Syria and its spillover effect on the Kurdish question in Turkey, which led the Turkish authorities to perceive the Syrian rebels/opposition as strong partners in rolling back Kurdish influence in Syria, especially since the Bashar regime did little to address the Kurdish influence in Syrian territory.

Last but not least, while the Bashar regime has spared its armed forces from major blows by Israel, as it stayed on the sidelines in the ongoing confrontation in the region, it failed to seize the opportunity to enhance its image in Arab public opinion, which could be a major obstacle for any rapid, significant attacks by the Syrian rebels/opposition against his regime.

Indeed, the timing of the Syrian rebels/opposition offensive said everything. Waiting for Hezbollah to finish its war with Israel, the Syrian rebels/opposition, unable to launch a simultaneous offensive with Israel against Hezbollah and Iran in Syria (as it would make them perceived in Syria and in the Arab world as Israeli puppets), chose not to let either Hezbollah or Iran rehabilitate. Thus, on the same day of the Hezbollah-Israel ceasefire on 27 November 2024, the Syrian rebels/opposition launched Operation Dawn of Freedom and began their military offensive against the Syrian Arab Armed Forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces. The window of opportunity that opened for the Syrian rebels, due to Turkey's anger, the Israeli military operations that had devastated Iranian and Hezbollah influence in Syria, and the window of vulnerability presented by the incoming US elected president, Trump, who could make the Bashar regime more willing to strike a deal with him (which could further enhance its position both in Syria and in the region), led the rebels/opposition to act as soon as possible to reap the most significant gains.

 The fall of Damascus and the Rise of a Sunni Revolutionary Regime in Syria

What will happen in Syria and its implications for the region is indeed an extremely complex question. One thing is for certain: both the behaviors of critical regional states influence events in Syria, and at the same time, the events within Syria influence regional configurations.

Turkey is the only clear winner of the current events in Syria—at least if the new regime in Syria does not disintegrate and Syria does not fall into another civil war, as happened in Libya. Indeed, Turkey, under the AKP, is the only regional state that shares ideological affinities with the current Syrian regime and has the extreme ability to penetrate the Syrian regime’s decision-making due to their tense past cooperative interactions. Both have common interests in eliminating the Syrian Democratic Forces’ influence within Syria; both are skeptical of Israeli and Iranian behaviors within Syria and in the region. Likewise, Turkey and Qatar are the only gateway for the new Syrian regime to reach the United States, making Turkey has significant influence the new Syrian regime.

Iran is the main clear loser. Although they had grown tired of the Bashar regime in Syria, Iran not only lost its presence in Syria but the new regime now sees Iran as the main regional enemy. Syria shares borders with Iraq and Lebanon, the only two Arab states where Iran still holds considerable influence. This makes the new Syrian regime capable—if it stabilizes its internal politics and is willing—of causing significant trouble for Iran in those states. Furthermore, while Iran claims it is trying to negotiate with the new regime, it is doubtful that these negotiations will lead to anything due to ideological differences, and especially since good relations with Iran would likely provide liabilities rather than assets for the current new regime position both within Syria and in the region.

Israel, while perceiving that the fall of Damascus into the hands of rebels and the rise of a Sunni revolutionary regime in Syria would do little to alter its security perception, the rapid military gains of the Syrian rebels and the growing threat from Iran—despite its decreasing capabilities, could only made Israel unable and unwilling to the save the Bashar regime. Indeed, The Iran has shown twice that it is willing to strike Israel directly, even though the Jewish state is under the U.S. security umbrella. As a result, Israel, while not trying to stop the rebels' advances, became more willing to take advantage of the Syrian internal political situation to enhance its security vis-à-vis Syria and even in the region. The Jewish state completely conquered the Golan Heights, launched 480 strikes against Syrian military capabilities to completely destroy Syrian military arsenals, and even attempt now to divide Syria into Kurdish, Alawite, and even Druze mini-states, which they would turn as natural allies for Israel in the region. Last but not least, the success of the Syrian rebels/opposition in toppling Bashar has undoubtedly emboldened Arab opposition movements in other Arab states which its regimes have stable relations with Israel . For instance, Reports claim that Israel is concerned about the potential risks to the Jordanian regime.

The  Arab elites are in a similar position to Israel. They are relieved by the major blow that Iran suffered in Syria, but at the same time, they remain skeptical of the new regime. Especially the UAE and Egypt—and to a lesser degree Saudi Arabia—they perceive the new Sunni regime in Syria as an existential threat to their domestic rule. Indeed, the new regime is a Sunni Islamic revolutionary one, and for the majority of Arab elites, such a regime is still perceived as a radical Islamist entity that could destabilize the Arab states. The success of the Syrian rebels/Islamists has started to be projected as a success story—despite the many failures—of the Arab Spring. This could embolden opposition movements, especially the dormant but still existing Sunni political Islam forces in Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.

The new Syrian regime has started, since it launched its offensive and before capturing the capital, to project itself as the main Syrian force, claiming it has no links to any other Arab or Islamist movements and is solely concerned with toppling the Bashar regime. Likewise, the Islamist regime has started to portray itself as modern, democratic, and open, claiming that it distances itself from the ideology of al-Qaeda and its transborder objectives. The new Syrian regime also seeks to present itself as a solution to the EU’s refugee crisis by inviting Syrian refugees to return to Syria, avoiding any public tensions with Israel—despite Israel’s occupation of Syrian territory—in part due to its current weakness, and to enhance its image in Washington, as Syria still under the U.S. sanctions and its defacto leader still under the list of terrorism . Furthermore, the new regime projects itself as the savior of Sunni Arabs from the Shia Persians and their affiliates in Syria. Nevertheless, how the new regime will deal with the Kurdish question, whether it can maintain internal stability, and how it will behave toward Israel, the Arab states, and Iran is still to be seen.