Stuck in Mid-Sentence: The Middle East at the Start of the 21st Century’s Second Quarter

The year 2025 was quite a strange period for the Middle East. Depending on who undertakes to describe it, it can be called the year of shuttered hopes or new aspirations, appeasement or wars, triumph and defeat. It was also a year when everything changed, just as it can be argued that nothing changed in 2025.

One thing is certain, though. While major developments unfolding in the Middle East have been sending shockwaves across the region and the world, none of them signalled the advent of something new or put an end to earlier processes. In fact, not a single process can be viewed as finished, meaning that the region ended the year as if it was stuck mid-sentence.

Mid-sentence is also an appropriate description of how 2026 started for the Middle East.

As we are writing these lines in early January, the Middle East remains in the state of permanent turmoil and the events are unfolding at such a rapid pace that it would be impossible to go beyond exploring the key emerging trends in terms of striking a new balance in regional affairs and outlining the possible avenues for future changes.

These changes are expected to revolve around four main knots, specifically, the Israeli-Iranian, Syrian, Palestinian and Yemeni knots.

It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way—in short, the period was so far like the present period, that some of its noisiest authorities insisted on its being received, for good or for evil, in the superlative degree of comparison only.

Charles Dikkens. A Tale of Two Cities

The year 2025 was quite a strange period for the Middle East. Depending on who undertakes to describe it, it can be called the year of shuttered hopes or new aspirations, appeasement or wars, triumph and defeat. It was also a year when everything changed, just as it can be argued that nothing changed in 2025.

One thing is certain, though. While major developments unfolding in the Middle East have been sending shockwaves across the region and the world, none of them signalled the advent of something new or put an end to earlier processes. In fact, not a single process can be viewed as finished, meaning that the region ended the year as if it was stuck mid-sentence.

Mid-sentence is also an appropriate description of how 2026 started for the Middle East.

As we are writing these lines in early January, the Middle East remains in the state of permanent turmoil and the events are unfolding at such a rapid pace that it would be impossible to go beyond exploring the key emerging trends in terms of striking a new balance in regional affairs and outlining the possible avenues for future changes.

These changes are expected to revolve around four main knots, specifically, the Israeli-Iranian, Syrian, Palestinian and Yemeni knots.

Rostam¹, David, and Uncle Sam

The so-called Twelve-Day War was probably one of the strangest events of the past year. Three countries took part in this military conflict, each of them claiming a major victory after the confrontation, and, even more surprisingly, each of them having a point. Of course, it could be argued just as well that all three countries suffered a crushing defeat.

Rostam

Perseverance in the face of adversity is a sign of courage; an easy life is the lot of those who cannot withstand trials.
Mohammad-Taqi Bahar (1886–1951)

During the conflict, Tehran demonstrated its ability to confront and stand up to a more powerful and technologically-sophisticated adversary, as well as its advanced administrative and political institutionalisation, since the killing of some of its senior government officials did not affect or undermine the system as a whole. By the same token, Iran showed its ability to respond to military strikes and to spring back once the hostilities came to an end. The fact that Arab countries took a neutral position during the conflict can be credited to Iran’s policy to promote normalisation in Gulf affairs in recent years.

At the same time, this war also exposed several major challenges, primarily on the domestic front.

People may have had the natural instinct to coalesce around the current government during the hostilities, but this did nothing to bridge the deep divides in the Iranian society.

Three main tracks shape these divides.

First and foremost, there is the old conflict of values between traditional social forces and those advocating a more modern outlook. It was this confrontation that plunged the Iranian monarchy into a crisis and paved the way for the Islamic Revolution. This lingering divide within Iranian society – a phenomenon not unique to Iran – render any political system vulnerable, but it cannot be considered fatal in itself. The strategy adopted by the country’s government in the summer and autumn to combine repression with liberal initiatives, on the one hand, and attempts to rely on a nationalist platform for consolidating the society, on the other hand, demonstrate the commitment to easing tension.

The problem is that this customary social divide in Iran has coincided with economic inequality.

In recent years, the country has faced severe economic hardship, driven largely by the sanctions regime. High inflation and rising poverty have coincided with the consolidation of economic control by actors linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, amid widespread corruption. Not only did these factors had a direct bearing on the quality of life of Iranians, but they also affected the state’s ability to meet the basic needs of its people in terms of water and power supply. In addition, this has also undermined the country’s self-defence capabilities. Taken together, all this led to the erosion of trust towards the government. People may have been willing to come together and support their political leaders during the military escalation, but this spirit largely evaporated in just six months, with the mass protests in December 2025 and January 2026 demonstrating how dire the situation has become.

Ethnic and religious factors have also played a role in escalating tension during these protests. Minorities account for a large share of the Iranian society, while demographic processes as well as mass migration have made the social fabric even more complex and intricate in recent years. Isolated protest movements broke out in parts of the country dominated by ethnic minorities in the summer and autumn of 2025. The same regions found themselves at the centre of the protest wave that evolved into a national phenomenon at the end of 2025 and the beginning of 2026.

The Iranian leadership was keen to exploit the fact that these protests benefited from external support coming from not only the opposition-leaning Iranian diaspora, but also the Islamic Republic’s sworn enemies. This offered the Iranian regime an opportunity to justify the crack-down on rioters and consolidate its loyal base.

However, all the externalities aside, these social divides created a situation which required the Iranian government to take systemic action. This effort should probably start with economic policy.

Even after the protests subside, external pressure on the Iranian government is unlikely to diminish, with further escalation remaining a distinct possibility. In terms of foreign affairs and external relations, the war demonstrated that Iran has failed to keep pace with its adversaries on the technology front. Coupled with the urgent need to improve the economic situation in the country, the imperative to catch up with its rivals is likely to serve as an incentive for the Islamic Republic to forge closer ties in defence, science and technology with its partner countries, primarily Russia and China.

The future of Iran’s nuclear programme remains in jeopardy. There are reasons to question the effectiveness of the policy by the United States and Israel to use military pressure for forcing Iran to give up on its nuclear ambitions. That said, no matter what new strategy Tehran comes up with to resume the programme or whether it cancels it, this will create greater risks. This, in turn, also demonstrates the need for Iran to build stronger relations with its partners.

Finally, Tehran lost some of its regional influence and has now fewer foreign policy levers at its disposal following what must be recognised as quite effective, at least in the short-term, Israeli strikes against Iran’s regional allies, including Hezbollah and Hamas, along with the creation of an anti-Iranian political regime in Syria. At the same time, in keeping with its guiding principle, known as the Velâyat-e Faqih concept, the Iranian state feels compelled to support Shia communities. It remains to be seen how its limited capabilities affect the state’s religious and ideological imperatives.

David

 …A man can be weaker than a fly and stronger than steel…
…Wisdom and second thoughts are two things that always come too late...
Sholem Aleichem (1859–1916)

Israel demonstrated its supremacy in military affairs and technology in its bid to assume the role of a regional military hegemon, as demonstrated not only by the way it attacked Iran or carried out strikes against Hamas leaders in Qatar, but also by the military campaigns in 2025 against several other Arab countries, including Lebanon and Syria.

However, several factors cast a shadow over this victorious narrative.

In fact, Israel failed to achieve any of its political objectives during the war in June 2025, despite its extensive bombing campaign against Iran. Instead of crumbling, the political regime in Tehran became more consolidated, while the destruction of the nuclear programme’s infrastructure does not appear to be fatal. Moreover, by the end of 2025 it became clear that Tehran was recovering its military capabilities much faster than expected, while the fact that Israel and the US have been so outspoken about welcoming the anti-government protests enabled the Iranian leadership to employ the usual narrative by saying that these movements were caused by external factors.

The war has also exposed what already seemed obvious – time is on Iran’s side in a situation of military conflict. Israel lacks strategic depth and is extremely sensitive when it comes to human casualties amid a complex social and political environment within the country. All this makes Israel ill-equipped for engaging in protracted conflicts against powerful adversaries. Its once-legendary defence infrastructure failed to ensure effective security, resulting in civilian casualties, including in Tel Aviv.

Finally, the war showed that Israel lacked the capability to put an end to this conflict on its own. Considering the Arab neutrality, the resilience of the Iranian political regime and the time factor, the US felt compelled to intervene, which demonstrated Israel’s dependence on its American allies on critical matters.

The fact that Israel’s traditional European allies have been increasingly vocal in voicing their criticism made Israel’s dependence on the United States even more apparent. Having fought a war in Gaza with all its civilian casualties, Israel embarked on a new military campaign, which has greatly undermined its image of a victim, especially in the eyes of young Europeans.

Taken together, all these circumstances demonstrate the need to revise Israel’s foreign policy strategy and the serious challenges the country will have to deal with moving forward.

Uncle Sam

Anyway, I keep picturing all these little kids playing some game in this big field of rye and all... And I’m standing on the edge of some crazy cliff. What I have to do, I have to catch everybody if they start to go over the cliff…
Jerome David Salinger (1919–2010)

Donald Trump claimed that the United States demonstrated its excellent combat readiness, valour and responsibility to all its partners in the region. America’s involvement in the Middle East proves yet again that the White House remains a key actor there despite all the speculation about leaving the region to its devices. Nevertheless, just as with other actors, many things remain unclear.

The US intervention has failed to bring about lasting peace. The rumoured preparations by the United States and Israel to carrying out new attacks against Iran, and the lack of any permanent agreements all point to the fact that the current state of affairs is transitory, which puts into question the so-called transactional diplomacy and its potential.

The United States has been consistent in backing its allies, including Israel and – to a lesser extent – certain Arab countries, but this commitment has been increasingly at odds with its declared intention to scale back the American presence in the Middle East.

As for the Iranian and Israeli strikes on Qatar, these incidents demonstrated that the decades-old strategy of the Gulf’s Arab monarchies to outsource their security proved to be unreliable. In this regard, this is not a matter of technology or politics. It can be posited that both factors will serve as an impetus for GCC countries to forge closer ties with alternative actors in military technology and military policy matters, while also seeking to reinforce regional security institutions. It seems that this could put the United States in a somewhat challenging situation.

Syria: Can a house divided against itself stand?

Even if the old roots have dried up and the leaves have scattered, the tree must stand.
Hanna Mina (1924–2018)

In last year’s Middle East report of the Valdai Club², we tried to sum up the challenges the new Syrian leadership faced by dividing them into four large groups: institutions, administration and territory, ideology, and foreign policy. In other words, to address these challenges, the country had to reinforce its governance framework, reshape the way the central government interacted with the periphery by taking into consideration the interests of the local elites, having state-minded leaders take over the Islamic romantics within the government, while also enhancing the regime’s international legitimacy.

A year passed. Many things happened over the past 12 months in and around the country without causing any meaningful changes, however. The political regime which is currently in power in Damascus controls only part of the country’s territory and there are serious doubts about whether it will hold.

The new Syrian regime decided not to hold direct parliamentary elections and opted for appointing to senior government positions people who are loyal to the political leader, including, quite often, family members³. There are shadow cardinals running state agencies based on their personal ties and connections instead of formal procedures. The country lacks a sound development programme and wants to centralise its administrative and territorial structure as much as possible, and the list goes on. All this demonstrates that this regime has decided to follow in its predecessor’s footsteps. On the one hand, this places it on what can be described as an institutional path to restoring old governance practices in a new environment. On the other hand, new elites are eager to secure their positions, which has a direct and immediate bearing on their policies. It is not that the previous regime was not prone to these practices, but the new leaders tend to rely on personal connections and loyalists while rejecting any attempts to offer a more inclusive political framework.

Compared to the previous regime, there are two major differences.

First, the current government cannot rely on party structures which used to cement the political space under al-Assad. There is nothing to replace the Ba’ath Party structures in Syria.

Second, the new government’s religious identity and the fact that they represent a specific regional political tradition, as well as the power-sharing formula along ethno-sectarian lines, also known as the al-ta’iffya concept, and the escalation of ethnic and religious conflicts in recent years – all this has been compelling various groups, including the Druze and Alawites, to pursue deeper political institutionalisation.

Having to cope with its weakness at home and the uncertainty regarding the future, Damascus finds itself naturally inclined to consolidate its grip on the country, primarily by relying on external support. Ahmed al-Sharaa has been travelling the world talking about a multi-pronged foreign policy and building relations with all the interested countries other than Iran. He has been advocating the Turkish concept of zero problems with the neighbours, even if its effectiveness is not obvious, at least judging by Turkey’s own experience. Still, all this demonstrates the kind of strategy the new Syrian regime has chosen for itself.

And the results it achieved have been quite ambiguous too.

The meeting with Donald Trump in Saudi Arabia can be interpreted as a diplomatic victory. During it, the President of the United States said that he was lifting the sanctions on Syria. This was followed by the visit of the Syrian leader to Washington, as well as an effort to build a positive working relationship with Moscow. Damascus could benefit from it by strengthening its national security, ensuring that Israel switches to a less assertive policy towards Syria, while retaining Ankara’s and Doha’s support, as well as keeping Riyadh and Abu Dhabi interested. This, of course, assumes the Kurdish issue is resolved.

However, there is still too much flux in all these instances, while regional powers seem to lack a consensus on what the future holds for Syria.

Turkey has invested more than any other country in enabling the current government to come to power. Kurds are its key concern. In the meantime, Ankara views any efforts to improve the economic situation in Syria and prop up Damascus through the lens of its national interests. In fact, this means that an ideal model for a new Syria would be the old Syrian regime, but without Ba’ath or al-Assad and with a moderate Islamist government willing to forge friendly ties with Ankara and Doha and capable of pressuring Israel.

Of course, Israel has a totally opposite vision. A Syria united under the Islamist rule and supported by Qatar and Turkey poses a direct threat. Hence Israel’s policy to support any separatist and self-governance movements in Syria. By the same token, Israel seeks to expand its buffer zone along the border by gradually taking over new territory, especially considering that this expansionist policy fulfils the religious and ideological aspirations of the Israeli far right.

The interests of the UAE partially coincide with Israel’s agenda. Abu Dhabi has been competing against Qatar for regional leadership and has a tradition of firmly opposing any Islamist forces. The fact that many members of al-Assad’s elite have found refuge in the Emirates can also indicate Adu Dhabi’s proactive involvement in Syrian affairs.

Riyadh’s position has yet to crystalise, though. It used to treat Doha as its utmost rival but has recently brought its relations with Qatar back to normal, while focusing on rivalling Abu Dhabi. Saudi Arabia also acted as a mediator between Damascus and Washington, which suggests that the kingdom has been quite positive about the new Syrian government.

This leaves Turkey and Israel with their contradicting policies towards Syria. Looking ahead, this could make this divide even more important than the Israeli-Iranian confrontation and pave the way for the emergence of two alliances with Turkey and Qatar on the one side, and Israel and, even if to a lesser extent, the UAE, on the other. In fact, the same patterns have been crystalising in other regional contexts for quite some time now.

Extra-regional actors, primarily the United States and Russia, can play a bigger role in this context.

In keeping with Donald Trump’s logic, the United States is not really interested in following any specific strategy in Syria. It is more willing to cater to the interests of its main allies in the region by building capital though transactional diplomacy. That said, both emerging coalitions include Washington’s allies, but it may well be that the White House views this as an opportunity rather than a challenge.

As for Russia, its relevance in the context of this multilateral confrontation stems from its ability to act as a possible mediator whose presence could prevent a possible escalation.

There are three factors which could have a decisive effect on how the situation in and around Syria unfolds.

The country’s domestic politics is the primary factor. Will the current government be able to stay in power? What kind of ideology will it follow? How can it engage with its allies, those with coinciding interests and adversaries, as well as alternative centres of power? The answers to all these questions will largely depend on internal, primarily personal factors, rather than external developments.

In this regard, whether Damascus can achieve any progress in its relations with the Kurds is expected to play an important role. Significant progress has been achieved in this regard in January 2026. The ceasefire in Aleppo; the expansion of territory under Damascus’s control – including the Tabqa Dam, the El Omar oil field, and the Conoco gas field; the alignment of tribal authorities in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor with the government; and, crucially, the official recognition of Kurdish rights and language – all made a resolution of the Kurdish issue appear increasingly likely.

Signed in January 2026 in Aleppo, the ceasefire agreement can be viewed as the first step in this direction, although it remains to be seen whether the reconciliation process will continue.

The future of the emerging regional alliances will depend on the relations between their participants in other contexts rather than in relation to Syria. After all, the extent to which these stakeholders are interested in Syria vary, and there are no formal commitments. Therefore, the set-up may evolve over time, at least for the Gulf monarchies.

Iran has so far stayed outside of these developments. It has scaled back its presence in the Middle East while retaining a support base and the potential to restore its standing.

Gaza: An illusion of a future

On this land, is what makes life worth living: on this land is the lady of the land, the mother of beginnings and ending. She was named Palestine. Still named Palestine.
Mahmoud Darwish (1941–2008)

The contradictions related to the Gaza Strip and Palestine in general are set to retain defining role in shaping the region’s future.

Two years into the war in Gaza, on October 13, 2025, Sharm El-Sheikh served as a venue of the so-called peace summit. Designed to end the war in Gaza, it was a solemn occasion for presenting lengthy and eloquent statements praising the authors of a peace plan. However, the document itself and the fact that it was adopted left a dual impression.

The fact that the United States had to weigh in for ending the war in Gaza, just as it happened with the 12-Day War, demonstrated that Israel’s foreign policy suffered from a structural deficiency. Of course, ending a war is always harder than starting it, while Israel lacks the capability it needs to deliver on its Peace Through Strength vision. Only defeating the enemy or destroying it can offer a pathway to a unilateral peace. But if the resources are not there, which is the case, what is needed is compromise. The problem is that that this is not part of the Peace Through Strength formula.

Against this backdrop, the Israeli establishment is considering two main options for its future strategy.

Followed by Netanyahu, the first strategy provides for keeping the Israeli society mobilised and ready to resolve the main regional issues by force for achieving lasting solutions. Of course, this implies that the United States is ready to support its Israeli ally at all times.

The main problem with this strategy is that the clock is ticking for Netanyahu at least in three ways. This is true for the United States, since the pro-Israeli consensus in Washington is gradually weakening, while the need to remain involved in carrying out military operations in the Middle East accelerates this process. There is also the regional dimension. Any military escalation is like a two-way road, offering Israel’s opponents an opportunity to learn to counter it. Social and political affairs constitute the third dimension, since people inevitably get tired of living in a state of permanent military mobilisation.

But there are also more radical groups in the Israeli government, primarily those led by Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich. As far as we can see, they view the ceasefire as a step towards taking over Gaza and then replacing Palestinians with Jews. Moral aspects and international law aside, this approach could lead to more mass violence not only in Gaza or the West Bank, but also in Israel, and could also give rise to more anti-Semitism around the world.

So far, Israel’s inability to come up with a single foreign policy vision has not prevented it from asserting its position. The effort to annex the West Bank continued after the deal was announced. Apart from ensuring the return of hostages, it helped distract the international community from what was happening in Gaza by focusing on other topics. Israel also expanded its military presence in Gaza. In terms of the West Bank, Israel sought to legalise the news settlements and expand old ones, including within the E1 corridor, which de facto separates East Jerusalem from the West Bank. As for the military presence in Gaza, Israel has used the ceasefire as a cover for building new military outposts and gradually moving the so-called yellow line.

At the same time, the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit and UN Security Council Resolution 2803 can be viewed not only as a final act in a two-year drama and Netanyahu’s exit strategy, but also as an attempt to devise a strategy for a future settlement. If this is the case, many aspects of this issue become moot.

This is the case for the Board of Peace. It is designed to be chaired by no other than Donald Trump. Its structure, which, in addition to the Board itself, includes an Executive Board and a Gaza Executive Board, appears inherently complex, and the principles for forming each of these elements are unclear. There is a strong case for questioning whether creating an external administration structure of this kind for a territory which is not a colony or even disputed territory is appropriate. It can be regarded as yet another blow to international law, which has been on life support even before it all happened. From a purely political perspective, what makes the situation even worse is the lack of clarity regarding the Board’s mandate as well as the actual mechanisms for fulfilling it. How can a “Palestinian technocratic, apolitical committee”⁴ be formed and who will be part of it as per Resolution 2803 with its mission to provide for the responsible operation of Gaza’s public services? How will it interact with the Board of Peace, which is expected to oversee this committee? How will this committee relate to the Palestinian Authority? These questions need answers. In the worst-case scenario for the Palestinians, it will consist of de facto placing their adversary in control of their government. The very existence and international recognition of this structure would offer Israel a free hand for acting in Gaza as it pleases. As a result, the effort to expel Palestinians from Gaza may continue, which would lead to the emergence of new radical resistance structures.

Resolution 2803 also provides for establishing an International Stabilisation Force (ISF).This initiative is also rife with issues and ambiguity. It is obvious that Israel has little, if any, interest in having the IDF transfer its control over Gaza to this structure, as set forth in Trump’s 20-point plan. This is why Israel will seek to put this process on the back burner. However, just as with the Board of Peace overseeing the administrative structures, the framework and mechanisms for establishing and operating the ISF have yet to be defined. In this regard, the meeting on December 16, 2025 of the countries willing to be part of this effort failed to provide any clarity. Moreover, if the ISF ends up being created, the all-too-likely failure to recognise Palestine’s political agency as part of the Board of Peace and its affiliated bodies would mean that the states that join this force can be viewed as running a colonial regime.

Diplomat Viktor Smirnov⁵ noted that prioritising tactics over strategy has been the hallmark of the negotiating process over the past 30 years. Parties to the conflict and international mediators were willing to engage in endless discussions on secondary matters, even if these efforts did bear some fruit, and create new structures. This created an illusion of a constant effort but without even trying to tackle the key challenges, let alone achieve a settlement. However, it must be acknowledged that despite all the inefficiencies baked into the Oslo-Washington process, it has succeeded in preventing any major escalation of this conflict for more than a quarter of a century.

In the media, Trump’s supporters presented his plan as a brilliant deal, casting the President of the United States as an effective dealmaker. Transactional diplomacy serves as an antithesis to conventional diplomacy, mired as the latter is in red tape and its propensity to engage in endless processes instead of achieving results. However, there will be no deal if Trump’s plan materialises. On the contrary, it will pave the way for creating new institutions for settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and these structures will be just as removed from the possibility to bring about a final solution as their predecessors.

Therefore, Donald Trump’s commitment to cut the Gordian knot of international bureaucracy could end up tying a similar knot of contention, even if it takes shape in a new environment, according to new rules and without the Palestinians.

The fact that the Palestinians could be left in the cold will have a major bearing on the peace process. The need to bring the Palestinian political forces together, empower them and ensure that people trust them, while also creating effective mechanisms for working not only with the international community, but also with their own people – all these matters remain on the agenda. However, they are unlikely to come to fruition.

About two years have passed since the Palestinian political organisations held meetings in Algiers, Moscow and Beijing, but little has changed over this period. There was an important decision to recognise the Palestine Liberation Organisation as the only entity with the right to represent Palestinians, but it failed to go beyond a declaration of principle. Even the press releases following these meetings suggested that the most radical groups, i.e., Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, were gradually strengthening their positions in the Palestinian camp. In keeping with their vision, these documents did not mention the 1967 borders or East Jerusalem. However, both organisations suffered substantial damage since that time, while Fatah failed to benefit from this situation by strengthening its positions on the ground. Scheduled to take place in May 2026, the 8th Fatah Conference is expected to elect a new Central Committee, which could help the movement reinforce its standing.

Neither Israel nor the United States have been willing to steer their foreign policy action in a way that would give Palestine more political agency, which makes the prospect of achieving unity among Palestinians quite blurry.

Just as with the two other entanglements as reviewed above, Jordan and Egypt, as well as the Gulf monarchies can play a key role in promoting a settlement for Palestine. They are the only ones to possess the resources for offering Palestinians economic assistance, as well as political backing, coupled with the diplomatic resources to influence both the United States and Israel. Finally, they have more interest than any other actor in ensuring that the settlement process succeeds so that they can go on to build a new security framework for the region in a calm environment, and expand their economic ties with Israel without fearing any opposition from their own people who still tend to side with the Palestinians. Saudi Arabia’s action is probably affected the most by this possible public pressure. In this country, the elite has to deal with its own people and the Palestinians, while also maintaining dialogue with the United States and Israel. The fact that Riyadh has reinforced its positions in the south of the Arabian Peninsula could enable it to play a more active role on the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

Yemen: A not-so-happy Arabia

O my Fatherland! My voice is shattered by your grief. Once again you feed the orphans, giving them the malt of your love.
Abdullah al-Baradouni (1929–1999)

The situation in Yemen changed dramatically in late 2025.⁶ Regions controlled by the Sanaa Alliance the Sanaa Alliance (based on Ansar Allah and the General People’s Congress) and the north of the country have entered a period of relative calm by October, while the south faced a new round of escalation.

The existing disagreements between Saudi Arabia and the UAE within the Arab coalition and the internationally recognised government can easily create an irreversible divide, splitting the country in two not only de facto, but also de jure. This can also have ramifications across the region and affect other territories too.

As a matter of fact, there has never been any secret about the lack of unity within the internationally recognised government. The UAE views Al-Islah, a party close to the Muslim Brotherhood (banned in Russia) and treated by Saudi Arabia as its core constituency in the country, as an unacceptable partner. Since 2016 Abu Dhabi has been seeking to support political forces from southern Yemen. The Southern Transitional Council (STC) emerged as the main structure in terms of this agenda in 2017. In their public statements, both Abu Dhabi and Riyadh have always stressed that they were pursuing the same goals in Yemen and stressed that the internationally recognised government remained united. However, the deepening disagreement between the two main factions was an open secret. Signed in 2019 in Riyadh, the agreement offered STC a very slim presence in government. However, when the Presidential Leadership Council was established in 2022, pro-Saudi and pro-Emirati forces split the seats in two. Adopted in 2023, the Southern National Charter stipulated the commitment by south Yemen to achieve independence within the borders of the former PDRY,⁷ demonstrating that the split between the two factions within the government was fixed on paper. Control over the First Military Region, which covers Hadramawt and Mahara, has been a major asset for the pro-Saudi forces.

In early December, southern forces undertook a military campaign that resulted in STC taking over the main strongholds of Al-Islah across these territories. This enabled the STC to assert its military dominance across the former PDRY. On 16 December 2025, Al-Ayyam, a newspaper published in Aden, came out with the headline saying: “The Second Southern Republic begins in Hadramawt.”⁸

These developments offered several scenarios.

Those supporting the STC and its allies were seeking to expedite the secession of southern Yemen. This would have not only changed the existing borders within the region, setting an important precedent for Syria, as well as Iraq and Libya and several other countries, but also radically change the balance of power. With Israel’s recognition of Somaliland and having a political regime in southern Yemen⁹ loyal to the UAE and friendly to Israel would create a totally different environment in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait.

In another scenario, the internationally recognised government carried out a new campaign against the Sanaa Alliance as a prelude to the self-determination of the south, which would have frozen the southern issue for some time, while causing a new round of escalation in the north.

The option of offering the south a wider autonomy could create an opening for establishing a federation, once again raising the issue of federalism in the Middle East.

All these scenarios made the further fragmentation of the Yemeni political space possible. However, academic projections failed to keep up with reality, as usual.

In response to the STC’s triumph in expanding its territory, and unwilling to accept the new balance of power, the Saudi-led Arab coalition carried out strikes against two vessels sailing from the UAE to Al Mukalla in the early hours of December 30, 2025. Rashad al-Alimi, who heads the internationally recognised government, cancelled the joint defence agreement with the UAE and demanded that Abu Dhabi withdraws all its military forces and technical staff from the country. A counter-offensive followed shortly. Accused of high treason by the internationally recognised government, the STC leader, Aidarus al-Zoubaidi, fled the country to the UAE.

The STC’s delegation to Riyadh announced its dissolution on January 9. However, questions remain about the organisation’s future. A day later, Aden served as the venue for a joint meeting of the STC’s governing bodies, i.e., the National Assembly, the Consultation Council and the General Secretariat. In their outcome declaration, they denied and refuted the dissolution and promised that the STC and all its structures would continue to work, while accusing Saudi Arabia of forcing the southern delegation to make the statement, violating its declared neutrality and encouraging the Muslim Brotherhood (banned in Russia). Finally, they reaffirmed al-Zoubaidi’s leadership and the STC’s ultimate mission to restore the sovereignty of southern Yemen.¹⁰

Of course, this is a developing story, and many things can happen while this report travels from the authors’ desks to the printer. However, we can already draw some conclusions from these developments.

No matter how the situation unfolds and what turn it takes, the declaration to disband the STC does not mean that the south Yemeni political project has run its course. The idea of restoring statehood remains popular in the country’s south. People there are used to bearing arms and have a lot of combat experience, as well as the ability to create political organisations. Accordingly, it is highly likely that new structures for promoting the so-called southern project would emerge.

The effort to reinforce the pro-Saudi forces in southern Yemen must be based on securing the loyalty of local governments. This requires time, as well as administrative and human resources, which could be in short supply. Of course, this would also require a system-wide effort to reintegrate the STC military structures into the armed forces controlled by the internationally recognised government. In the future, this could enable it to consolidate its forces for launching a new offensive against Sanaa, even if this scenario remains hypothetical.

In addition to this, the UAE is not prepared to directly confront Saudi Arabia – this much is clear. However, this does not mean that the two monarchies have overcome their contradictions and are no longer competing against one another. There is still a conflict of interest between them in other regions too. The fact that al-Zoubaidi is in the UAE and the lingering support for his leadership in Aden suggest that Abu Dhabi may restore its positions there.

Finally, the balance of power within the internationally recognised government has also a major bearing on the situation in Yemen. Al-Islah was forced out of the Hadramawt regions it used to have under its control. This can also have surprising consequences as the Yemeni political space becomes increasingly fragmented, while al-Aslah tries to find new allies and recover.

These developments can influence international relations in the Middle East in three important ways.

First, they demonstrate the multi-faceted nature of the current conflicts. In fact, there is not a single confrontation which can be reduced to a simple binary opposition, for example, with Sanaa opposing Aden. The fact that so many parties are involved in these conflicts and their multi-tiered nature imply a variety of goals and objectives for their actors, as well as a wide range of criteria used to delineate various sides. Consequently, not a single of these conflicts can be resolved simply by having two sides reach a compromise on a given question. When one confrontation loses momentum, in this case between Sanaa and the internationally recognised government, this not only does not guarantee an overall de-escalation, but could even serve as an impetus for more conflict elsewhere.

In addition to this, the current situation in Yemen exposed the ambiguity of the relationship between external actors and those taking part in these conflicts on the ground. Describing the latter in Yemen (just as anywhere else) as someone’s proxies would be misleading and distort the overall understanding of the regional processes, placing it at odds with reality. In fact, local forces tend to act in their own interests and are not willing to sacrifice them for the sake of their external partners, as long as they can rely on a social base and follow the corresponding moral precepts. This is the case not only for the STC, which has been following its own strategy regardless of the UAE’s aspirations, but also all other local regional forces, including the Sanaa Alliance. It will fight for its interests regardless of what happens in Iran. The same logic can be easily applied at a higher level in terms of the way regional actors interact with global players.

Second, understanding the interplay between internalities and externalities has principled importance for understanding the current divides. The STC and its allies, or Al-Aslah, or the forces controlled by Rashad al-Alimi, may all be pursuing their own agendas. But in all cases, the steps they take will lead to a new balance of power between Saudi Arabia and the UAE in Yemen, which encourages even more rivalry. So far, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have been able to exercise restraint without openly confronting each other and even ruling out this possibility in their statements. This time, however, they were unable to avoid a clash, even if efforts to prevent further escalation succeeded. Overall, avoiding confrontation becomes increasingly challenging as external actors take sides in local conflicts.

The third and final factor is related to the prospect of changing the existing borders in the region. International observers have been talking about the demise of the Sykes-Picot framework since the start of the Syrian crisis. The conflict in Ukraine, the operation in Gaza, and Donald Trump’s initiatives regarding Greenland, the fact that several countries recognised Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara, and the recent recognition of Somaliland by Israel – all these developments helped gradually lift the taboo of the 20th centuries on changing state borders. In some cases, this is a matter of ensuring that international norms are consistent with reality, while in other cases it can be a matter of fulfilling national aspirations. Sometimes this can be part of an endless territorial and political fragmentation which places the emergence of new and effective governance systems out of reach. It is obvious that the probability of witnessing this process unfold in southern Yemen will remain high.

To sum up: Where does strength lie, brother?

All kinds of scenarios are possible for all the abovementioned knots of conflict. The most radical ones could reshape the regional political space to an extent that it falls apart. However, as long as these scenarios have at least a grain of reason in them, they are unable to bring about a quick resolution or give rise to a new sustainable system of relations in the foreseeable future.

In terms of international relations, there has been continuity between the processes which unfolded in 2025 and are continuing to this day, on the one hand, and earlier stages in regional development, on the other hand. The same knots of conflict define the regional landscape. The key actors remained unchanged, and the same goes for their foreign policy strategies.

So far, the shifts in the balance of power do not appear fatal in any of the abovementioned cases. This applies to Iran, whose international standing has weakened over the past year more than for other actors. The fact that it lost its Syrian ally and the fact that Hezbollah’s positions in Lebanon and other friendly forces in the region have been losing ground does not spell disaster for Iran. After all, all these actors still enjoy popular support. Asserting political agency is not new for them, and their identities share common aspects. The same can be said about the UAE. It lost ground in south Yemen and had to withdraw from Somali. However, Abu Dhabi has the potential to restore its positions, and local structures it used to rely on are still in place.

At the same time, the Gulf’s Arab monarchies continue playing an increasingly important role in regional affairs. Today, they have the most resources for ensuring their dominance, on the one hand, while on the other hand they are less vulnerable at home compared to their rivals. Of course, Saudi Arabia remains the most important actor, which is attributable to objective factors, including its geography, military and political capabilities, symbolic importance, etc. At the same time, Saudi Arabia must pay more attention to social and political risks in its foreign policy action compared to its neighbours.

On closer inspection, the situation in the Gulf is quite patchy. About a decade and a half ago, there was a notable sense of unity within the GCC with its members even seeking to deepen their integration. However, what happened in Bahrain and then the Qatar crisis showed that this unity was a far cry from reality. Judging by the contradictions that emerged in the relations between the Gulf monarchies on the Iranian issue since that time, they can be divided into two groups with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE taking a rather anti-Iranian position, while Qatar, Kuwait and Oman viewing Iran more favourably. The Qatar crisis has run its course, while Iran and Saudi Arabia have succeeded in overcoming the most urgent differences, with China’s mediation, even if deep mistrust between them persists. Their rapprochement did not come to a halt even in 2025. However, all these developments have not revived the sense of unity that the GCC countries once sought to nurture.

On the contrary, in addition to the ongoing tensions between Qatar and its neighbours, there is a growing rift between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. It seems that the effort to reinforce their respective political identities and promote nation building efforts draws the foreign policies of the Arab monarchies further apart. Three and a half decades ago, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq gave rise to a nation building movement in Kuwait. This traumatic experience in 1990 and 1991 defined the emirate’s special position on several matters in today’s world. The Qatar crisis reinforced the country’s national identity. Saudi Arabia’s development agenda (Vision 2030) and the plans of the UAE (until 2071) also demonstrate the commitment of these countries to implement national projects following their own unique visions.

The divide separating the Gulf monarchies is gradually widening. They have been competing against one another at the regional level. At the same time, there is a trend which may lead to the emergence of several regional axes, whose interests will manifest themselves in all the conflicts mentioned in this paper.

One such axis – the Turkey-Qatar axis – has been forming for ten years now. Another one – the Saudi-Egyptian axis – has existed for quite a long time, although it may have lost some of its momentum in recent years. The UAE-Israel axis represents the third, emerging one. There are several obstacles in this process, primarily, Israel’s policy which can make it a toxic asset for potential allies. Every axis has a GCC state at its core, on the one hand, while, on the other hand, includes a major power located along the edges of the Middle Eastern region. Countries are also complementary within their respective axes. And all of them lack an institutional framework.

Apart from these three axes, the Iranian axis – which has been losing momentum, but without breaking apart completely – must be taken into account when studying the regional landscape.

The interplay between these four axes when dealing with the abovementioned conflicts is expected to largely define the future of the region. That said, the Kurdish issue remains an important factor that deserves special attention. It has been part of the Syrian conflict and affects domestic policy in Turkey, Iraq and Iran with the potential of impacting the entire region.

Despite the media points scored by the United States, external actors play a secondary role within the Middle Eastern system of international relations. External actors, including the United States, Russia, and China, lack the required resources for undertaking consistent strategies in the region. Still, they can serve as catalysts for launching various processes without being able to define their substance. At the same time, the expansion of the list of these extra-regional actors appears significant. The conclusion of defence agreements between Saudi Arabia (and potentially Turkey) and Pakistan, on the one hand, and between the UAE and India, on the other, testifies both to the ongoing escalation in relations between the “fraternal” monarchies and to a potentially significant rapprochement between the Middle Eastern and South Asian subsystems.

Domestic and even social and political factors pertaining to countries within this region and the abovementioned conflicts, rather than international imperatives, shape the ongoing changes.

Iran’s regional role will primarily depend on whether its political system is effective and resilient in the face of challenges abroad and at home, while the country’s military and technology might play a secondary role.

Israel’s regional role is defined by the special nature of its society that has little appetite for a left-leaning political agenda, limiting the actual options to choosing between Netanyahu and ultra-radicals like Smotrich and Ben-Gvir.

The Gulf monarchies play a defining regional role. This is not due to their ability to use military force or the particular ambitions of their leaders. The objective nation-building processes taking place in the region have demonstrated the resilience of these states’ socio-political systems. Meanwhile small powers, fearful of large ones, perceive their medium-sized neighbours as more reliable partners.

Therefore, the answer to the well-known question from the iconic Russian film Brother 2 (2000) is easy: strength, brother, lies in the resilience of regimes and their ability to meet the demands of their own societies.

 

 

 

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¹ Legendary hero from the Shahnameh – Epic of Kings – epos, a paladin who confronts Turan and its ruler Afrasiab.
² Naumkin V., Kuznetsov V.. Syria: The Crossroad of Middle Eastern Uncertainty // Valdai Discussion Club Report. February 4,.2025. URL: https://valdaiclub.com/a/reports/syria-the-crossroad-of-middle-eastern-uncertainty/ 
³ Мамедов Р. Туман войны: новая элита Сирии в условиях снятия санкций // Russian International Affairs Council. December 26, 2025. URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/tuman-voyny-novaya-elita-sirii-v-usloviya...
⁴ Resolution 2803 (2025) adopted by the Security Council at its 10046th meeting, on 17 November 2025 // United Nations. November 17, 2025. URL: https://docs.un.org/en/s/res/2803(2025)
⁵ Смирнов В. 2025 год подошел к концу: с чем Ближний Восток вступает во вторую четверть XXI века? // Russian International Affairs Council. December 25, 2025. URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/2025-god-podoshel-k-kontsu-s-chem-blizhni...
⁶ The authors have the pleasure to thank Sergei Serebrov who shared his materials and advice for this section.
⁷ People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen.
⁸ // Al Ayyam. December 12, 2025. URL: https://www.alayyam.info/news/AG5JP3RP-UD2BXW-6082
⁹ Asmar А. Yemen slams STC remarks on Israel normalization // АА. February 4, 2021. URL: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/yemen-slams-stc-remarks-on-israel-normalization/2133775. In addition to this, much has been published over the past years about UAE’s efforts to work with Israel in Socotra. For more details, see https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/uae-yemen-somalia-circle-bases-control-gulf-of-aden.
¹⁰ // Stcaden. January 10, 2026. URL: https://stcaden.com/posts/32435

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Source: Valdai. Discussion club