What Will Follow Russia’s Exit from Moratorium on INF Deployment

In early August, an official statement from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs put an end to yet another potentially useful arms control instrument: the unilateral moratorium on the deployment of ground-based intermediate- and shorter-range missiles has been lifted. Why did this happen, and what comes next?

There are three groups of factors that contributed to the scrapping of the “moratorium”: the buildup of relevant U.S. capabilities and forward deployment of advanced missile systems; the involvement of more European and Asian countries in this arms race; and the state of Russian programs in this area—particularly since the leadership of Russia (and Belarus) clearly has a special affection for the weapon known as “Oreshnik.”

By the end of 2025, new rocket regiments and/or brigades with appropriate weapons are likely to be formed and then deployed (probably in limited numbers) with an eye to deterring threats from both the West and the East. In addition to the Oreshnik, these units may also be armed with ground-launched versions of Kalibr cruise missiles, Tsirkon hypersonic missiles and other innovations from Russia’s missile industry—considering that there has been enough time since 2019, when these efforts were officially announced, to bring various systems to mass-production readiness.

Accordingly, the Russian Armed Forces may soon receive new missile systems of the once “forgotten” intermediate- and shorter-range classes. These processes may involve not only the Strategic Rocket Forces (which will field the Oreshnik) but also rocket brigades of the Ground Forces and coastal units of the Navy (here the Zmeyevik anti-ship ballistic missile comes to mind). And in what would be a throwback to Cold War practices, the Aerospace Forces may be equipped with ground-launched long-range cruise missile systems.

It is already clear that the main problem on both Russia’s western and eastern borders will come from missile systems that are not only and not so much U.S.-made. Accordingly, the current situation cannot be compared to the Cold War for two reasons. First, the focus is now on conventional (non-nuclear) intermediate- and shorter-range missiles (although there is no doubt about the “dual” purpose of at least some Russian systems). Second, many more countries are seeking to acquire these missiles. What we are witnessing now has all the hallmarks of an arms race, both defensive and offensive.

Over time, we may see an INF Treaty 2.0 with a larger number of signatories and a more nuanced scope. But for now, we are witnessing a missile renaissance, accompanied by the incorporation of various disruptive technologies—from manufacturing to increasingly intelligent onboard guidance systems and robotization of the battlefield. Interestingly, the phenomenon known as the “drone revolution” evokes the Soviet-era terminology where cruise missiles were referred to as “airplane-munitions.”

Still, we should stress that Russia has shown remarkable restraint in this area, even though the special military operation offered credible and useful scenarios for employing such weapons. Now, once again, restraint is giving way to deterrence.

In early August, an official statement from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs put an end to yet another potentially useful arms control instrument: the unilateral moratorium on the deployment of ground-based intermediate- and shorter-range missiles has been lifted. Why did this happen, and what comes next?

The end of a long process

When the United States announced its withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) in 2019, Moscow’s response was quite restrained. President Vladimir Putin pledged that Russia would not place such systems in Europe or anywhere else unless U.S.-made weapons of this kind appeared there. Russia was essentially imposing voluntary restrictions on itself, but only regarding operational measures, while the development, testing and production of these systems were no longer limited. In October 2020, the initiative was expanded with a proposal for reciprocal verification measures to demonstrate that neither side had fielded the agreed missile systems.

It is unlikely that the Russian MFA, in announcing the end of the moratorium, was aiming to take a jab at Trump, but the facts speak for themselves: it was during his first term that the INF Treaty received a fatal blow. Both the Biden administration and the new Trump administration had every opportunity to show goodwill and respond to Russia’s moratorium proposal. Yet they chose not to.

The moratorium never came into full effect, even though that initiative had great potential for strengthening strategic stability. What we are witnessing now is a kind of “leveling of the playing field,” albeit somewhat belated. The Russian MFA laid out in detail the advances the U.S. made in developing and deploying intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. But the question remains why Moscow, while Washington was chalking up successes, did not respond symmetrically, at least by starting tests of a ground-launched version of the Kalibr cruise missile and the “intermediate-range ground-launched hypersonic missile” announced back in 2019.

There are three groups of factors that contributed to the scrapping of the “moratorium”: the buildup of relevant U.S. capabilities and forward deployment of advanced missile systems; the involvement of more European and Asian countries in this arms race; and the state of Russian programs in this area—particularly since the leadership of Russia (and Belarus) clearly has a special affection for the weapon known as “Oreshnik.”

The trends of recent years

Apparently, Moscow hoped to reach some kind of agreement, if not with Biden, then with Trump after his comeback to the White House, since the INF Treaty had been a useful accord, and the moratorium could have served as a building block for a new framework of European, Eurasian, and global security. However, the U.S. hinted at the possibility of substantive discussions on this issue only in early 2022—as they say, too little, too late.

Today, the U.S. continues to expand its capabilities and is practicing the forward deployment of new systems, and American allies have joined this process with much enthusiasm. At the same time, Russia and Belarus (along with North Korea, China and Iran) have formed their own views on the benefits of these missile systems—both in the context of deterrence (Pyongyang has been especially active in expanding such arsenals, while Beijing has historically focused on missiles of this class) and for combat scenarios. Their perspectives have also been shaped by the use of these missiles in ongoing conflicts, for example, between Israel and Iran.

Specific projects are being implemented by our potential adversaries as well. Beyond the U.S. systems cited in the MFA statement (Typhon, Dark Eagle and PrSM), there are European initiatives under the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA) program and intermediate- and shorter-range missiles that have already entered or will soon enter the arsenals of South Korea and Japan. Berlin intends to acquire U.S. Typhon launchers as a stopgap measure until ELSA is ready.

What will happen in Russia

By the end of 2025, new rocket regiments and/or brigades with appropriate weapons are likely to be formed and then deployed (probably in limited numbers) with an eye to deterring threats from both the West and the East. In addition to the Oreshnik, these units may also be armed with ground-launched versions of Kalibr cruise missiles, Tsirkon hypersonic missiles and other innovations from Russia’s missile industry—considering that there has been enough time since 2019, when these efforts were officially announced, to bring various systems to mass-production readiness.

Accordingly, the Russian Armed Forces may soon receive new missile systems of the once “forgotten” intermediate- and shorter-range classes. These processes may involve not only the Strategic Rocket Forces (which will field the Oreshnik) but also rocket brigades of the Ground Forces and coastal units of the Navy (here the Zmeyevik anti-ship ballistic missile comes to mind). And in what would be a throwback to Cold War practices, the Aerospace Forces may be equipped with ground-launched long-range cruise missile systems.

Moreover, it is conceivable that, in the course of their evolution, the Russian Airborne Forces may produce their own versions of the U.S. Army’s Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs). These units could be armed not only with strike systems of various ranges but also with their own “organic” means of air defense, electronic warfare, signals intelligence and other useful assets.

The associated organizational and staffing procedures may be marked by formal ceremonies, for example, the awarding of battle banners to newly formed rocket regiments or brigades. A deliberate link to the legacy of the Pioner and Relief operators of the 1980s should not be ruled out. The handover of the missile systems themselves may also take place with maximum media coverage, possibly including the military attaché corps. Glossy footage of test launches will be released, and the crews will definitely take part in various drills. The new missiles are unlikely to be ready in time for the Zapad–2025 strategic exercise; but, at least, their hypothetical presence on Belarusian territory is certainly built into the exercise scenarios.

It cannot be ruled out that the relevant authorities, primarily the defense and foreign ministries, may resume briefings showcasing some of the advanced missile systems and discussing their features.

As the capabilities of the national defense industry increase, organizational and staffing structures take shape, and combat control frameworks are refined—in the absence of a political and diplomatic settlement of the Ukraine crisis—intermediate- and shorter-range missiles of various types may well be used in the special military operation. Their mission is clear: overwhelming and destroying Ukrainian air and missile defenses and striking both infrastructure facilities and possibly mobile targets.

Is there an alternative?

It is already clear that the main problem on both Russia’s western and eastern borders will come from missile systems that are not only and not so much U.S.-made. Accordingly, the current situation cannot be compared to the Cold War for two reasons. First, the focus is now on conventional (non-nuclear) intermediate- and shorter-range missiles (although there is no doubt about the “dual” purpose of at least some Russian systems). Second, many more countries are seeking to acquire these missiles. What we are witnessing now has all the hallmarks of an arms race, both defensive and offensive.

There does not seem to be any “double-track decision” (expanding arsenals while negotiating disarmament) in sight — everyone is striving solely for qualitative and quantitative growth of their military capabilities. However, in the future, as the obstacles to such rearmament become clear and the risks of escalation mount, it is not inconceivable that efforts could be renewed—not necessarily for reduction, but at least for arms limitation and for steps to mitigate the risks of armed conflict.

Over time, we may see an INF Treaty 2.0 with a larger number of signatories and a more nuanced scope. But for now, we are witnessing a missile renaissance, accompanied by the incorporation of various disruptive technologies—from manufacturing to increasingly intelligent onboard guidance systems and robotization of the battlefield. Interestingly, the phenomenon known as the “drone revolution” evokes the Soviet-era terminology where cruise missiles were referred to as “airplane-munitions.”

An interim conclusion

The outlook seems bleak. We are at the early stage of a multilateral arms race in missile systems and missile defenses. International military and political relations are in deep crisis, and at this point, the vast majority of countries place the strengthening of their own military capabilities above anything else.

We will not speculate about which cities and countries may be threatened with new missiles, and the balance of power remains the same for now—individual missile systems of the U.S. or its allies change little in the grand scheme of things. Over time, however, new rocket units may be formed in all of our military districts, and they will be armed with ground-based cruise missiles, intermediate-range ballistic missiles and new hypersonic systems.

Still, we should stress that Russia has shown remarkable restraint in this area, even though the special military operation offered credible and useful scenarios for employing such weapons. Now, once again, restraint is giving way to deterrence.

First published in Russian in the Profile Magazine.