Russia Completes the Diplomatic Puzzle

The visit of Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to Russia once again raises questions about Moscow’s position regarding the conflict between Iran on one hand, and the United States and Israel on the other. The Iranian minister’s trip should come as no surprise. Russia is a major power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Moreover, Iran and Russia view each other as friendly states, a status formalized in the 2025 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty between Russia and Iran. While Russia is currently unlikely to exert direct influence on the outcome of the conflict, its political stance and practical actions nevertheless remain an important variable in the equation of yet another Middle East crisis.

Russia’s position clearly reflects a preference for a political settlement. Moscow’s ability to provide direct military support to Iran is limited—a reality that was evident well before the conflict began and is reflected in the 2025 Treaty: while it establishes a framework of friendly relations, it does not amount to a military alliance. At the same time, Russia maintains and develops relations with other Gulf countries. It is therefore in Moscow’s interest to avoid further conflict escalation between Iran and its neighbors. The region is so complex that it is virtually impossible to predict the consequences of wars there.

Thus, the best strategy is to promote a peaceful settlement, even if a military scenario may bring short-term gains.

It appears that in Tehran, Moscow’s position is perceived as favorable to Iranian interests. Iran has managed to withstand a powerful military offensive by the United States and Israel, which in itself is often regarded as a significant tactical victory. At the same time, Iran has also been able to secure a diplomatic situation that works to its advantage. The U.S. and Israel have found themselves without any meaningful support from other major players. European NATO allies have distanced themselves from participation in mine-clearing operations in the Strait of Hormuz and other activities. They are unlikely to see involvement in the conflict as justified, particularly given that the attack on Iran was not coordinated with them. U.S. partners in the region have also sustained considerable damage as a result of the conflict. Military actions have not strengthened their security; rather, they have weakened it. China is clearly opposed to military action. As is often the case, Beijing avoids escalation, but its position is evident—especially in light of its close economic ties with Iran. India is also unenthusiastic about the conflict, particularly given the large number of its citizens working in the region. Iran entered the conflict in diplomatic isolation, without military allies obliged to provide immediate assistance. However, the United States and Israel have also found themselves in a similar situation. Washington has many partners, but there is little sign of their active support. Russia’s position completes this complex diplomatic puzzle, and Minister Araghchi's visit to Russia reinforces it.

The visit of Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to Russia once again raises questions about Moscow’s position regarding the conflict between Iran on one hand, and the United States and Israel on the other. The Iranian minister’s trip should come as no surprise. Russia is a major power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Moreover, Iran and Russia view each other as friendly states, a status formalized in the 2025 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty between Russia and Iran. While Russia is currently unlikely to exert direct influence on the outcome of the conflict, its political stance and practical actions nevertheless remain an important variable in the equation of yet another Middle East crisis.

Russia’s view of the conflict is articulated in clear and unambiguous terms: the United States and Israel have committed an act of aggression against Iran; its consequences extend far beyond Iran and the Middle East; the conflict is fraught with numerous risks, including growing dangers of a humanitarian catastrophe and potential nuclear contamination in the event of damage to nuclear facilities. There is no military solution to the conflict—it requires sustained and careful diplomatic efforts. Naturally, Russia does support any economic restrictions against Iran. This follows directly from the 2025 Russia–Iran treaty and is consistent with Moscow’s longstanding position that any sanctions imposed outside the framework of the UN Security Council are unacceptable. The same applies to other hostile actions against Tehran, including a naval blockade.

At the same time, Russia’s position clearly reflects a preference for a political settlement. Moscow’s ability to provide direct military support to Iran is limited—a reality understood well before the conflict and reflected in the 2025 Treaty: while it establishes a framework of friendly relations, it does not amount to a military alliance. Moreover, Russia maintains and develops relations with other Gulf countries. It is therefore in Moscow’s interest to avoid further conflict escalation between Iran and its neighbors. The region is so complex that it is virtually impossible to predict the consequences of wars there.

Therefore, the optimal strategy is to promote a peaceful settlement, even if a military scenario may bring short-term gains. Such gains for Moscow do exist—higher oil prices and the diversion of attention from the conflict in Ukraine. However, Russia is also well aware that a temporary improvement in the oil market does not eliminate the need for structural reform of the Russian economy under Western sanctions pressure. It is equally clear that external conditions alone are insufficient for achieving its objectives in Ukraine. For this reason, Moscow is not fixated on short-term gains. What matters more is the principle of conflict resolution and the mitigation of its negative consequences. Among these potential consequences are a humanitarian crisis in Iran, a slowdown in the global economy due to excessive energy price increases followed by declining demand, risks of a financial crisis, stemming from disruptions to regional financial hubs, and threats to Russian businesses, which have significantly expanded their presence in the region in recent years.

It appears that in Tehran, Moscow’s position is perceived as favorable to Iranian interests. Iran has managed to withstand a powerful military offensive by the United States and Israel, which in itself is often regarded as a significant tactical victory. At the same time, Iran has also been able to secure a diplomatic situation that works to its advantage. The U.S. and Israel have found themselves without any meaningful support from other major players. European NATO allies have distanced themselves from participation in mine-clearing operations in the Strait of Hormuz and other activities. They are unlikely to see involvement in the conflict as justified, particularly given that the attack on Iran was not coordinated with them. U.S. partners in the region have also sustained considerable damage as a result of the conflict. Military actions have not strengthened their security; rather, they have weakened it. China is clearly opposed to military action. As is often the case, Beijing avoids escalation, but its position is evident—especially in light of its close economic ties with Iran. India is also unenthusiastic about the conflict, particularly given the large number of its citizens working in the region. Iran entered the conflict in diplomatic isolation, without military allies obliged to provide immediate assistance. However, the United States and Israel have also found themselves in a similar situation. Washington has many partners, but there is little sign of their active support. Russia’s position completes this complex diplomatic puzzle, and Minister Araghchi's visit to Russia reinforces it.

However, the situation remains extremely unstable and, above all, dangerous for Iran. Despite the relative weakness of the anti-Iran coalition, the United States retains ample opportunities to launch military strikes whenever it thinks best. It is true that Washington may be facing temporary resource constraints; the conflict has exposed certain shortcomings in the organization of its armed forces when confronting a major regional power—primarily, the need to expand its naval capabilities. Yet the United States remains largely beyond the reach of an effective Iranian response. It may require time to address these shortcomings, but it has that time. Nor can the U.S. be described as vulnerable to a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz: it has already become the world’s leading oil producer and, together with Canada and Mexico, continues to strengthen its position. A potential change in the Washington administration is also unlikely to solve the problem. Since 1979, the U.S. has remained a consistent adversary of the Islamic Republic, despite occasional shifts in in its policy. Washington may be ready to strike a deal with Iran today—but could just as easily withdraw from it if it deems it necessary or sees a favorable opportunity to crush Iran.

At the same time, the military strikes against Iran have revealed their limitations. For the first time in a long while, a large-scale U.S. military operation has failed to produce swift and decisive political results. Moreover, it has arguably worsened Washington’s strategic position. Prior to the conflict, its leverage rested significantly on the threat of force itself. While that threat still exists, its credibility has been called into question. It is likely that the limitations of military instruments will push Iran’s adversaries to rely more heavily on “hybrid warfare” tools, while also seeking ways to enhance the effectiveness of their military machine.

For Iran, a major challenge remains the search for a sustainable economic and national development model. The state has demonstrated its ability to withstand intense military pressure, but it is unlikely that a long-term development model can be built solely on crisis management measures. Tehran will seek to buy some time to take a pause to rebuild its economic potential. The limitations of Iran’s economic model were evident long before the conflict and may continue to pose risks in the future.

First published in Al Jazeera.