Russia-China Strategic Partnership Requires a New Level of Quality

In about a month, President Vladimir Putin is expected to visit China. In preparation for the trip, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov recently traveled to Beijing. The visit will take place in a year marking the 30th anniversary of the establishment of the strategic partnership and cooperation between the two countries, as well as the 25th anniversary of the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation. These milestones reflect how Russia–China relations have, over recent decades, evolved into a model for relations between major powers.

Commemorating past achievements is, of course, important. It is equally essential to look around and ahead. The current dynamic state of international relations reflects a struggle over a new world order—one that, as Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov recently and rightly put it, is “a fight for life and death.” It must be acknowledged that the evolutionary transition from a unipolar to a multipolar order has not taken place. Instead, a fragmented, uneven multipolarity has effectively emerged—without a corresponding system of order. Historically, struggles over the future structure of the world have led to global wars. In today’s conditions, given the factor of nuclear weapons, this struggle represents a functional equivalent of a world war.

Russia and China share many common views on the future of the world order. Leaders in Moscow and Beijing speak of a “strategic partnership without limits” and describe their relationship as “more than an alliance.” This is true: the relationship is indeed broader than a military alliance, yet it clearly does not amount to one. There are many reasons for this. It is important to take into account, in particular, that the two powers have different relationships with the United States and, especially, with European countries. For Russia, over the past year Europe has effectively replaced the United States as the primary military adversary, whereas for China, the countries of the European Union and the United Kingdom remain key economic partners and, in many respects, like-minded actors on issues of global economic governance.

A military alliance between Russia and China is neither feasible today nor, arguably, necessary. Classical peacetime military alliances are relics of the Cold War era. This does not mean, however, that Moscow and Beijing do not need closer coordination and deeper cooperation on key geopolitical and geostrategic issues. Washington operates on a global scale; Moscow and Beijing would significantly strengthen their positions if they not only stood back-to-back but also acted shoulder-to-shoulder. To meet current challenges and trends, the Russia-China strategic partnership, proclaimed 30 years ago under very different international conditions, requires a new level of quality.

In about a month, President Vladimir Putin is expected to visit China. In preparation for the trip, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov recently traveled to Beijing. The visit will take place in a year marking the 30th anniversary of the establishment of the strategic partnership and cooperation between the two countries, as well as the 25th anniversary of the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation. These milestones reflect how Russia–China relations have, over recent decades, evolved into a model for relations between major powers.

Commemorating past achievements is, of course, important. It is equally essential to look around and ahead. The current dynamic state of international relations reflects a struggle over a new world order—one that, as Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov recently and rightly put it, is “a fight for life and death.” It must be acknowledged that the evolutionary transition from a unipolar to a multipolar order has not taken place. Instead, a fragmented, uneven multipolarity has effectively emerged—without a corresponding system of order. Historically, struggles over the future structure of the world have led to global wars. In today’s conditions, given the factor of nuclear weapons, this struggle represents a functional equivalent of a world war.

This conflict is already underway: in its “hot” form in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, and in a still “cold” phase in the Asia-Pacific. It is also unfolding through special operations and economic blockades in Latin America, while its reverberations are felt in Africa and the Arctic. The character of this new global confrontation is shaped by U.S. attempts—through a large-scale global counteroffensive—to contain the rising influence of China, Russia, and the countries of the Global Majority, and to restore its position, if not as a universal hegemon, then at least as the world’s leading power.

Given the nature of this new type of global conflict, the composition and objectives of its participants, and its geographic scope, the confrontation is likely to be determined, intense, and prolonged. “Hot” wars will occur intermittently, while “cold” confrontation will persist as a constant backdrop, periodically generating crises. It is unlikely, however, that any major country will be able to remain on the sidelines. “Sitting it out” will not be an option. Even China’s largely peaceful rise in recent years has triggered a tough response from the United States, which tends to view the strengthening of other countries as a challenge—or even a threat—to its own position.

The countries of the collective West, despite their differences and even contradictions, remain deeply integrated in the sphere of military policy and are strategically capable of acting as a unified front. The United States, even under the Trump administration, not only preserves but reinforces its dominant position within NATO and other U.S.-led military alliances. Over the past year and a half, Washington has succeeded in shifting a significant share of the burden of containing Russia in Europe onto its allies, thereby freeing up its own resources to focus on containing China in Asia. All of this forms part of the U.S. global strategy.

Russia and China share many common views on the future of the world order. Leaders in Moscow and Beijing speak of a “strategic partnership without limits” and describe their relationship as “more than an alliance.” This is true: the relationship is indeed broader than a military alliance, yet it clearly does not amount to one. There are many reasons for this. It is important to take into account, in particular, that the two powers have different relationships with the United States and, especially, with European countries. For Russia, over the past year Europe has effectively replaced the United States as the primary military adversary, whereas for China, the countries of the European Union and the United Kingdom remain key economic partners and, in many respects, like-minded actors on issues of global economic governance.

A military alliance between Russia and China is neither feasible today nor, arguably, necessary. Classical peacetime military alliances are relics of the Cold War era. This does not mean, however, that Moscow and Beijing do not need closer coordination and deeper cooperation on key geopolitical and geostrategic issues. Washington operates on a global scale; Moscow and Beijing would significantly strengthen their positions if they not only stood back-to-back but also acted shoulder-to-shoulder. To meet current challenges and trends, the Russia-China strategic partnership, proclaimed 30 years ago under very different international conditions, requires a new level of quality.

In the sphere of global geopolitics, this could involve much closer coordination of actions across the key theaters of the ongoing global confrontation: Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. This necessarily implies a trust-based exchange of assessments regarding U.S. foreign policy and a certain degree of coordination between Russia and China in their approach to Washington. The upcoming talks in Beijing with U.S. President Donald Trump could become a subject of in-depth dialogue both before and after his visit.

At the regional level, the current pause in the U.S. and Israeli war against Iran could be used to develop trilateral cooperation among Russia, China, and Iran, aimed at strengthening Tehran’s defense capabilities and assisting in the reconstruction of infrastructure damaged during the conflict. A window of opportunity has also emerged to actively promote—together—the idea of a collective security system for the Persian Gulf states and Iran, capitalizing on the growing disappointment in Gulf countries with U.S. security guarantees, which in practice have “worked in reverse.”

The experience of the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, as well as other contemporary conflicts, can serve as a subject for in-depth analysis by military and technical specialists from both countries, contributing to the enhancement of military-strategic planning and the technological development of their defense industries, as well as to the expansion of practical cooperation in scientific, technical, and industrial spheres.

There is a need to develop a common Russian-Chinese approach to issues of nuclear deterrence and strategic stability in a multipolar nuclear world. This should take into account the capabilities of advanced non-nuclear strategic systems, the outcomes of the revolution in military affairs (including the development of unmanned systems, robotics, quantum computing, and military artificial intelligence), as well as the emergence of new domains of competition—cyberspace and outer space.

If the beginning of the fourth decade of the Russia-China strategic partnership is marked by tangible progress in these areas, the two countries, without replicating their own past models or those of others, could form the core of a new type of coalition, better equipped to counter hegemonic powers and to bring closer a more balanced and equitable world order. Such a coalition could prove attractive to other states, enabling the Global Majority to evolve from an abstract analytical concept into an active participant in international affairs.