Eurasian Security Architecture: Origins, Core Principles, and Prospects for Evolution

The idea of new security architecture in Eurasia is becoming a key concept in Russia’s foreign policy. It was first outlined in the Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly in February 2024. Later that year, it was included in the agenda of the Russian President’s summits with the leaders of China and India, discussed by CIS foreign ministers, and further developed within the Union State of Russia and Belarus.

Russian diplomacy consistently incorporates the theme of a Eurasian security system into the dialogue with its partners in various parts of the world’s largest continent. The intensification of activity in this sphere inevitably prompts a series of conceptual and political questions. What exactly is meant by Eurasian security? Upon which principles could it be constructed? What steps could be taken for its gradual development? What objectives is it intended to serve, and who are the prospective participants? In what form could its architecture be designed and function? How might it interact with other actors’ projects? It is important to be based on a set of basic assumptions when addressing these questions.

First, modern-day international relations remain largely an anarchic system. The issue of security remains fundamentally unresolved, and almost every country faces a particular set of threats originating from other countries or coalitions of countries, terrorist or criminal groups, or man-made or natural factors.

Second, different strategies for adapting to security threats and challenges have emerged. They range from attempts at hegemony and dominance in regional and global affairs to alignment with stronger players up to and including the dissolution of one’s own sovereignty into the interests and priorities of one’s allies and partners. Adaptation strategies generate hierarchical security systems in which some players are de facto forced to submit to others. The modern world remains highly asymmetric. Only a few poles of power stand out, which are represented by relatively sovereign countries that are capable of independently pursuing their own policies.

Third, rivalry and competition between countries unfold both around material interests and values. Although the Cold War era of ideology-driven bloc confrontation remains a thing of the past, value-based competition is gaining momentum. Moreover, it is becoming more complex and convoluted. Whereas in the past it was a clash of two modernist and rationalist ideologies comparable in nature (liberalism and socialism), today the battle revolves around value systems of a different nature and origin. Modernist ideologies are challenged, on the one hand, by postmodern simulations of ideologies, and on the other hand, by archaic pre-modern frameworks and local nationalist movements.

Fourth, the technological environment of rivalry is changing. A new revolution in the military art is in full swing. It shows itself vividly in the Ukraine conflict, but goes much deeper than the spheres directly affected by hostilities in Ukraine. Changes are taking place at all levels of military art. Tactical manoeuvres, methods of conducting operations, and strategic planning, as well as logistics and transport management, reconnaissance, and so forth are all being transformed.

Fifth, there remains a wide range of parameters of power and dominance, as well as spheres of competition in which they are applied. Military-political tools are combined with methods of economic coercion, information campaigns, and soft power. Hybrid use of various methods of rivalry is customary when it comes to international relations. However, the combinations of tools of dominance, coercion, and influence are taking on new configurations. Communication, surveillance, data collection and processing, and information management particularly through the use of AI technologies play a critical role in these configurations.

Sixth, the modern world is in a state of asynchronous polarity. In some areas (such as military security), the world has long since become multipolar, while in others (such as global finance), it retains features of unipolarity and concentration of power in the hands of a single centre of power.

Seventh, the diversity of political and social systems in modern states did not go anywhere. They do not fi t into a single template. They make their own rules, sometimes even within diametrically opposed systems of coordinates. The modern world is far from living under uniform political and social forms.

Russia is in the epicentre of rapid changes in international politics. It is a unique player, which, by virtue of its geographic location, is present in several key regions of the planet that form the extremities of the Eurasian continent.

The idea of new security architecture in Eurasia is becoming a key concept in Russia’s foreign policy. It was first outlined in the Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly in February 2024. [1] Later that year, it was included in the agenda of the Russian President’s summits with the leaders of China and India, discussed by CIS foreign ministers, and further developed within the Union State of Russia and Belarus. Russian diplomacy consistently incorporates the theme of a Eurasian security system into the dialogue with its partners in various parts of the world’s largest continent. [2]

The intensification of activity in this sphere inevitably prompts a series of conceptual and political questions. What exactly is meant by Eurasian security? Upon which principles could it be constructed? What steps could be taken for its gradual development? What objectives is it intended to serve, and who are the prospective participants? In what form could its architecture be designed and function? How might it interact with other actors’ projects? It is important to be based on a set of basic assumptions when addressing these questions.

First, modern-day international relations remain largely an anarchic system. The issue of security remains fundamentally unresolved, and almost every country faces a particular set of threats originating from other countries or coalitions of countries, terrorist or criminal groups, or man-made or natural factors.

Second, different strategies for adapting to security threats and challenges have emerged. They range from attempts at hegemony and dominance in regional and global affairs to alignment with stronger players up to and including the dissolution of one’s own sovereignty into the interests and priorities of one’s allies and partners. Adaptation strategies generate hierarchical security systems in which some players are de facto forced to submit to others. The modern world remains highly asymmetric. Only a few poles of power stand out, which are represented by relatively sovereign countries that are capable of independently pursuing their own policies.

Third, rivalry and competition between countries unfold both around material interests and values. Although the Cold War era of ideology-driven bloc confrontation remains a thing of the past, value-based competition is gaining momentum. Moreover, it is becoming more complex and convoluted. Whereas in the past it was a clash of two modernist and rationalist ideologies comparable in nature (liberalism and socialism), today the battle revolves around value systems of a different nature and origin.

Modernist ideologies are challenged, on the one hand, by postmodern simulations of ideologies, and on the other hand, by archaic pre-modern frameworks and local nationalist movements.

Fourth, the technological environment of rivalry is changing. A new revolution in the military art is in full swing. It shows itself vividly in the Ukraine conflict, but goes much deeper than the spheres directly affected by hostilities in Ukraine. Changes are taking place at all levels of military art. Tactical manoeuvres, methods of conducting operations, and strategic planning, as well as logistics and transport management, reconnaissance, and so forth are all being transformed.

Fifth, there remains a wide range of parameters of power and dominance, as well as spheres of competition in which they are applied. Military-political tools are combined with methods of economic coercion, information campaigns, and soft power. Hybrid use of various methods of rivalry is customary when it comes to international relations. However, the combinations of tools of dominance, coercion, and influence are taking on new configurations. Communication, surveillance, data collection and processing, and information management particularly through the use of AI technologies play a critical role in these configurations.

Sixth, the modern world is in a state of asynchronous polarity. [3] In some areas (such as military security), the world has long since become multipolar, while in others (such as global finance), it retains features of unipolarity and concentration of power in the hands of a single centre of power.

Seventh, the diversity of political and social systems in modern states did not go anywhere. They do not fit into a single template. They make their own rules, sometimes even within diametrically opposed systems of coordinates. The modern world is far from living under uniform political and social forms. [4]

Russia is in the epicentre of rapid changes in international politics. It is a unique player, which, by virtue of its geographic location, is present in several key regions of the planet that form the extremities of the Eurasian continent.

Russia boasts significant military-political resources and substantial material capabilities. It is the only great power that has dared to challenge the dominance of the collective West, and plays an important role in the balance of power between two major global poles, the United States and China. Finally, it advances innovative ideas and concepts in international politics. One of these is the idea of a new security architecture in Eurasia. The reasons for turning to this idea and its possible characteristics, as well as its areas of development are addressed in this report.

From Europe to Eurasia

The crisis of the European security architecture with the conflict in Ukraine at its core can be considered one of the key reasons behind the emergence of the idea of a new Eurasian security system. The latest edition of the European security architecture took shape in the wake of the Cold War. Abandoning bloc confrontation, the former rivals laid down the principle of equal and indivisible security in the new system. In other words, the security of some countries must not be ensured at the expense of the security of others. This system received a robust regulatory and institutional foundation that was fixed by treaty and formed in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s.

On the regulatory level, the core principles of the European security architecture were laid down in the 1990 Paris Charter. [5] They were reinforced by a number of treaties that regulated disarmament, arms control, and mutual transparency. Among them were Russia- US treaties on nuclear arms control (START and INF Treaty), the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE, CFE-2), and agreements on eliminating chemical and biological weapons, as well as the Open Skies Treaty, to name a few. Institutionally, that architecture was embodied in the transformation of the CSCE into the OSCE. The ten principles of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 [6] defined the regulatory framework, including the principle of equal and indivisible security. An institutional platform for a Russia-NATO dialogue emerged in the form of the Russia-NATO Council. Another factor in normalising relations between Russia and the West was the comprehensive deepening of Russia-EU cooperation based on the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. [7] Europe witnessed an act of unprecedented demilitarisation. Russia withdrew its troops from Germany and the former Warsaw Pact countries, significantly cutting its Armed Forces and defence spending. The United States cut down its military presence in Europe as well, even though not as much and did not dissolve the Euro-Atlantic alliance.

Despite the impressive achievements and perceptible demilitarisation, contradictions began to pile up within the European security system. The exit from the Cold War played out differently for each of the former adversaries. The Warsaw Pact dissolved on the heels of velvet revolutions and regime changes in its former member countries. Soon after, the Soviet Union disintegrated. As the legal successor of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation was confronted with a devastating financial, economic, political, and social crisis, as well as an ideological and value breakdown. The country was weakened and bled white. By contrast, the Western camp grew stronger. Former Warsaw Pact members and a number of former Soviet republics, primarily, the Baltic states, openly pursued integration into NATO and the EU. Both organisations entered a phase of qualitative and quantitative strengthening.

Russia itself showed commitment to market and democratic reforms, and to partner-like relations with the collective West. On the one hand, this approach helped endure a severe internal crisis in a relatively favourable foreign policy environment. On the other hand, Russia largely lost its status as a de facto peer partner. It was seen as the losing side doomed to decline and eventual demise. Cooperation with it was regarded as desirable, but only in the context of gaining access to the Russian market and ensuring predictable policy. Though ostensibly treated with respect, its foreign policy interests were, in fact, ignored. Apparently, at some point, the West developed an approach whereby weakened Russia, even though it was the former great power in the post-Soviet space, was not allowed to have its own interests, and any attempt to change the existing status quo was out of question. After the Cold War, Russia experienced a tremendous identity trauma. In the West, by contrast, an identity of the victor took shape, one whose system of ideas, institutions, and political and economic structures enjoyed undeniable superiority.

In reality, European security began to splinter along multiple lines.

First, NATO’s eastward enlargement. Moscow reacted with restraint to the accession of former Warsaw Pact allies and even the Baltic countries into the Alliance, particularly since it was not accompanied by the deployment of significant US or other major NATO contingents in the new member countries. Far greater concern was caused by the prospect of further expansion with the involvement of, above all, Ukraine. Given the size of the country, its long border with Russia, and the Black Sea Fleet base, the prospect of Ukraine drifting towards the North Atlantic Alliance was viewed as a red line. The absence of a clear Western position on Ukraine neutrality further exacerbated by the strengthening of pro-Atlantic forces inside Ukraine following the colour revolutions compounded Russia’s concern.

Second, incremental degradation of the arms control regimes. NATO countries refused to ratify CFE-2, seriously undermining prospects for conventional arms control. The United States withdrew from the 1972 ABM Treaty. Even though Moscow maintained constructive relations with Washington, and the two sides signed the New START treaty in 2010, the arms control system began to unravel. The deployment of the US missile defence system in Poland and Romania was a serious irritant for Russia. In the following years, the degradation of arms control regimes became irreversible.

Third, activation of NATO’s war mechanism and military interventions, which immediately evolved into a series of conflicts or laid down time bombs. The bombing of Yugoslavia and the subsequent recognition of Kosovo’s independence are a textbook example. In addition to Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and other countries were subjected to military interventions. Moscow reacted differently in each case. In the Afghan campaign, the United States relied on Russia’s assistance. Moscow and its EU partners denounced the invasion of Iraq, but neither could nor, apparently, wanted to put pressure on Washington. Russia reacted negatively to the invasion of Libya, but did not take active measures. In Syria, however, the Russian leadership decided to launch its own military campaign with the aim of supporting functioning state institutions and defeating terrorist groups. Overall, the military activity of the United States and NATO was perceived by Russia as an alarming development and a zero-sum game.

Fourth, Western countries’ conspicuous political interference in domestic political processes across the post-Soviet space. Western capitals openly supported political forces that declared a policy course towards integration into the EU and NATO. Under the banners of democratic reforms, a series of colour revolutions took place that brought pro-Western governments to power. In Russia, colour revolutions were seen as political stunts aimed at interfering in the internal affairs of the post-Soviet countries in order to increase Western leverage with them.

With the above four trends underway, Russia adjusted its own policy as well. Despite devastating losses in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow retained the status of a nuclear superpower. The gradual degradation of arms control over nuclear weapons encouraged Russia to upgrade its nuclear triad, and the country achieved impressive results in developing new missile and nuclear systems. NATO’s eastward expansion made complying with tactical nuclear weapons-related commitments unnecessary for Russia. New tactical missile systems became a means of countering potential threats as well. The Armed Forces underwent a large-scale reform. Russia started responding more often to crises and made targeted use of its Armed Forces, such as in 2008, after Georgia attempted a military operation against Abkhazia and South Ossetia; in 2014, ensuring military security during integration with Crimea amid the colour revolution in Ukraine; and in 2015, when it launched an operation in Syria. In all three above instances, Moscow drew on earlier precedents created by the West.

Russia was increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo in its political dialogue with the West. In his 2001 speech to the Bundestag, President Vladimir Putin outlined the growing problems with great caution. [8] In 2007, in Munich, he provided a much clearer definition. [9] Russia’s attempts to rectify the defects of the European security system through a new European security treaty [10] among other avenues were not supported by the West. The Ukraine crisis of 2014 exacerbated Russia- West relations. The attempt to use the Minsk agreements to settle the Ukraine crisis failed. [11] Later, a number of Western leaders admitted that the Minsk agreements were used to prepare Ukraine for a conflict with Russia. [12] In 2022, the piled-up contradictions led to a large-scale military conflict around Ukraine, which received comprehensive military and financial support from the West. Only the risk of a direct confrontation with Moscow with the prospect of a nuclear escalation deterred the West from openly intervening in the conflict.

The state of affairs in other areas was quite different. In the mid- 1990s, Russia abandoned a one-sided orientation towards the West. While maintaining a full-fledged political dialogue, Moscow began strengthening its ties with various players across Eurasia and went to great lengths to promote interaction within the Russia-India-China triangle, which later became the backbone of BRICS+. The territorial dispute with China was settled, and a new Russian-Chinese treaty was signed. One of the world’s longest borders underwent sweeping demilitarisation. China became a key trading partner. Russia rapidly restored key areas of cooperation with India, including military-technical cooperation and peaceful nuclear energy. In 2001, with Russia’s participation, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) became operational. Its agenda included a wide range of issues from economic interaction to security. As it grew larger, the SCO brought together major and smaller players in Eurasia (Belarus, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, as well as 14 dialogue partners). It included countries torn by severe contradictions, meaning the SCO became an important platform for communication and building mutual trust. Wide-scale efforts were undertaken to create and expand security institutions in the heart of Eurasia. In 2002, a decision was made to create the CSTO, a military- political alliance of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. In 2015, after extensive preparatory work, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) was launched. The five members of the Union (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia) worked hard to form new markets and common economic spaces with a high degree of institutionalisation.

The year 2015 marked the early phases of work to develop the Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) initiative advanced by President Vladimir Putin. [13] The initiative relied on coordination and cooperation among a variety of integration projects across Eurasia. One can argue that the GEP served as a prototype for the initiative on a new architecture of Eurasian security. Going far beyond existing institutions and projects, both share a continental scope. However, the Greater Eurasian Partnership concept did not focus on security issues, but they took centre stage in the new initiative put forward by the Russian President in 2024.

Eurasian security architecture: Key components

In his Address to the Federal Assembly on February 29, 2024, President Vladimir Putin emphasised the importance of forming a new framework of equal and indivisible security in Eurasia and expressed his willingness to launch a substantive dialogue with the stakeholders. Soon after, the initiative was made part of Russia-China’s high- and top-level dialogue. In June 2024, it was further elaborated in Vladimir Putin’s speech at the Russian Foreign Ministry. [14] The idea of equal and indivisible security in Eurasia was discussed during the Russia-India summit in Moscow. The initiative is making strides through a joint statement by the CIS foreign ministers on the principles of cooperation and security in Eurasia [15], as well as through a Russian–Belarusian statement on Joint Vision of the

Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity in the 21st Century. [16] The Minsk Conference on Eurasian Security became an important forum for the political and intellectual work on this initiative. Step by step, the new idea became part of the dialogue between Russia, its partners, and like-minded countries in Eurasia.

Building on the discussions focusing on the new architecture, we can identify several key components that define its conceptual framework.

First. The Russian initiative prioritises the principle of equal and indivisible security. Strengthening the security of some countries must not affect the security of others. Contentious situations and frictions in international relations must be resolved through dialogue. Ignoring security interests leads to military conflicts, and overcoming the consequences may take years, if not decades.

Second.The Eurasian security architecture spans the entire continent. It is not limited to a limited interpretation of Eurasia as the post-Soviet space or as a group of countries including Russia, China, and Central Asian countries. The way Russia sees it, the issue is about the continent within its geographical boundaries and the complexity and diversity of the regions that make up Eurasia. The US allies on the continent’s periphery are not excluded from this security architecture. Moreover, security issue discussions involving their participation are quite possible in the future.

Third. Security is multidimensional. Traditional military security that is protecting a country against the threat of external military aggression in any form remains at its core. However, in addition to this core classical concept, Eurasian security can hardly ignore the threats of civil conflicts or disintegration of states, interference in the internal affairs of Eurasian countries, digital security, or the security of their economic ties in light of the expanding practice of economic sanctions, the security of logistical and transport routes, and so on.

Fourth. The Russian initiative represents a regulatory framework within which different formats of interstate interaction and dialogue can and should exist. Such formats include bilateral security treaties and agreements, such as the recently concluded Russia-DPRK and Russia- Iran treaties, multilateral agreements, and established international organisations, such as the SCO, the CSTO, and the EAEU, to name a few. The Eurasian security architecture is unlikely to be made part of a single and consolidated institutional system. At least such a rigid institutional structure is unlikely to materialise any time soon. The Eurasian security architecture has greater prospects as a flexible system that includes multiple elements.

Fifth. The Eurasian security architecture relies on horizontal rather than vertical ties. Unlike, for example, the North Atlantic Alliance with a clear military-political leader in the form of the United States, the Eurasian system is decentralised. The absence of bloc discipline that is characteristic of NATO may be a side effect of such decentralisation. However, the system was not conceived as a military alliance, so it does not need to adopt NATO parameters.

Sixth. Russia’s initiative is not directed against any particular country or an association of countries. It is not aimed at containing the West or any other group of countries. By advancing the initiative, the Russian leadership recognises the fact that many Eurasian countries have built their own relationships with Western countries that vary within the range of allied commitments in the case of Western and Eastern Europe, South Korea, and Japan to fierce confrontation in the case of the DPRK and Iran. Major players such as China and India have developed their own logic of relations with the West, combining partnership with strategic autonomy, and in some cases with elements of rivalry and competition. Russia is amid an acute political crisis with the collective West. However, a reduction in tensions, or escalation, cannot be ruled out.

Seventh. The Eurasian security architecture relies on recognition of diverse political and economic systems in Eurasia. These systems depend on each country’s specific requirements, historical trajectories, and traditions. It is impossible and counterproductive to force this diversity into binary schemes of democracy vs. autocracy, or market economy vs. planned economy. Every country is free to choose its own path of its political and economic development with respect for international law as a mandatory condition.

Eighth. The Eurasian security agenda can be supplemented and reinforced through interregional formats. The dynamically evolving BRICS group is a key and promising format. The UN Charter must serve as a foundation for any security system, including the Eurasian security architecture. In a number of fundamental areas, the Eurasian security architecture overlaps with other initiatives, in particular, the Global Security Initiative put forward by Chinese President Xi Jinping, allowing for harmonisation. [17] The Russian and Chinese initiatives differ across a number of variables, such as the geographical scope or the specifics of their practical implementation. However, they tend to coincide when it comes to basic principles, including equal and indivisible security for all, equality of sovereign countries, and respect for their diversity. Moscow, it appears, is open to exploring the initiatives offered by other countries or groups of countries, especially if these ideas are based on overlapping principles.

The above components of the new Eurasian security architecture are, of course, only a scheme, which can and should be expanded as the system continues to evolve. It will be enriched with the ideas of Russia’s Eurasian partners and get adjusted as the conceptual framework gets implemented in practice.

Mitigating the risks of military and other conflicts in Eurasia, ensuring steady conditions for economic and humanitarian ties without politicisation, and creating a foundation for the peaceful resolution of conflicts with due respect of the diversity and interests of the many countries of the region can be considered the key objectives of Russia’s initiative.

Tentative step-by-step plan for promoting the initiative

Russian diplomacy is already acting on the idea of building Eurasian security architecture as a conceptual framework in its foreign policy planning. Isolated principles are reflected in bilateral and multilateral formats. The bilateral formats include new bilateral treaties between Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and between Russia and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Multilateral initiatives include the declaration adopted at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Astana in 2024. In their final document, the SCO member states emphasised that “interaction within the Organisation may serve as the basis for shaping an architecture of equal and indivisible security in Eurasia.” [18] The same wording went into the SCO Tianjin Declaration of 2025. [19] At the CSTO summit in Astana in 2024, it was noted that there was a “demand for forming and developing of a stable security system in Eurasia in the interest of maintaining stability and peaceful coexistence of all Eurasian states.” [20]

Nevertheless, more goal-oriented steps will be needed to promote the initiative aimed at gradually shaping it into a regulatory doctrine and, possibly, a system of institutions.

The first step is to consolidate the fundamental principles and ideological foundation of the Eurasian security architecture in a core doctrinal document such as, for example, a Eurasian Charter proposed by the Republic of Belarus and Russia. A draft of such a document can undergo a series of trials in various dialogue formats. The Minsk Conference on Eurasian Security, which is on track to become an established forum of high standing, is well-suited to serve as the central “assemblage point.”

The second step is the signing of the Charter by all stakeholders. These may include both the Eurasian countries and the international organisations that they form. At the initial stage, all countries and organisations of the continent will not be required to sign the Charter. Existing political contradictions and the novel nature of the initiative will make this impossible. Individual countries and associations may be cautious about joining the Charter. Therefore, the document must remain open to new participants.

The third step is to create a permanent political forum (conference) of the countries that have joined the Charter. This forum could be held annually or at another regular interval in the countries that have joined the Charter.

The fourth step includes soft institutionalisation of the Eurasian security architecture which could begin with the creation of an international working group to prepare political forums (conferences) of the countries that have joined the Charter. At the same time, a Eurasian Security Fund supported by contributions of the countries that have joined the Charter could be established and used to hold forums (conferences), as well as to fund individual projects and programmes to support the initiative.

The fifth step includes the formation of a pool of Eurasian security projects and programmes. These programmes could be used to address specific issues and to counter particular security challenges. Their number should be limited at the initial stage. What matters most here is achieving specific results. In other words, quality must be above quantity. A project office funded by the Eurasian Security Fund and responsible for coordinating individual initiatives might be needed to implement projects and programmes. The potential working projects could include, for example, programmes for overcoming or mitigating the humanitarian fallout of conflicts in Eurasia; mediation programmes for the resolution of specific conflicts; secure financial settlement projects; joint natural disaster relief programmes; and digital security programmes, to name a few. Clearly, developing a project portfolio will take a long time with inevitable trials and errors. However, the emergence of mechanisms for addressing specific issues in Eurasian security architecture and, above all, success stories will significantly strengthen its regulatory foundations and increase its appeal with the countries of the region.

* * *

Russia’s initiative to create Eurasian security architecture remains in its early conceptual and political phase. However, its semantic core is clearly seen already now. The initiative is based on equal and indivisible security for all countries of the continent; it presumes abandoning hierarchical blocs in favour of a flexible and horizontal cooperation format; it is oriented towards overcoming a variety of security issues in different areas; it welcomes a variety of cooperation formats based on bilateral relations or established and emerging international associations; it rules out zero-sum games or its direction against particular countries or groups of countries; and it allows for cooperation with other regional associations.

In many respects, Russia’s initiative resonates with China’s Global Security Initiative. Their alignment across a number of areas is both possible and advisable.

The next step in developing this initiative could include its regulatory formalisation as a Eurasian Charter or another document, possibly based on the Minsk Conference on Eurasian Security. In the future, the initiative can be gradually institutionalised, and a pool of projects and programmes aimed at addressing specific security issues can be developed.

The regulatory, institutional, and project dimensions of the initiative may evolve at a different pace. Yet already today, the regulatory principles of the Eurasian security architecture have begun to shape Russia’s policy in bilateral and multilateral initiatives across Eurasia.

First published in the Valdai Discussion Club.

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