Поиск по блогам

 

A game approach to the Crimean crisis. Part II: Game Solution

Game structure By design, the game is implemented in two stages. At stage 1, Ukraine and Russia choose levels of financial transfers and military involvement not knowing each other’s choice. At stage 2, Crimean voters observe the levels chosen and opt for the preferred country. Does it sound familiar? Hopefully so, because the game could be regarded as a modified all-pay auction in which the good to be auctioned is Crimea and Sevastopol, the auctioneer are Crimean voters, and the bidders...

Опубликовано:
19.03.2014 00:22:00

Why corruption can enhance social welfare

... efficient resource allocations than the law-abiding strategy. To see this, I model typical interactions between public officials and citizens in the game form, where players are assumed to maximize their pay-offs against the other player’s choices. Game theory appears to be a natural and simple way to account for the seemingly complex phenomenon in question, as it requires quite little knowledge to produce predictions about real outcomes. WHY DOES CORRUPTION OCCUR? Before examining why corruption ...

Опубликовано:
24.12.2013 17:48:00

Sorted by relevance | Sort by date