The Evolution Of Political And Economic Cooperation Between China And Myanmar

Wei Wenjing, Master’s degree student, Basic Department of Institute of China and Contemporary Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, HSE University

Regan Arthur, Master’s degree student, Basic Department of Institute of China and Contemporary Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, HSE University

Qamar Abbas, Master’s degree student, Basic Department of Institute of China and Contemporary Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, HSE University

Source: Unsplash

Introduction

In the past few decades, China-Myanmar relationship has undergone major changes, mainly from initial cautious and limited exchanges to close relations involving much political and economic cooperation. With the global political and economic system constantly evolving, and the pattern of the Asia-Pacific region constantly changing, the transformation of China and Myanmar relations has become particularly important. For China political and economic cooperation with Myanmar marks the continuous strengthening of its diplomatic strategies; while for Myanmar, the development of relations with China meets its needs of seeking development while facing domestic political challenges.[1]

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

Both Chinese and Western scholars have examined the dynamics of China and Myanmar relations. Fan Hongwei’s research provides a critical examination of the diplomatic and strategic interactions between China and Burma (now Myanmar) during the early stage, especially the Cold War era. Fan outlines Myanmar’s neutralist stance in the cold war because of the perception on its national strength and sensitive geographic location and other factors. He argues that although Myanmar was the first non-socialist country to contact China on the occasion of the founding of People’s Republic of China (PRC), it had fear and distrust of China, and this continued throughout the Cold War.[2]

Thu Rein Saw Htut Naing explores how Myanmar strategically engaged with China during a period of intense Western pressure and economic sanctions, particularly from the United States from 2003-2011. The research applies the concept of “hedging” in international relations to explain Myanmar’s balancing act between China and the US, and emphasizes how Myanmar increased political and economic cooperation with China post-2003. The author details bilateral cooperation in border security and trade, and also explores Myanmar’s positioning in ASEAN and the UN, noting China’s backing of Myanmar in international forums as a critical pillar of bilateral ties. It sets the foundation for a comprehensive analysis of Myanmar and China relations as shaped by geopolitical constraints and regional power dynamics.[3] 

Yun Sun analyzes China’s strategic adjustments in response to Myanmar’s democratic reform in 2011. Sun argues that before its political reforms, China was Myanmar’s most significant diplomatic and economic partner, particularly during the Western sanctioned military junta era, but under President Thein Sein, Myanmar shifted towards the United States, which undercut China’s original blueprint regarding the strategic utilities of Myanmar at ASEAN. And as Myanmar persified its foreign relations, Beijing adopted a more flexible approach, combining economic incentives with cautious political engagement.[4]

The period from 2012 to 2021 witnessed several significant changes in China-Myanmar relations. Kevin Woods pointed out in his research that China’s increasing investment in Myanmar’s forestry, minerals and energy sectors has generated local opposition.[5] Hannah Beech examined local perceptions of Chinese projects in Myanmar. The crisis of public trust, particularly the public backlash against the Myitsone Dam, was a manifestation of this.[6] According to Tan-Mullins et al. China took advantage of Myanmar’s internal political situation after 2017 to reorganize BRI projects to make their implementation more effective and to shield them from local criticism.[7]

Scholars Aaron Connelly and Morgan Michaels focused their attention on the measures taken by the West, China, and ASEAN to deal with the continuing conflict in Myanmar after the coup in 2021. They believe that China plays a dominant role in Myanmar’s conflict, acting as both a key economic partner and political shield for the junta. Unlike other powers, China’s approach is pragmatic, focused on securing its border, protecting strategic infrastructure like the Kyaukpyu port and pipelines, and shutting down cross-border scam centres targeting Chinese citizens. While it has mediated ceasefires, such as after Operation 1027, China avoids deeper engagement in multilateral efforts like ASEAN’s Five Point Consensus, maintaining a position rooted in its own interests rather than regional diplomacy.[8]

This research shows that China and Myanmar political and economic cooperation is not linear, but adaptive, and it is largely influenced by changing internal and external pressures. China has the ability to flexibly adjust its policies according to the changes in Myanmar’s political situation while maintaining its core strategic objectives, which shows China’s mature and pragmatic foreign policy. Myanmar is also trying to balance its diplomatic relations and adjust its policy toward China according to its needs while coping with its internal political changes.

Conclusion

Thus, in terms of geopolitics, Myanmar occupies an essential geostrategic position in Southeast Asia. It is an important link between China and the Indian Ocean as well as a vital hub of China’s ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative. Myanmar is an indispensable part of China’s efforts to bypass the Straits of Malacca, and projects such as the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor can help China achieve the goal of strengthening its energy security. After the military coup in Myanmar in 2021, the significance of China-Myanmar relations became more prominent, since many western countries have imposed sanctions on Myanmar, in this case, China-Myanmar relationship has affected the overall dynamics of ASEAN and China, and the effectiveness of western sanctions against Myanmar. From the economic point of view, Myanmar’s rich natural resources and infrastructure potential make it an attractive investment destination for China. Nowadays, China has become Myanmar’s largest trading partner and investor, the economic cooperation between the two sides has been deepening.

The evolution of China and Myanmar political and economic cooperation is highly related to the changes in the political and economic structure in the Asia Pacific region. Exploring this topic is helpful to understand how modern major power deals with state in transition and how economic dependence shapes political interaction between them. Understanding this issue will also help to explore the diplomatic principles and policies of China and Myanmar, thus making predictions for the next development of bilateral relations. 

References:

1. Sreeparna Banerjee, Myanmar’s trade relations with China, Observer Research Foundation. Published on Mar 31, 2023.


2. Hongwei, Fan. (2012). China-Burma Geopolitical Relations in the Cold War. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs. 31. 7-27. 10.1177/186810341203100102.


3. Naing, Thu Rein Saw Htut. Myanmar-China Relations (2003–2011). Master’s thesis, Thammas University, 2018. URL: https://www.tiara-tu.ac.th/uploadFiles/151523_1b3caeb9c6e8f11813c679c305e7b96b.pdf.


4. Sun, Yun. (2012). China and the Changing Myanmar. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs. 31. 51-77. 10.1177/186810341203100403.


5. Woods, K. (2013). “The Politics of the Emerging Agro-industrial Complex in Asia’s ‘Resource Frontier’.” Proceedings of the International Conference on Global Land Grabbing II, Cornell University.


6. Beech, H. (2017). “Why China’s Investment in a Massive Myanmar Dam is Backfiring.” Time Magazine.


7. Tan-Mullins, M., Mohan, G., & Power, M. (2020). “Redefining ‘Green’ in BRI Projects: Environmental Norms, Sustainable Development and Local Opposition in Myanmar.” Third World Quarterly, 41(7), 1147–1166.


8. A, Michaels. M, Disparate Diplomacy: Managing the Post-coup Myanmar Conflict. Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2024. IISS. May, 2024. URL: https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/asia-pacific-regional-security-assessment-2024/chapter-4/.

[1] Sreeparna Banerjee. Myanmar’s trade relations with China, Observer Research Foundation. Published onMar 31, 2023.

[2] Hongwei, Fan. (2012). China-Burma Geopolitical Relations in the Cold War. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs. 31. 7-27. 10.1177/186810341203100102.

[3] Naing, Thu Rein Saw Htut. Myanmar-China Relations (2003–2011). Master’s thesis, Thammas University,2018.

 https://www.tiara-tu.ac.th/uploadFiles/151523_1b3caeb9c6e8f11813c679c305e7b96b.pdf.

[4] Sun, Yun. (2012). China and the Changing Myanmar. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs. 31. 51-77. 10.1177/186810341203100403.

[5] Woods, K. (2013). “The Politics of the Emerging Agro-industrial Complex in Asia’s ‘Resource Frontier’.” Proceedings of the International Conference on Global Land Grabbing II, Cornell University.

[6] Beech, H. (2017). “Why China’s Investment in a Massive Myanmar Dam is Backfiring.” Time Magazine.

[7] Tan-Mullins, M., Mohan, G., & Power, M. (2020). “Redefining ‘Green’ in BRI Projects: Environmental Norms, Sustainable Development and Local Opposition in Myanmar.” Third World Quarterly, 41(7), 1147–1166.

[8] Aaron Connelly, Morgan Michaels. Disparate Diplomacy: Managing the Post-coup Myanmar Conflict. Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2024. IISS. May, 2024. https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/asia-pacific-regional-security-assessment-2024/chapter-4/.