The New Great Wall: The Logic of China’s Foreign Policy Behavior

In the early 2020s, China commenced a series of mobilization measures that, in consistency and scale, have no precedent since the early 1970s, and in some ways since the Soviet Union’s preparations for World War II. In Chinese literature, they are explicitly compared with major mobilization programs undertaken when China was preparing for a war with the USSR in the 1960s and 1970s, specifically with Third Front Construction.

These measures are not noticeable but are an important component of the general trend towards total securitization of all aspects of Chinese policy (even, e.g., culture and ecology) per Xi Jinping’s Holistic Security Concept.

The measures’ extreme cost indicates that, although the Chinese leadership advances optimistic conceptions like the Community of Common Destiny for Mankind and a “universally beneficial, inclusive economic globalization,” the leadership actually adheres to an extremely bleak outlook for the world in the 21st century. It is preparing—at the very least—for a severe military and political crisis, including the disruption of all normal economic ties and a slide to the brink of war. At worst, it is preparing for even more nightmarish scenarios.

This worldview likely yields China’s paradoxical behavior in the international arena, where clear claims to superpower status and visions of global scope are accompanied by passivity—essentially cowardice—in the face of unilateral U.S. actions.

Authors: 

Vassily B. Kashin, PhD in Political Science National Research University–Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia, Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies Director

Veronika A. Smirnova, PhD in Political Science, National Research University–Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia, Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies Head of Asia-Pacific Department

Alexandra D. Yankova, National Research University–Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia, Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies, Junior Research Fellow

This article examines China’s comprehensive mobilization policies undertaken since the early 2020s. Analysis reveals that they span multiple domains. First, China is developing a protected inland reserve of critical industrial capacity. Second, it is strengthening emergency supply mechanisms and accelerating the accumulation of food and raw-material reserves. Third, it is enhancing civil defense and urban infrastructure resilience, including the expansion of the ‘people’s air defense’ system. Fourth, recently amended legislation now regulates military service and the government’s obligations towards fallen servicemen’s families. The scope and pace of these measures indicate that Beijing anticipates a severe military-political crisis in the coming decade. This partly explains Chinese foreign policy’s apparent contradictions, with stated global ambitions coexisting alongside strategic caution and risk aversion.

In the early 2020s, China commenced a series of mobilization measures that, in consistency and scale, have no precedent since the early 1970s, and in some ways since the Soviet Union’s preparations for World War II. In Chinese literature, they are explicitly compared with major mobilization programs undertaken when China was preparing for a war with the USSR in the 1960s and 1970s, specifically with Third Front Construction.[1]

These measures are not noticeable but are an important component of the general trend towards total securitization of all aspects of Chinese policy (even, e.g., culture and ecology) per Xi Jinping’s Holistic Security Concept.[2]

The measures’ extreme cost indicates that, although the Chinese leadership advances optimistic conceptions like the Community of Common Destiny for Mankind and a “universally beneficial, inclusive economic globalization,” the leadership actually adheres to an extremely bleak outlook for the world in the 21st century. It is preparing—at the very least—for a severe military and political crisis, including the disruption of all normal economic ties and a slide to the brink of war. At worst, it is preparing for even more nightmarish scenarios.

This worldview likely yields China’s paradoxical behavior in the international arena, where clear claims to superpower status and visions of global scope are accompanied by passivity—essentially cowardice—in the face of unilateral U.S. actions.

If preparing for the apocalypse, such behavior is entirely reasonable. If the world is ruled by force, one must prepare for the worst and avoid risks until completely ready for the main battle. According to this logic, Nicolas Maduro’s fate, and even the Islamic Republic’s survival in Iran, are not important enough to disrupt preparations for the decisive conflict.

Such conclusions are prompted by various documented actions of the Chinese government, including:

• a program for relocating strategic industry inland to create a ‘strategic hinterland’ there;
• major civil defense and urban infrastructure resilience projects, including on the basis of lessons from Russia’s Special Military Operation;
• measures to strengthen the resilience of the national energy system;
• improvement of national legislation to clarify the terms of military service and provide timely support for families of fallen soldiers and law enforcement officers;
• the urgent build-up of food and raw material reserves.

Notably, these mobilization measures differ from buildup of the military itself, in that they bring few political pidends outside a full-scale war.

Building up the armed forces brings tangible foreign policy benefits but does not necessarily indicate a willingness to actually fight. Things like new aircraft carriers, fighters, and missiles can impress both foreign and domestic audiences, expand the country’s options for protecting its international interests, and permit impressive local military operations.

Mobilization programs, on the contrary, are useful only during major wars or disasters. They are expensive and tend to irritate or even scare people in peacetime. Mobilization readiness can strengthen strategic stability, but strategic offensive weapons are more important for that.

Therefore, mobilization policy is the most reliable indicator of a state’s strategic plans and intentions.

China’s measures do not necessarily indicate an intention to initiate a large-scale military conflict, but they certainly indicate that the Chinese leadership considers such a conflict very likely and perhaps unavoidable, sometime in the late 2020s or early 2030s. It would seem that the scenarios under consideration range from severe sanctions and naval blockade to a major war with missile strikes on Chinese cities.

Preparations for such an extreme scenario seem central to China’s planning of military—as well as foreign and domestic—policy. And these preparations are taking place alongside an accelerated buildup of strategic nuclear forces and hardened command posts.

Simultaneously, in 2023, China conducted purges of its armed forces, foreign policy staff, and mobilization structures: the Ministry of Emergency Management, the State Grain Reserve Bureau, the China Grain Reserves Corporation (now China Grain Reserves Group), etc.

Some of these moves followed inspections of the inventory and condition of mobilization infrastructure. For instance, senior officials of the Chinese Grain Reserves Corporation were prosecuted.

The army’s reshuffle may be similar to the major purges carried out by the great powers before World War II. A classic example is the major purge of the U.S. Army in September 1939,[3] undertaken by President Franklin Roosevelt and Army Chief of Staff George Marshall to bring the top army command in line with the needs of a major war. However, comparisons to Stalin’s Great Purge of 1937-1938 would clearly be an exaggeration: as far as is known, the vast majority of Chinese party disciplinary inquiries never reach court, ending with expulsion from the party, dismissal from the service, demotion, or other soft measures.

Relocation of Production Facilities: a Strategic Hinterland, Industrial Backup Bases, and Support Zones

The term ‘strategic hinterland’ (战略腹地)[4] was brought into official use by President Xi Jinping during an inspection trip to Sichuan Province in July 2023. Xi noted that the province is a “strategic hinterland,” as it has a “unique and important position in national development and in the Great Western Development Strategy.” This status imposes a whole range of obligations on the province, such as ensuring production, supply-chain, energy, and food security (Xinhua, 2023a). The Sichuan and Chongqing regions have essentially been tasked with building a national strategic reserve of resources and industry.

Xi also termed the Guangxi region a ‘strategic hinterland’ during an inspection trip there in December 2023, emphasizing its role in supporting the development of the Guangdong–Hong-Kong–Macao Greater Bay Area (Xinhua, 2023b). So, a ‘strategic hinterland’ is a territory that acts as a ‘rear area’ and resource base for a large industrial-technological macroregion, and, more broadly, for the whole country.

Speaking at the Central Economic Work Conference in December 2023, Xi stressed the need “to improve the distribution of major productive forces and strengthen the construction of the national strategic hinterland” (Xinhua, 2023c) linking this to the regional coordination agenda. This task was fixed in a March 2024 report on the work of the government, which called for updating plans for the functional zoning of the country (Xinhua, 2024a).

In subsequent documents, ‘strategic hinterland’ was linked more tightly to industrial security. The Third Plenary Session of the CCP’s 20th Central Committee, held on 18 July 2024, adopted the resolution “On Further Comprehensive Deepening of Reform and Chinese Modernization,” which for the first time mentioned the need to “build a national strategic hinterland and backup capacity for key industries” (Xinhua, 2024b). This phrase, which has become a fixed expression, meant enhancing the security of production and distribution chains, creating a risk-assessment and -prevention system, transferring key industry deep inside the country to ensure its resilience, and developing national resource reserves. Key industries include integrated circuits, medical equipment, industrial equipment and machine tools, basic and industrial software, and advanced materials (Ibid).

The Third Plenary Session’s resolution also spurred discussion in the Chinese academic community about the meaning of ‘strategic hinterland.’ Interestingly, it focused on comparisons with the Third Line construction program of the 1960s-1970s—a large-scale inland relocation of defense and other industries.

The modern strategy is seen as departing from the solely defensive Third Line, in that it seeks to integrate security with high-quality development. Reserves should be “living” and serve as centers of growth for “new quality productive forces.” In peacetime, they are to generate innovations and fully participate in market competition.

Nevertheless, despite the emphasis on economic efficiency, the academic discussion of the ‘strategic hinterland’ clearly reveals its role as a rear area in the military sense. Sichuan is described as a “deep strategic rear area for national security” (国家战略安全大后方).[5]

Plans for developing the strategic hinterland envision: First, enhancing key production lines’ ability to quickly switch from peacetime to emergency operation (平急转换) (Qingping and Rui, 2024). Second, developing strategic corridors—including the Yangtze Golden Waterway, the New Land-Sea Trade Corridor, and routes to Central Asia and Europe—so as to integrate China’s interior regions into national and trans-Eurasian transport networks (Shuwei, Xiumin, and Jincheng, 2024). Third, creating energy and resource reserves in the strategic hinterland, including infrastructure for storing and processing coal, oil, natural gas, lithium, and rare earth metals (Jianxun and Danning, 2024).

In addition to the strategic hinterland (Sichuan and Chongqing regions), Chinese mobilization plans mention the creation of ‘industrial backup bases,’ most often in reference to Guizhou Province, where energy resources, minerals, big data, and key equipment are to be stored. Reports on the work of the provincial government describe Guizhou as a “nationally-significant reserve industrial base” (全国重要的产业备份基地) (NPCCS, 2025).

The 15th Five-Year Plan extended the list of reserve bases and the ‘support areas’ that are intended to ensure the operation of industry in the strategic core. There are signs of competition between Chinese regions, including the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region and Heilongjiang Province (both bordering Russia) (Proposals, 2025; Report, 2025)—for participation in such programs.

Thus, only the wealthiest coastal provinces of Eastern China are excluded from the programs, although some local leaders seek a role in them anyway. For instance, in 2024, the Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference of Huai’an (in the coastal Jiangsu Province) suggested including the city plans for building a “national strategic hinterland” (The Paper, 2025).

Improving the Material Reserves Management System

One of the Chinese government’s key priorities is to reorganize and streamline the strategic reserves management system. Several laws have been adopted to this end. The National Food Security Law entered into force on 1 June 2024, the Energy Law on 1 January 2025, and the Mineral Resources Law on 1 July 2025.

Based on the conclusions drawn by the country’s leadership amid the COVID-19 pandemic, the emergency response system was reorganized during the 14th Five-Year Plan period (PRCSC, 2022a). The key goal was to form a stable multi-level management model, under which central authorities are responsible for strategic planning, interregional coordination, and operation of the unified digital platform, while regions are in charge of operationally deploying resources and implementing plans on the ground. This work involves creating professional emergency rescue teams, establishing standard command posts, and unifying response measures depending on the type and level of emergency.

As part of the emergency supply system’s reform, a network of backup storage facilities has been created, with five tiers: national/central, provincial, city, county, and township (Notice, 2023). Government reserves are supplemented by private ones, as companies store reserves in their own warehouses, commit to providing capacity for emergency production, and conclude advance contracts for supply in an emergency.

On 7 January 2026, China’s National Development and Reform Commission published a draft Law on the Security of State Reserves (Draft, 2026.) Currently, there is no single basic and comprehensive law to regulate the management of all types of reserves. Work on the new law began in 2023. Its key goal is to increase the state reserves’ capability to ensure national security. The draft law has nine sections and 60 articles that regulate the planning, receipt, storage, and use of material reserves, as well as the management of associated infrastructure. It also defines state reserves as resources stored for the needs of national development and security: grain, other key agricultural products, agricultural inputs, energy resources, minerals, critical equipment and components, and emergency supplies. It also states that the reserve system consists not only of the stockpiles of materials, but also of the capacity to rapidly increase their extraction/production in an emergency.

Accelerated Technological Development of the Mobilization System

Chinese provinces and cities are implementing accelerated infrastructure development programs for mobilization of the economy and ‘people’s air defense’[6] on a modern technological basis.

Some Chinese articles on infrastructure resilience enhancement refer directly to Russia’s Special Military Operation. They call for improving civil defense and warning systems, for increasing integrated urban security (shelters, evacuation routes, etc.) (Importance…, 2022), and for ‘hardening’ critical economic facilities (On Protection…, 2022). One of the few publicly available documents on the development of people’s air defense is Chongqing’s plan for the 14th five-year period. It envisages a four-level protection system: ‘protection of the core’ (preservation of critical government functions and administration), ‘protection of life’ (shelters and life support for the population, integrated with medical care and evacuation), ‘protection of capabilities’ (preservation of the economic and military-industrial base), and ‘protection of operation’ (continuous operation of critical infrastructure) (Plan, 2021).

The new civil defense system’s most important feature is the creation of flexible control systems capable of instantly converting civilian infrastructure to military or emergency needs.

Such programs have already been implemented in several Chinese provinces. Chongqing is building a three-level control system capable of quickly switching to emergency response mode. It is based on the emergency command communication system, which ensures communication, even in the event of partial infrastructural damage, by employing backup channels and redundant critical nodes (Plan, 2024).

Another area of work is the development of dual-use public infrastructure (平急两用). Key public facilities—stadiums, exhibition centers, large cultural and educational institutions, as well as hotels and industrial complexes—are now designed with the ability to quickly become hospitals, temporary accommodations, or aid distribution centers (Guidelines, 2024).

Adaptation of Legislation for Large-Scale Conflict

In 2024-2025, China adopted several regulations for commemorating fallen soldiers and law enforcement officers, and for supporting their families. The system is meant to respond faster to information about fatalities in the line of duty.

In 2024, the State Council issued a new version of the Regulations on Perpetuating the Memory of Fallen Heroes (Resolution 791) (Xinhua, 2024c) which clarifies the criteria and procedures for recognizing the right to benefits, thereby strengthening financial guarantees for families, as well as the maintenance and protection of memorials. In a major change, the Ministry of Veterans’ Affairs was authorized to review decisions on the (non-)recognition of people as fallen heroes.

In 2025, the Measures for Recognizing Fallen Heroes were adopted to clarify the entire system’s operation. The document (5 sections, 40 articles) establishes unified standards and procedures for granting Notices of Recognition as a Fallen Hero. It defines recognition criteria, procedural mechanisms, and special provisions for wartime and emergency situations (Measures, 2025).

The procedure is structured bottom-up within the administrative hierarchy. A county-level Veterans’ Affairs authority can initiate the process for several reasons. Requests can also be submitted by the employer or relatives of the deceased, or by persons/organizations present at the incident. The county-level VA conducts an initial inquiry and, if there are grounds, submits a report to the county government for approval, after which it goes to the prefecture and finally provincial levels. The standards of investigation explicitly state the need to establish the cause, course, and outcome of the event, the deceased’s behavior, factual details of the incident, and civic significance. The total review period should not exceed 30 business days.

Soldiers’ and firefighters’ cases are supervised by the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission and the Ministry of Emergency Management, respectively. Review is mandatory: the provincial authorities, the military, and the Ministry of Emergency Management report on a monthly basis to the Ministry of Veterans’ Affairs—which, in turn, verifies facts, confirms adherence to procedures, and announces results quarterly.

These regulations give no instructions to prepare for mass casualties, but their logic—centralization, unification, strict deadlines (monthly submission and quarterly feedback), and review by the national Ministry of Veterans’ Affairs—creates a mechanism for the mass processing of applications. In a major conflict or emergency, this architecture can handle a significant flow of cases systematically and without any bureaucratic disruption.

Building Up Reserves of Food and Other Strategically Important Materials

In the early 2020s, China rapidly tightened food security requirements for the agro-industrial complex and local authorities. The government is taking a range of costly measures to strengthen the country’s self-sufficiency in terms of basic foodstuffs, seeds, and agricultural machinery.

China intends to significantly increase its food production and storage capabilities. To this end, it has prioritized the protection of arable lands, stable production of grain crops, and management of national reserves. To put things in order, China adopted the National Food Security Law in 2023, the first regulatory act covering the entire food security system from top to bottom (PRCSC, 2023).

China has a multi-level system for accumulating and redistributing strategic reserves of food and fertilizers, and detailed regulations for activating these strategic reserves in an emergency. The country’s grain reserves are said to be at their historical maximum (NFSRA, 2025). Grain storage infrastructure is also steadily being expanded and modernized.

Some of the new measures are clearly at odds with China’s well-known long-term policy priorities, testifying to their extraordinary character. These measures include: a ban since 2022 on converting farmland to forest (PRCSC, 2022b); the cutting-down of some forests previously planted under state programs; and directives issued since 2023, by the National Development and Reform Commission, to reduce the length of time that soil lies fallow and to increase fertilizer production (NDRC, 2023; 2024; 2025). Fertilizer manufacturers appear to face weaker greenhouse-gas constraints than other industries.

The government is also taking measures to accelerate import substitution for high-tech agricultural machinery and seeds. In 2022, China set the goal of becoming an ‘agricultural powerhouse.’ This includes: the production of critical components for agricultural machinery (PRCSC, 2024); the achievement of 32% digitalization in agriculture by 2028 (PRCMoA, 2024); and a technological breakthrough in seed production (PRCMoA, 2021). GMO regulations, a sensitive issue stalled since the 1990s, were eased in 2022 (PRCMoA, 2023),

All this indicates that China is preparing for a major disruption of global food trade—and possibly a blockade—within the next few years.

Similar trends apply to other strategic reserves. By 2024, China’s crude oil storage capacity had exceeded 1.8 billion barrels, 130% of U.S. capacity (Collins, 2024). Although China had decided to gradually reduce coal consumption after 2026, there has been no significant progress in decommissioning coal mining enterprises. Some of the closed mines are maintained in a state of technical readiness and rewarded for keeping their capacities available (CREA, 2025). China is also building up strategic reserves of metals such as copper, aluminum, zinc, and cobalt. For some metals, visible market demand exceeds actual industrial need, indicating the accumulation of stockpiles (Wischer, G.D., 2024).

Prospecting has also been intensified, especially in the west. For instance, three deep deposits, with over 500 billion cubic meters of coalbed methane, have been discovered in the Ordos Basin (Inner Mongolia, Gansu, Shaanxi). A lithium ore belt, spanning about 3,000 km from the Jiajika deposit in Sichuan to Altyn-Tagh in Xinjiang, has an estimated capacity of 20-30 million tons (Xinhua, 2025).

* * *

China’s government is quietly but quickly turning it into an impregnable fortress, which, when completed, should have some resilience even to full-scale nuclear conflict. To achieve this goal, the Chinese government spares no expense: mobilization takes priority in urban planning, energy, agriculture, and high-tech industry. The expansion of China’s nuclear deterrent is also reducing the chance of war directly touching the Chinese mainland at all.

Chinese foreign policy is probably tied tightly to certain unknown indicators of resilience. Once these are achieved—with the completion of this new Great Wall of underground bunkers, factories hidden in the mountains, and nuclear missiles—China will not necessarily switch to an active and offensive foreign policy. This is certainly possible, but not predetermined.

There are certainly some issues that China views as its core interests: Taiwan, territorial disputes in the South China and East China Seas, and regional security in the western Pacific as a whole. China is already pursuing an active and offensive policy in these spheres, including through the use of military force. But these are regional issues.

At the global level, China is likely to try (not necessarily successfully) to continue a restrained and cautious policy: the phenomenal level of resilience that it has achieved will allow it to choose the time and scale of its participation in world affairs.

References

[1] The Third Front Construction program三线建设 (sanxian jianshe) was a large-scale industrial and defense campaign launched in 1964 amid sharply deteriorating relations with the USSR. Its purpose was to create industrial facilities, protected from external attack, in the mountainous interior regions of the country’s west.

[2] The concept of ‘holistic national security’ 总体国家安全观 (zongti guojia anquanguan), put forward by Xi Jinping in 2014, is based on an expanded understanding of national security as encompassing not only the military and politics, but also economics, finance, energy, food, technology, cyberspace, ideology, culture, ecology, outer space, and deep-sea and polar areas.

[3] Within a short time, over 600 senior officers and generals were dismissed from the Army, which had less than 200,000 personnel in 1939, after Marshall tested commanders’ aptitude for large-scale conflict.

[4] Dictionaries define 腹地 (fudi) as internal/central territory around a country’s economic and administrative core, in contrast to coastal and border areas. Geoeconomically and strategically, 腹地is a robust spatial base for the development and positioning of basic resources, backup functions, and industry.

[5] The term ‘rear area’ 大后方 (dahoufang) was coined during the Sino-Japanese war of 1937–1945 and extensively used by both the Kuomintang and the Communists. It described the material base, formed in the southwest from evacuated enterprises and institutions, for resistance to the Japanese.

[6] The term ‘people’s air defense’ 人民防空 (renmin fangkong), as used in legislation, has a slightly narrower meaning than the Russian ‘civil defense’. It denotes shelters, warning systems, facility camouflaging, and the preparation of cities for mobilization and cooperation with the air defense system.

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References

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PRCSC, 2022b.自然资源部、国家林草局、国家发展改革委、财政部、农业农村部关于进一步完善政策措施、巩固退耕还林还草成果的通知 [Ministry of Natural Resources, National Forest and Grass Bureau, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs: Notice on Further Improvement of Policies and Measures to Consolidate the Results of Conversion of Farmland to Forests and Grass]. PRC State Council, 28 October. https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2022-11/11/content_5726119.html

PRCSC, 2023. 中华人民共和国粮食安全保障法 [National Food Security Law]. PRC State Council, 30 December. https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202312/content_6923387.htm

PRCSC, 2024. 农业农村部关于印发《全国农业科技创新重点领域（2024–2028年）》的通知 [Notice of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs on the Issuance of the “National Key Areas of Agricultural Science and Technology Innovation (2024-2028)”]. PRC State Council, 5 November. https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202502/content_7003703.html

Proposals, 2025. 内蒙古自治区党委关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十五个五年规划的建议 [Proposals of the CPC Committee of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region on the Development of the 15th Five-year Socio-Economic Development Plan]. People’s Government of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, 25 November. https://nmgjgdj.gov.cn/jgdj/zzqyw/69264bb2f14cc6722dd88c62.shtml

Pu Qingping and Ma Rui, 2024. 国家战略腹地建设的内涵特征、重大意义和推进策略 [Connotation Characteristics, Great Significance and Promotion Strategy of National Strategic Hinterland Construction]. 重庆大学学报（社会科学版）[Journal of Chongqing University (Social Science Edition)], 30(4), p. 46.

Report, 2025. 关于黑龙江省2024年国民经济和社会发展计划执行情况与2025年国民经济和社会发展计划草案的报告 [Report on the mplementation of Heilongjiang Province’s 2024 National Economic and Social Development Plan and the Draft 2025 National Economic and Social Development Plan]. Heilongjiang Province People’s Government. 11 February. https://www.hlj.gov.cn/hlj/c107856/202502/c00_31810453.shtml

Shi Jianxun and Lu Danning, 2024.石建勋、卢丹宁. 健全提升产业链供应链韧性和安全水平制度研究 A Sound System to Enhance the Resilience and Security of the Industrial Supply Chain]. 财经问题研究 [Research on Financial and Economic Issues], 11, pp. 3-17.

An Shuwei, Shen Xiumin, and Xiao Jincheng, 2024. 中国战略腹地的科学内涵与建设路径 [The Scientific Connotation and Construction Path of China’s Strategic Hinterland]. 中国软科学 [China Soft Science], 12, pp. 1-11.

The Paper, 2025. 江苏两会丨委员建议支持淮安建设“国家战略腹地” [Jiangsu Two Sessions: a member of the CPPCC suggests supporting the construction of Huaian as a “national strategic hinterland”]. The Paper, 25 January. https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_26137062

Wischer, G.D., 2024. Statement for the Record before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on “China’s Stockpiling and Mobilization Measures for Competition and Conflict”. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2024-06/Gregory_Wischer_Statement_for_the_Record.pdf

Xinhua, 2023a. 习近平在四川考察时强调：推动新时代治蜀兴川再上新台阶，奋力谱写中国式现代化四川新篇章，返京途中在陕西汉中考察 [Xi Jinping Emphasizes the Need to Raise the Development of Sichuan to a New Level and Write a New, Sichuan Chapter of Chinese Modernization]. Xinhua, 29 July. https://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/2023-07/29/c_1129775942.htm

Xinhua, 2023b. 在推动高质量发展上展现更大作为——习近平总书记在广西考察时的重要讲话提振信心、催人奋进 [Show a Greater Role in Promoting High-Quality Development—General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Important Speech during His Visit to Guangxi Boosted Confidence and Urged People to Forge Ahead]. Xinhua, 16 December. https://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/2023-12/16/c_1130030328.htm

Xinhua, 2023c. 中央经济工作会议在北京举行，习近平发表重要讲话 [Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech at the Central Economic Work Conference in Beijing]. Xinhua. 12 December. https://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/2023-12/12/c_1130022917.html

Xinhua, 2024a. 政府工作报告 [Government Work Report]. Xinhua, 12 March. https://www.news.cn/politics/20240312/bd0e2ae727334f6b9f59e924c871c5c2/c.html

Xinhua, 2024b. 中共中央关于进一步全面深化改革，推进中国式现代化的决定 [Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China “On Further Comprehensive Deepening of Reform and Chinese Modernization]. Xinhua, 21 July. https://www.news.cn/politics/20240721/cec09ea2bde840dfb99331c48ab5523a/c.html

Xinhua, 2024c. 烈士褒扬条例 [Regulations on the Praise of Martyrs]. Xinhua, 29 September. https://www.news.cn/politics/20240929/8b9cfc733bde4d25b825d98edafab752/c.html

Xinhua, 2025. 新一轮找矿行动，有重大突破！ [A New Round of Geological Prospecting Operations Make a Major Breakthrough!]. Xinhua, 14 February. https://www.news.cn/politics/20250214/d4bae7d3bef246b5bc56c852cb1ef85a/c.html

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Source: Russia in Global Affairs