The Era of Chaos and a New Crisis Around Iran

US President Donald Trump has never concealed his intention to act decisively in international affairs, but what we witnessed at the beginning of this year exceeded all expectations. Following the capture of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro and the imposition of stringent measures against Cuba, the United States and Israel initiated military action against Iran on February 28, 2026. Among Russian and foreign experts, opinions differ on the rationale for these actions. In our view, the primary driving force, as with earlier measures against Chinese firms in the Panama Canal Zone and elsewhere, is the intensifying US­­–China rivalry. At the same time, both the US and the PRC seek to ensure that competition remains contained within certain boundaries. Both sides are meticulously preparing for Trump’s visit to China and the forthcoming negotiations.

The crisis surrounding Iran is currently escalating. The United States and Israel hold dominance in the military sphere—particularly in electronic warfare, airspace, and maritime domains. However, Iran’s armed forces have largely retained their combat capability and continue to resist. A full-scale ground operation by the US and Israel is unlikely—at most, they might seize Khark Island, through which the main export of Iranian oil passes, and parts of the coast of the Strait of Hormuz to secure shipping, as well as conduct landings to establish control over Iranian uranium reserves. The course and duration of the confrontation are extremely difficult to predict at present. It is gradually becoming apparent that the diplomatic situation is not playing out in Iran’s favour. Initially, only a small number of countries openly supported the US and Israel. But after Iran began attacks on neighbouring states, global attitudes shifted. Tehran’s calculations—that the threat of expanded conflict and chaos in the global economy would pressure influential Gulf states to push the US to halt military action—proved mistaken. On the contrary, the number of Iran’s rivals (and even enemies) has increased, and they have consolidated to some extent.

Contemporary international relations are experiencing an era of “interregnum”, in which the old system ceases to exist while the new is only beginning to take shape, creating fertile ground for chaos, the most unexpected crises, twists, and combinations of developments, believes Professor Konstantin Khudoley of the School of International Relations of Saint Petersburg State University.

US President Donald Trump has never concealed his intention to act decisively in international affairs, but what we witnessed at the beginning of this year exceeded all expectations. Following the capture of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro and the imposition of stringent measures against Cuba, the United States and Israel initiated military action against Iran on February 28, 2026. Among Russian and foreign experts, opinions differ on the rationale for these actions. In our view, the primary driving force, as with earlier measures against Chinese firms in the Panama Canal Zone and elsewhere, is the intensifying US­­–China rivalry. At the same time, both the US and the PRC seek to ensure that competition remains contained within certain boundaries. Both sides are meticulously preparing for Trump’s visit to China and the forthcoming negotiations.

The crisis surrounding Iran is currently escalating. The United States and Israel hold dominance in the military sphere—particularly in electronic warfare, airspace, and maritime domains. However, Iran’s armed forces have largely retained their combat capability and continue to resist. A full-scale ground operation by the US and Israel is unlikely—at most, they might seize Khark Island, through which the main export of Iranian oil passes, and parts of the coast of the Strait of Hormuz to secure shipping, as well as conduct landings to establish control over Iranian uranium reserves. The course and duration of the confrontation are extremely difficult to predict at present. It is gradually becoming apparent that the diplomatic situation is not playing out in Iran’s favour. Initially, only a small number of countries openly supported the US and Israel. But after Iran began attacks on neighbouring states, global attitudes shifted. Tehran’s calculations—that the threat of expanded conflict and chaos in the global economy would pressure influential Gulf states to push the US to halt military action—proved mistaken. On the contrary, the number of Iran’s rivals (and even enemies) has increased, and they have consolidated to some extent.

Western European states, initially restrained, are now seeking to strengthen energy ties with the US amid the threat of an energy crisis. The French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, already in the Mediterranean, and naval vessels from other Western European states, preparing to deploy in the region, are acting not only to demonstrate solidarity with Cyprus, but also because they perceive a threat to their own interests, making their participation in military operations plausible. The Gulf states attacked by Iran have suffered significant losses—oil and gas production, desalination, tourism, and more—but none intends to capitulate. The Arab League and the Organization of Turkic States have expressed support for Iran’s neighbours subjected to attacks. Pakistan has made it clear that it will honour the 2025 treaty with Saudi Arabia. Even China, a country close to Iran, is concerned about the disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz due to its heavy reliance on oil supplies from the region.

Despite the prevailing trend towards chaos and unpredictability in international relations and the policies of inpidual states, several possible scenarios for the development of events can be outlined.

The first scenario envisages the US and Israel, having achieved their objectives of destroying facilities related to nuclear energy, missile production, and other armaments, concluding that halting military action is financially and politically more advantageous than continuing it, while maintaining sanctions in full. In this case, Iran’s current political system would persist in a severely weakened form, but hardliners within the ruling circles would gain influence. They would strive to rebuild the country’s devastated military potential, likely leading to renewed hostilities after some time. Internal contradictions in Iran would inevitably sharpen, and domestic tensions would remain high.

The second scenario, somewhat reminiscent of Venezuela, involves a change of ruling circles (not merely the ruler at the top) while maintaining the core of the existing political system. This could occur if prominent political and religious figures, senior and mid-level commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and connected organisations, were eliminated, clearing the way for mid- and lower-level bureaucrats, moderate opposition activists, and military personnel to assume positions of power, their role proving crucial, if not decisive. Although the current picture is incomplete, it appears that US and Israeli strikes are focused on the IRGC, and army losses beyond the top leadership are not substantial. The likelihood that Iranian forces would accept “unconditional surrender” is minimal, but they might make certain concessions to the US to end hostilities and prevent economic collapse. 

The third scenario—the most desirable from a US perspective—is the dismantling of Iran’s entire political system and the rise of a broad coalition of its opponents.

This could include internal opposition forces popular in major cities and among educated strata, émigrés (many highly educated and talented inpiduals who wield significant influence abroad yet remain concerned about their homeland—US politicians cannot ignore the two-million-strong, highly active Iranian diaspora), and parts of the current elite, most likely mid- and lower-level bureaucrats. Prince Reza Pahlavi—the son of the last Shah—is viewed as a potential leader. While his political activity and recognition have surged in recent months, the consolidation of discontent around him is not yet evident. Moreover, the internal opposition is poorly organised, and the impact of air strikes, affecting civilians as well, remains unclear. Should this coalition come together and take power after all, a restoration of the monarchy would not occur, nor would Iran adopt Western-style democracy. It can only be predicted with certainty that the government would be entirely secular. In foreign policy, Iran would become one of America’s closest partners while seeking constructive relations with Russia, as Shah-era Iran did.

The fourth scenario is that of a slide into complete chaos. Central and, to a large extent, local authorities would be paralysed, command over security forces lost, and each unit—or even parts of them—would act independently. Both international and internal economic links would collapse, housing and utilities would operate with major disruptions (already partially evident), crime and other negative phenomena would only worsen. There could be a period without a force capable of restoring proper governance and basic order. No one would be able to negotiate peace on Iran’s behalf. At the same time, any international intervention would likely fail, partly due to civilian resistance—Iranians possess a strong sense of national pride and a keen memory of the negative consequences of foreign interference over the past two centuries.

The fifth scenario involves chaos evolving into civil war, likely involving conflict between multiple centres rather than just two. It could be extremely brutal and draw in neighbouring states.

The probability of events following the first four scenarios appears roughly equal, while the outbreak of civil war remains unlikely at present. Other scenarios may emerge as events unfold, but in all cases, one can predict with high confidence that stability in the region will not be restored in the medium term.

Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov rightly noted that “this is not our war”. Russia maintains a comprehensive strategic partnership with Iran, good relations with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other Arab states, and mutual understanding on a number of issues with Israel. Objectively, Russia’s influence in the Middle East today is greater than that of the USSR even at its peak, as Russia can shape developments that unfold on a regional scale, rather than just in inpidual “socialist-oriented” countries. Severing or even merely worsening relations with any state for the benefit of another partner would be rather irrational, as Russia could play a significant role in political-diplomatic settlement processes due to its working relations with all regional states. At this particular moment, Russia faces both political-economic gains and losses. The greatest concerns are the emergence of a large-scale armed conflict at its southern borders, the fate of the North–South transport corridor, and conditions in the global energy market. Above all, however, there is the imperative to determine Russia’s long-term strategy in this exceptionally important region. The Middle East, like the world at large, is living through an era of “interregnum”, and Russia must work hard to secure a worthy place in the emerging configuration of international relations.