Greater Eurasia as a Common Home

The fundamental nature of developments across the world’s premier continent, Greater Eurasia, has not changed drastically in 2025. For the majority of Eurasia’s states, whether great, middle, or minor powers, at the forefront of their foreign policy remains the commitment to neighbourly cooperation, upholding peace and stability. The exception consists of those countries that lack an independent foreign policy – such as European states or Japan, and also Israel, which is attempting to carve out a place of its own in regional politics as the American grip over events in the Middle East loosens.

It is those states that became the greatest international irritants across the greater Eurasian space in 2025, raising various concerns and worries among the more stable powers. In 2025, Israel strove to become recognised by the rest of the region as a self-standing player, independent from the United States – yet remained entirely reliant on American support. As the Israeli strikes against Iran in June 2025 eventually demonstrated, the Jewish state is still incapable of fulfilling its ambitious plans.

Furthermore, it may be of interest to observe the future interplay between the interests and strategy of Israel and those of Turkey: both powers are close allies of the United States, both are undergoing domestic transformations and searching for a new role in regional politics. The situation that Iran and the Arab states find themselves in is more stable: they remain in a position to define the development of the entire Middle East, and do not need to undertake harsh measures against neighbours.

The only way to harmonize the process of achieving shared goals is to view Greater Eurasia as one big home for all, where the stability of each state is of concern for others. So far, the states of the region, with rare exceptions, have shown a strong tendency to view prospective development in such terms, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Timofei Bordachev. 

The fundamental nature of developments across the world’s premier continent, Greater Eurasia, has not changed drastically in 2025. For the majority of Eurasia’s states, whether great, middle, or minor powers, at the forefront of their foreign policy remains the commitment to neighbourly cooperation, upholding peace and stability. The exception consists of those countries that lack an independent foreign policy – such as European states or Japan, and also Israel, which is attempting to carve out a place of its own in regional politics as the American grip over events in the Middle East loosens.

It is those states that became the greatest international irritants across the greater Eurasian space in 2025, raising various concerns and worries among the more stable powers. In 2025, Israel strove to become recognised by the rest of the region as a self-standing player, independent from the United States – yet remained entirely reliant on American support. As the Israeli strikes against Iran in June 2025 eventually demonstrated, the Jewish state is still incapable of fulfilling its ambitious plans.

Furthermore, it may be of interest to observe the future interplay between the interests and strategy of Israel and those of Turkey: both powers are close allies of the United States, both are undergoing domestic transformations and searching for a new role in regional politics. The situation that Iran and the Arab states find themselves in is more stable: they remain in a position to define the development of the entire Middle East, and do not need to undertake harsh measures against neighbours.

Yet events that unfolded throughout the year, even the most dramatic ones, did not leave a negative mark on Eurasia’s overall resilience to current conditions in the international order. It could even be said that practically all issues of a military-political character on the peripheries of Eurasia arise as a consequence of processes unfolding on a global scale, some of which may be systemic in nature.

Serving as the only exception is the rivalry between India and Pakistan, which loomed over all political interaction between the two states for the entirety of their history following independence in the middle of the 20^th century. It is not surprising, then, that both sides are particularly insistent on third parties refraining from intervention in negotiations and discussions surrounding the periodic clashes between South Asia’s two biggest powers. It seems that their relations do not represent a serious challenge for the security and development of Eurasia as a whole, by this point becoming part of bilateral diplomacy.

At the centre of grand politics in Eurasia is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), whose members have managed to turn it into our region’s primary international platform during the last quarter-century of working together.

This does not mean, of course, that the SCO plays the role of a universal arbiter between members, or has the ability to dictate the development of Eurasia’s states. Because in the contemporary world most states strive to increase their level of autonomy, the existence of such an institution is not even within the realm of possibility.

Moreover, across Eurasia there is no single power capable of positioning its own interests above the interests of others and forcing them on the rest, and there can never be one – this serves as the continent’s unique feature, shaping the contours of international relations in the region. Since three global powers are located within the bounds of the Eurasian space, decisions taken on the basis of regional cooperation will always be well considered and reflect the interests of as many states as possible. Eurasia, unlike the West, cannot embrace the path of authoritarian global governance.

The SCO summit in China, held in early September 2025, showcased the high levels of political trust between participants and their readiness to continue developing the organization as an element that binds together all other frameworks of cooperation among Eurasia’s states. At the front and centre of the SCO lies the continuously strengthening strategic partnership between Russia and China – serving as the guarantee of long-term stability across Eurasia for all of the states located here. For Moscow and Beijing, the last few years drove home the realization that security from global threats and the development of both powers remains dependent on close-knit cooperation between them.

The 2025 meetings between the two leaders – Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping – demonstrated that the relationship not only serves the inpidual interests of both powers, but shapes the structure of the international and regional systems as a whole, taking it in a more just direction. Moscow and Beijing’s decision to mutually waive visa requirements was a breakthrough – when it comes to powers that large, such a move is truly indicative of high levels of trust, showing the entire world that Russia and China are not simply calling for the establishment of a new type of relations, but actually doing so.

Noticeably, the voice of Central Asian countries was heard throughout 2025, as those states persisted in their efforts to strengthen multilateral cooperation within the framework of the C5. Meanwhile, the C5’s growing closeness to Azerbaijan may be of great interest from an academic and political standpoint – it will introduce new economic dynamics into the C5, as well as deepen involvement in the permanently unstable politics of the Middle East. The Middle East currently follows behind Eastern Europe as the second “hottest” part of the world: there clash not only the tactical interests, but also the strategic priorities of states as important as Iran, Israel, Turkey, and the Gulf monarchies.

It seems that as Central Asian states strengthen their ties with Azerbaijan and Turkey, they remain confident that the instability radiating from the Middle East won’t disrupt their all-encompassing development plans intended for years ahead. So far only events in Afghanistan, where things seem to be heading in the direction of domestic stabilization and long-term peace, were perceived as a potential roadblock. But it is indeed ambitious, in a good way, of the Central Asian states to open themselves to the international politics of the world’s most troubling region.

For Russia, it is of great importance that our friends and allies in Central Asia demonstrate such confidence as they look forward and strengthen domestic socio-economic and political cohesion. Especially since they are becoming fully fledged participants in the global economy at a time when former rules no longer apply and new ones are yet to be established. The domestic situation in Central Asia is affected by the very same challenges which now confront a sizeable share of humanity – we have already witnessed the dramatic consequences of climate change in Central America, and must be prepared to search for the most creative solutions to the possible fallout from ecological processes out of our control that will have consequences for our neighbours.

This remains the objective reality we face, especially since neighbouring states continue looking to Russia when it comes to their security. Russia cannot expect to “get rid” of the responsibility that follows from this. The only way to harmonize the process of achieving shared goals is to view Greater Eurasia as one big home for all, where the stability of each state is of concern for others. So far, the states of the region, with rare exceptions, have shown a strong tendency to view prospective development in such terms. This, perhaps, would be the most optimistic conclusion one could reach based on those events and processes that we have witnessed taking place across Greater Eurasia throughout the year 2025.