China’s Strategy in an Intensifying Global Rivalry
Doctor of Science, Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club; Academic supervisor of the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies, HSE University, RIAC Member
Short version
This is indeed the case: possessing colossal internal resources and attracting external investment, China has, over the course of just a few decades, secured leading positions in the global economy. It has then gone on to assert itself with considerable confidence as a global political actor. A decisive step in this direction was the unveiling in 2013 of the Belt and Road concept—a major initiative aimed at turning Chinese resources into a driver of development for entire regions. It has also provided many countries of the Global Majority with sources of development not tied to those traditionally controlled by the United States and Europe.
Full version
China is a power with an economy that remains intimately dependent on foreign markets—be it energy and raw resources to fuel an extensive industrial sector, consumer markets abroad to provide demand for manufactured goods, foreign capital to stimulate growth and innovation, or other major benefits derived from unimpeded access to the international economy. Timofei Bordachev, Programme Director of the Valdai Club, highlights that it is this stake in maintaining secure economic links with the outside world while sticking to a lighter touch in global affairs that may put Beijing in a difficult position vis-à-vis its increasingly assertive rival—the United States.
The dramatic events of the first months of 2026 on the global stage offer an excellent opportunity to examine how the role and significance of those powers regarded by many as potential architects of a new international order are evolving under contemporary conditions. Among them, China undoubtedly ranks first, even ahead of Russia and the United States, both absorbed in their rivalry in Europe. For quite some time now—from the 1990s through the 2000s—China’s rise, made possible by its economic achievements, has been one of the most important drivers of global transformation. It is no coincidence that one of the last major political thinkers of the twentieth century, Henry Kissinger, insisted that the qualitative increase in China’s international significance was far more consequential for the fate of the world than the end of Europe’s pision in 1989 or the conclusion of the Cold War in 1991.
This is indeed the case: possessing colossal internal resources and attracting external investment, China has, over the course of just a few decades, secured leading positions in the global economy. It has then gone on to assert itself with considerable confidence as a global political actor. A decisive step in this direction was the unveiling in 2013 of the Belt and Road concept—a major initiative aimed at turning Chinese resources into a driver of development for entire regions. It has also provided many countries of the Global Majority with sources of development not tied to those traditionally controlled by the United States and Europe.
In recent years, the Chinese leadership has also advanced compelling concepts such as the “Shared Future of Mankind” and new approaches to international security. All these initiatives have been enthusiastically received by a significant number of middle and small powers across Eurasia and beyond. This is all the more so given that China has substantially expanded its global investment presence in recent years, becoming an important economic partner for many countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
Against this backdrop, China has come to be perceived by many around the world as a genuine alternative to the United States and the West as a whole—actors that have grown rather tiresome in their attempts to cloak selfish interests in rhetoric about the virtues of an open market economy. The emergence of Beijing as a new player has thus been seen as evidence of a truly radical shift in the global balance of power, especially considering that Western countries have, for several decades, tied development assistance to the fulfilment of politically sensitive conditions.
For its part, China has consistently refrained from interfering in the domestic politics of its partner countries, opting instead to prioritise the stability of their government systems. It should be noted that this perception of China has been shaped not only by its own capabilities and rhetoric, but also by a certain inertia in global expectations regarding how a rising great power ought to behave. Even if China has never set itself the goal of displacing the United States as the global hegemon, its immense capabilities have inevitably fuelled growing expectations within the international community.
In general, inflated expectations regarding the strategies and tactical decisions that major powers ought to adopt amid a deteriorating international environment are a defining feature of contemporary international politics. This has been partly encouraged by Western countries—particularly the United States, which has repeatedly emphasised its status as a hegemon endowed with responsibility over all that unfolds in every corner of the world. At the same time, it reflects the simple desire of a significant group of middle and small powers to obtain an alternative, if not a full-fledged replacement, for the West.
Be that as it may, by the beginning of the current phase of restructuring the international order, China was already clearly perceived as a power comparable to the United States in terms of its influence on global affairs—and, correspondingly, its ability to insert itself into virtually any issue worldwide. Chinese rhetoric, shaped during a period when the United States exercised restraint even in regions geographically closest to it, has also contributed to this perception.
The radical changes that took place in recent months, despite their still uncertain consequences, have somewhat altered this picture. Above all, this is because China is now consistently refraining from intervention in matters where its vital interests are not affected—which, in turn, are largely confined to areas within its immediate Asian neighbourhood. Beijing reacted rather calmly to the United States’ attack on Venezuela in the opening days of 2026, despite having maintained quite friendly relations with the Venezuelan ruling regime. China has also refrained from attempting to assist Cuba, which is currently facing the harshest blockade in its history and is teetering on the brink of total state collapse.
In this context, some concerned observers have even questioned whether China is failing to meet the expectations placed upon it and thereby undermining its position on the broader international stage. Following the outbreak of US-Israeli aggression against Iran, China—unlike Russia—has adopted a markedly neutral and restrained stance towards the unfolding crisis in the Middle East, focusing its attention instead on negotiations with the United States on matters of bilateral interest. This is despite the fact that China is the principal consumer of Iranian oil, and that the collapse of Iran could have serious negative consequences for the People’s Republic of China. This is all the more noteworthy given that Iran is a full participant in organisations strongly supported by China—the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS.
Rather than decisively entering into confrontation with the United States at present, China has chosen to act modestly and to confine itself to defending its interests in its immediate periphery—proceeding from a long-term strategy of prevailing over America without engaging in direct confrontation. From our perspective, it would be strange to assess this choice unequivocally as erroneous. At the same time, however, it does raise several important questions. First, it remains unclear to what extent refraining from confrontation with its principal geopolitical adversary in “distant theatres” might affect Washington’s willingness in the future to shift towards offensive action in areas directly adjacent to China.
Should the United States succeed in its current revolutionary endeavours, its resolve may only grow stronger, presenting China with the prospect of encountering its adversary literally at its own doorstep. Second, China’s present restraint provides a compelling reason to revisit the following question: to what extent developments beyond their borders truly matter for powers of this scale—at least in situations concerning strategic survival. One of the axioms of international relations theory holds that only great powers themselves can pose a genuine threat to one another—nothing else.
In this sense, China is entirely correct: preserving internal stability and sustaining economic growth will, in time, draw even those countries currently under clear-cut US dominance into Beijing’s orbit. However, it must be taken into account that, unlike the United States or Russia, China possesses far more limited domestic resources in such a sensitive sphere as energy. Like Europe, it will remain dependent on external supplies—and therefore correspondingly vulnerable.
Ultimately, for a power of this kind, the disruption of external economic ties resulting from the loss of geopolitical positions may prove to be a significant factor undermining the very internal stability that the Chinese authorities seek to preserve. In other words, China may be too deeply embedded in the global economy to confine itself entirely to its immediate sphere of interests. In the not-too-distant future, we are likely to witness the consequences of decisions whose rationality now appears entirely self-evident.
Source: Valdai. Discussion club