Fahil Abdulbasit Abdulkareem

Juris Doctor, Researcher and lecturer at Duhok Polytechnic University, Iraqi Kurdistan Region

Column: Middle East Policy

Short version

Each piece on the Middle East chessboard has a function, yet some are always disposable. For the purpose of the game and to defend the throne, the Kurds are the ones usually ordered to fight and keep the line, only to eventually be crushed. For years, Syrian Kurds have viewed as pawns in a greater geopolitical game, which is a grave miscalculation. Kurds played a vital role in the years-long battle against ISIS in Syria alongside the United States. In the military, they were unsurpassed. However, the post-ISIS phase exposed a significant vulnerability in terms of politics and diplomacy; they failed to establish regional alliances and put all their stakes on the United States.

Since they were a stable and orderly army in a volatile landscape, the Kurds were Washington's most reliable ally in Syria. However, once the Assad regime fell on December 8, 2024, Syria's chessboard shifted. Damascus reestablished its influence in the US through middlemen like Turkey and Gulf states. In the meantime, the Kurds continued to be strategically isolated and entirely reliant on the US; Ankara and Damascus were actively working with the White House to establish an agreement that would put an end to Kurdish aspirations for an autonomous region in Syria.


Full version

Each piece on the Middle East chessboard has a function, yet some are always disposable. For the purpose of the game and to defend the throne, the Kurds are the ones usually ordered to fight and keep the line, only to eventually be crushed. For years, Syrian Kurds have viewed as pawns in a greater geopolitical game, which is a grave miscalculation. Kurds played a vital role in the years-long battle against ISIS in Syria alongside the United States. In the military, they were unsurpassed. However, the post-ISIS phase exposed a significant vulnerability in terms of politics and diplomacy; they failed to establish regional alliances and put all their stakes on the United States.

Since they were a stable and orderly army in a volatile landscape, the Kurds were Washington's most reliable ally in Syria. However, once the Assad regime fell on December 8, 2024, Syria's chessboard shifted. Damascus reestablished its influence in the US through middlemen like Turkey and Gulf states. In the meantime, the Kurds continued to be strategically isolated and entirely reliant on the US; Ankara and Damascus were actively working with the White House to establish an agreement that would put an end to Kurdish aspirations for an autonomous region in Syria.

Syrian Democratic Forces Face New Challenges After Negotiation Setback

The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces SDF commander Mazloum Abdi and the Syrian Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa most recent attempt to negotiate the implementation of the March 10 agreement, which took place on January 4, was unsuccessful. According to reputable sources in Damascus, this was because Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Sheibani purposefully sabotaged the talks. As a result, the negotiation phase came to an end, and a new phase that combined military pressure with negotiation started. The failure of the negotiations, which was followed by al-Sharaa's subsequent military actions against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), is blamed for this change in the dynamics of the negotiations.

In the months preceding the events in Rojava, a number of key occurrences occurred. In September, US President Donald Trump met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to strengthen their relationship and fill the void left by Iranian influence in Syria. Then, on November 10, Trump received al-Sharaa at the White House, where they agreed that Syria will join the international coalition against ISIS. Al-Sharaa promised "active assistance" to the US against the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, Hamas, and Hezbollah. In exchange, Trump expressed his support for Syrian unity and restoration. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan attended the meetings, which, according to a statement issued by US envoy Tom Barrack on November 13, established a US-Turkish-Syrian framework for integrating the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into new Syrian structures and redefining Turkish-Syrian-Israeli relations. On November 18, Trump met with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to strengthen regional understanding of Syria's new role in US strategy.

Implications of the Syrian-Israeli Agreement on Regional Stability

In relation to Israeli security in particular, on December 29, the US president declared an agreement with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu regarding Syria, claiming that Netanyahu would come to a deal with the Syrian government and cautioning him against "any steps that could destabilize Syria." Despite his misgivings, Netanyahu, after his conversation with Trump, declared that he would seek a different relationship with Damascus, citing his wish to ensure the safety of his "Druze friends" and defend minorities, particularly Christians, without bringing up the Kurds. A new round of Syrian-Israeli negotiations was held in Paris in recent days, under extensive US auspices. Alongside Tom Barrack, the meetings were attended by Steve Wittkov and Jared Kushner, as well as Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. The negotiations, held on January 5 and 6, resulted in an agreement by the parties to "respect Syria's sovereignty," and a commitment by both Damascus and Tel Aviv to reach "security arrangements" through the establishment of a "joint fusion mechanism” (JFM) tasked with "facilitating immediate and continuous coordination regarding the exchange of intelligence and de-escalation of military tensions." under United States supervision. In the short term, the "Syrian-Israeli Coordination Mechanism" was created to give Syrian authorities a concrete assurance that, should the Syrian army choose to end the war militarily against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Israel would not use airstrikes to impede its movements, as it had done last July to thwart the Syrian army's campaign against the Druze in the Suwaida Governorate.

The Syrian army's escalation of attacks against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Aleppo, particularly targeting positions in the Ashrafieh and Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhoods, was almost immediately evident because of these negotiations. Israel, on the other hand, swiftly removed itself from the situation and said nothing. Two days after the attacks in Aleppo, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar denounced them and urged Western countries that care about the Kurdish people "not to remain silent" without threatening or hinting at Israeli action. The Israeli Prime Minister and his Defense Minister, Israel Katz, had not yet addressed the fighting in northeastern Syria. Amid a tense four-day ceasefire between government soldiers and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northern Syria, Russian forces have fortified their military presence at the airport of Qamishli in northeastern Syria (Rojava). The sources called the news "inaccurate" and refuted claims made by the local media that Russian forces had started to evacuate Qamishli airport. They described the action as a "calculated redeployment rather than a withdrawal" and said the troops were moved from Hmeimim airfield, Russia's biggest military facility in Syria. The reinforcement coincides with mounting doubts about Russia's continued involvement in Rojava.

Iran's internal turmoil hastened the al-Sharaa faction's preparations to launch an offensive against Rojava since it removed Tehran from the regional scene and made it more difficult for Tehran to stop al-Sharaa and his supporters from Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar from using force to decide Rojava's future. Since al-Sharaa's control of Rojava would give him direct access to Iraq and connections with the Sunni tribes of Anbar and Diyala, upsetting the delicate balance of power in the region, Iran might have tried to thwart these plans through its ties with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) if it were not for this obsession.

Despite these characteristics, the SDF failed to adequately evaluate the situation; the post-ISIS phase exposed a serious flaw in its leaders' diplomacy and strategies, as seen by its complete reliance on the US and inability to form regional partnerships.

Shifting Alliances: The Evolving Role of the Syrian Democratic Forces

However, the Kurdish negotiating position was weakened by the deadly miscalculations that affected the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) fronts in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, including the defection of some Arabs who had served in the SDF's Sanadid Forces and Arab tribes that had previously been loyal to ISIS. Al-Sharaa and Abdi signed a new electronic agreement on January 18 that replaced the March 10 agreement after tripartite talks with Barak. In accordance with this arrangement, the SDF gave up authority over the governorates of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor as well as the remaining territories it controlled west of the Euphrates River. Genuinely, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) gained control of Hasakah Governorate and the city of Kobani in Aleppo Governorate on the morning of January 19 after withdrawing from their final holding, the Tishrin Dam on the western bank of the Euphrates River. The SDF declared a "general mobilization" across Kurdish territories of Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and Iran, urging all Kurds to join the resistance, after negotiations the next day failed to consolidate the accord and collapsed completely. Negotiations between the regime forces (al-Sharaa) and the SDF began on January 20, under pressure from the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and the United States. Following a mutual understanding between Damascus and the SDF over the future of Hasakah Governorate, a fresh four-day ceasefire was negotiated. This agreement stated that neither the Kurdish villages nor the city centers of Hasakah and Qamishli would be entered by government forces. At the same time, SDF commander Abdi reiterated that safeguarding places with a large Kurdish population was a “red line,” Then, on Saturday, January 24, 2026, just hours after a four-day ceasefire between the Kurdish-led SDF and the Syrian government ended. The ceasefire has been extended by a further 15 days, according to Syria's defence ministry.

The ceasefire put a stop to the Syrian regime forces' lightning-fast military campaign that drastically altered Syria's political landscape and regional balances. Unexpectedly, the US abandoned away from its Kurdish ally, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), declaring the end of the SDF's campaign against ISIS and claiming that the relationship was no longer justified.

Military forces unrelated to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) crossed the Euphrates River from west to east without being stopped by US forces for the first time since the deconfliction agreement between Russia and the US (Memorandum on Air Safety in Syria) in October 2015. The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (Rojava), a semi-autonomous entity set up in these crucial regions, is threatened by this escalation. It is home to a diverse ethnic population that includes sizable populations of Arabs, Kurds, Syriacs, and Assyrians, as well as smaller populations of Turkmen, Armenians, Chechens, and Yazidis.

This course of action has changed the conflict from a confrontation between the Syrian regime and the SDF to a nationalist conflict between the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), which have steadfast support from the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), and the Syrian government (Arab-Sunni), which has local support from some Arab tribes in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor and regional support from Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. As a result, the contested territories' political backdrop has become incredibly unstable.

Consequently, the Pentagon's new National Defense Strategy recognizes Israel as a "model ally" in the Middle East, emphasizes the defense of the American homeland, advocates for a return to the "peace through strength" doctrine, and places an unprecedented burden of security on allies. The key clause in this 34-page document, signed by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, is that Washington would provide "more limited" assistance to allies. If the ceasefire breaks when it expires, this action will thus add "gasoline to the fire" of the Syrian civil war, putting the entire region in peril and breaking the Global Coalition To Defeat ISIS.