Reassessing Gulf Security Dynamics

A geostrategic frontier between the Global North and South, the East and West, and the Persian Gulf has always existed. It is situated where vital energy supplies, marine trade, and ideological conflict converge. The Persian Gulf has become a focal point of international interest and attention since the Arab Spring uprisings broke out in 2011.

Recent events suggest that tides are changing. Attacks against Qatar, first by Iran in June and then by Israel this month, indicate a significant change in the region's security landscape. The attacks have called into question the fundamental strategic presumptions that have served as the foundation for Gulf Arab state security doctrines for the past fifty years. With unpredicted consequences, such as divergent views of Israel and Iran, this is also compelling introspection at a challenging moment for the larger region.

A geostrategic frontier between the Global North and South, the East and West, and the Persian Gulf has always existed. It is situated where vital energy supplies, marine trade, and ideological conflict converge. The Persian Gulf has become a focal point of international interest and attention since the Arab Spring uprisings broke out in 2011.

Recent events suggest that tides are changing. Attacks against Qatar, first by Iran in June and then by Israel this month, indicate a significant change in the region's security landscape. The attacks have called into question the fundamental strategic presumptions that have served as the foundation for Gulf Arab state security doctrines for the past fifty years. With unpredicted consequences, such as divergent views of Israel and Iran, this is also compelling introspection at a challenging moment for the larger region.

Entanglement or Empowerment? New Security Paradigm for Gulf States

For decades, the fundamental strategic presumption among the Arab states of the Gulf has been that the United States is the ultimate guarantor. Washington has been seen as key to the security of the Gulf. The U.S. military presence has been viewed as the ultimate deterrence against external aggression and as the backstop for regime survival, particularly since the Gulf War in 1990–1991.

Protection was thought to be guaranteed by housing U.S. military bases, purchasing U.S. hardware, and coordinating foreign policy with U.S. interests. This belief is being called into doubt by the Israeli and Iranian strikes on Qatari land. The United States failed to prevent hostile action against its closest Gulf Arab security partner, which is classified as a key non-NATO ally, in June and September. Inaction and silence have been construed as complicity rather than oversight.

Gulf Arab states also believed that they could stay relevant and reduce their security needs by integrating themselves deeply into western, particularly U.S., systems of governance. The main instrument of this entanglement used to be the oil and gas markets, but during the 2000s, countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have positioned themselves increasingly as stand-ins for U.S. power projection.

The Gulf changed from being a net acquirer of U.S. security to a solid outlet for U.S. power, from counterterrorism to regional diplomacy. Another layer of this entanglement was the 2020 Abraham Accords, which made the UAE and Bahrain the first of numerous Arab nations to formally establish ties with Israel. In Abu Dhabi and Manama, normalization with Israel was viewed as a means of gaining influence in Washington. The flaws of this reasoning are demonstrated by the Doha strike: entanglement has not provided security or U.S. restraint of Israel.

Changing Threat Perceptions and Security Frameworks in the Gulf Region

For over a decade now, the approach of Gulf Arab states to security has been predicated on the idea that, despite Israel's historical threat, it can be subtly and discreetly courted to keep its animosity in control. In the meantime, Iran has continued to be the principal enemy, and the primary defense against Tehran is integration into the U.S.-led defense infrastructure. Now, that balance seems to have altered.

Under U.S. supervision, Israel was once viewed as a possible partner, but now it is a free player that may project force into the Persian Gulf without fear of repercussion. Although the West has historically restrained Iran's behavior, the country is nevertheless seen as a threat. Israel, on the other hand, seems to have strategic impunity, unhindered even by its primary ally.

Crucially, the retrenchment in the United States has also been presumed to be temporary. Persian Gulf Arab leaders believed that the U.S. position as a security guarantor would be reinstated with a change in leadership or a strategic realignment. That conviction has been disproved. U.S. disengagement is now viewed as permanent in the Persian Gulf.

There are no assurances in a transactional Washington that is motivated by ephemeral interests rather than strong partnerships. One example of Donald Trump's seeming weakness in the face of Israeli adventurism is the fact that, despite Gulf Arab states promising to invest up to 3.6 trillion dollars in the U.S. economy, the U.S. president did not defend its most significant regional mediator. Today, the Gulf effectively underpins U.S. power, but Washington is unable to do the same for Gulf security.

Strategic Autonomy and Diversifying Alliances

This year's Israeli and Iranian attacks on Qatari territory are landmark events rather than mere occurrences. They exacerbate the trauma caused by the 2019 Abqaiq attack, which was perceived as Iran targeting the core of Saudi oil infrastructure, to which the U.S. only responded mildly, despite being claimed by Yemen's Ansarullah movement. The Kingdom had a harsh awakening.

Qatar had a similar experience in June of this year when Washington was unable to deter Iran. The Trump administration was similarly unable to deter Israel in September. These developments serve as further evidence to Gulf Arab nations that the U.S. no longer offers reliable security assurances. Even worse, Gulf capitals now think that Washington's silence essentially supports Israel's new strategic plan, which goes beyond "mowing the lawn" in Gaza to plough the entire region, including friendly Arab nations, in order to further its short-term, self-serving security plans.

From a Gulf standpoint, Israel has turned into yet another outlaw state, and because it works under Western security measures, it is even more dangerous than Iran. Tel Aviv is allowed and unrestricted, while Tehran is sanctioned, restricted, and watched. Thus, there is a strong sense of betrayal. Formerly considering themselves to be net contributors to U.S. strength, Gulf Arab states today are beginning to view the U.S. as a freeloader state, taking advantage of their diplomatic efforts and financial resources with little reciprocation.

Gulf states, particularly Qatar, are being forced to reevaluate their own grand policies because of these events. Qatar followed a policy of proactive neutrality for many years. In addition to hosting U.S. bases and keeping up a conversation with Iran, it has been mediating between Israel and Hamas and interacting with Washington. That tactic has been cruelly put to the test. The lesson here is that protection is not assured by neutrality alone.

Therefore, a larger degree of strategic autonomy is required of the Gulf Arab countries. To prevent aggression from being cost-free, this entails creating domestic deterrence capabilities, such as missile defense and retaliatory attack options. Furthermore, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) must be revitalized as a true collective defense agreement rather than a talking club to improve intra-Gulf security cooperation. To make sure that U.S. disengagement does not leave a void, it is also necessary to diversify external relationships by involving Russia, China, and India. Additionally, neutrality should be defined in a multilateral manner so that international organizations and a wider variety of international players, rather than only U.S. goodwill, support Gulf mediation.

Establishing a Third Pillar of Stability

Although Qatar's mediation function is still crucial, it needs to be integrated into a larger security framework. In contrast to the narrative surrounding the Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA), which Trump only vaguely promoted during his first term as president from 2017 to 2021, this new environment needs to be more robust and strategically independent.

The Gulf Arab states are currently positioned between two revisionist powers, Israel and Iran. Tel Aviv and Tehran have both expressed their willingness and readiness to attack Gulf states. The United States is no longer a trustworthy barrier. Therefore, creating a third pillar of stability through a security architecture led by the Gulf is the work at hand. Gulf self-reliance, collective defense, and strategic alliances that extend well beyond Washington must be the foundation of such an agreement. Only then will Gulf Arab nations be able to maintain their standing as an essential intersection of the East and the West, defend their sovereignty, and maintain their position as a major global energy hub.