Potential Scenarios of Iran’s Conflict with the US and Israel Post-Khamenei

This wave of escalation would be distinct from its predecessors in 2024 and 2025, as was evident from the early hours of the joined American and Israeli strikes on Iran on the morning of February 28, 2026. The reason for this discrepancy is that 49 senior regime leaders were killed in the initial strikes of Operation Epic Fury, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, his advisor and head of the Defence Council Ali Shamkhani, Revolutionary Guard commander General Mohammad Pakapour, Defence Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh, and Chief of Staff Abdolrahim Mousavi.

Unlike the twelve-day conflict in June 2025, it is obvious that the current round of escalation will not end. The signs unequivocally show that the United States wants to bring about change in Iran, either by removing conservatives from the country's leadership and allowing moderate leaders who are open to negotiations to take over, or by continuing to use the military option to weaken Iranian capabilities by attacking the missile stockpile and assisting in the dismantling of Iranian regional proxies.

Even if Israel and the Trump administration entered the battle against Iran together, there is probably a difference in their perspectives on the goals of the current conflict. Tel Aviv appears to prefer a scenario of disintegration by continuing to weaken the army and its ability to control the country, allowing insurgent movements to increase their activity and opening Iran up to widespread international interventions, while the Trump administration seems to be seeking a change in Iran's leadership and eliminating its influence in the region and threat to US allies.

The stances of regional governments that have the power to affect American decision-making are among the other elements affecting the course of the conflict that should not be disregarded. Since they stand to lose from further escalation, it is quite likely that several of these governments would advocate for de-escalation and a return for negotiations to seek settlements. Furthermore, as Tel Aviv is a regional danger as well, these governments oppose Israel imposing its own vision of a confrontation with Iran. But any return to the negotiation table will not be predicated on the same terms set forward before to the present conflict.

This wave of escalation would be distinct from its predecessors in 2024 and 2025, as was evident from the early hours of the joined American and Israeli strikes on Iran on the morning of February 28, 2026. The reason for this discrepancy is that 49 senior regime leaders were killed in the initial strikes of Operation Epic Fury, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, his advisor and head of the Defence Council Ali Shamkhani, Revolutionary Guard commander General Mohammad Pakapour, Defence Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh, and Chief of Staff Abdolrahim Mousavi.

Following Khamenei's passing, official statements made an effort to highlight the persistence of the Iranian political system's institutions and customs. According to the Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)'s statement, the conflict with Israel and the United States would not end and the institution would not be impacted. However, Khamenei's position within the Iranian system and his vast powers—both those bestowed upon the Supreme Leader by the constitution and those he gained during his 38 years in office by controlling the complexities of the country's political, economic, and military landscape—make his absence a political void that will be challenging to fill and handle with ease. It is unlikely that the void left by a position that has developed over the course of four decades into its current form—one that controls the military establishment, casts a shadow over the entire Iranian political system, and directly oversees one-third of the country's economy while indirectly overseeing the other two-thirds—will be readily filled. Since a large portion of Khamenei's power came from his character and the interpersonal connections he developed over the previous fifty years, the distinctive nature of this function is inextricably related to his orientation.

Because of all of this, the most significant topic at the time is Khamenei's absence and the debates around possible outcomes for Iran's political landscape following his exit from power. Given that the outcome of this war, like the outcome of the Iranian political system, is inextricably linked to the position of the Supreme Leader, the suggested succession scenarios, and the expected political landscape the day after his absence, the importance of this issue may even outweigh discussions of the war's complications and trajectory.

Iran showed that it could continue centralised decision-making by establishing the “Interim Leadership Council” after the Supreme Leader was assassinated, despite the initial losses it sustained in the ensuing conflicts. Ayatollah Ali Reza Arefi, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, and Chief of the Judiciary Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei are members of this council. Additionally, Iranian missile assaults on Israel and strikes on military installations in the region demonstrated Tehran's military prowess, which may drastically raise the cost for the other side.

We evaluate the three conceivable possibilities arising from the current conflict in order to evaluate the situation:

First Scenario: Prompt Settlement, under the burden of military and growing losses, we may see a quick return to the bargaining table and an acceleration of the war's conclusion in accordance with the American perspective. This implies that Iran's new leadership must give preliminary signs of its readiness to compromise on three key problems: the removal of its nuclear stockpile; the dismantling of its missile program; and the cutting off of relations with regional proxies, particularly in Iraq and Lebanon.

Thanks to quick and extremely successful attacks that are thought to have interfered with the Iranian institutional system's ability to function, the Trump administration seems to be placing a wager on this outcome, perhaps preventing a lengthy battle of attrition. The emergence of Ali Larijani, the leader of Iran's Supreme National Security Council as a moderate figure, is another element that can lend credence to this scenario.

Second Scenario: The regional conflict continues, given the new Iranian leadership's ongoing rejection of the possibility of negotiation and Iran's expansion of its missile strikes to include several U.S.-allied different countries in the region, it is not improbable that the situation will worsen into a larger regional conflict of uncertain length. This escalation implies that Iran is communicating that it will not engage in negotiations under duress and that it has the power to increase costs and compel the affected countries in the region to engage in talks in order to protect their security and maintain the viability of their energy production. Negotiations will thus not be restricted to Iran making concessions in return for a de-escalation.

It seems improbable that the conflicts will be restricted to Iran on one side and Israel and the United States on the other if the current scenario develops into a full-scale conflict. Instead, we are more likely to see local players with foreign support take steps to undermine the capabilities of Iran's regional proxies, especially Hezbollah in Lebanon. Additionally, the leaders of Iran's numerous proxies in Iraq might be featured as US-Israeli operations targets.

Additionally, it is not implausible that the Yemeni Houthi group may escalate the conflict again if it does not cease, especially in regards to threats to Red Sea energy shipping lanes, which may call for an international reaction that takes place. In order to take advantage of the dispute in the larger game of international power balances, it is also likely that other parties may enter it, albeit clandestinely. The main issue is China's ability to provide Iran with precise hypersonic missiles, which would allow Tehran to inflict more damage on the US and Israel and guarantee a protracted conflict.

Third scenario: A turn toward inciting internal instability combined with a partial escalation. Additionally, rather than completely ending conflict, it is possible that the United States and Israel would attempt a partial de-escalation, with low-intensity firefights continuing. Parallel to this strategy, Iran's internal unrest will be stoked by a number of actions, including tightening economic sanctions to spark renewed protests and attempting to reduce the military's authority in the predominantly Kurdish provinces of western and central Iran to make room for armed Kurdish groups that oppose the Iranian government. Reports that the CIA is attempting to arm Kurdish fighters in order to spark an uprising in Iran lend credence to this scenario. This is happening in tandem with assistance for comparable activities in Iran's Baloch territories, with the potential for a last resort to be carried out via Pakistan, which is home to organisations connected to the Baloch Jaish al-Adl.

Conclusion

Unlike the twelve-day conflict in June 2025, it is obvious that the current round of escalation will not end. The signs unequivocally show that the United States wants to bring about change in Iran, either by removing conservatives from the country's leadership and allowing moderate leaders who are open to negotiations to take over, or by continuing to use the military option to weaken Iranian capabilities by attacking the missile stockpile and assisting in the dismantling of Iranian regional proxies.

Even if Israel and the Trump administration entered the battle against Iran together, there is probably a difference in their perspectives on the goals of the current conflict. Tel Aviv appears to prefer a scenario of disintegration by continuing to weaken the army and its ability to control the country, allowing insurgent movements to increase their activity and opening Iran up to widespread international interventions, while the Trump administration seems to be seeking a change in Iran's leadership and eliminating its influence in the region and threat to US allies.

The stances of regional governments that have the power to affect American decision-making are among the other elements affecting the course of the conflict that should not be disregarded. Since they stand to lose from further escalation, it is quite likely that several of these governments would advocate for de-escalation and a return for negotiations to seek settlements. Furthermore, as Tel Aviv is a regional danger as well, these governments oppose Israel imposing its own vision of a confrontation with Iran. But any return to the negotiation table will not be predicated on the same terms set forward before to the present conflict.