Maliki’s Candidacy Sparks US-Iran Proxy Conflict in Iraq

Three days after former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was selected by the "coordination framework" to form a new government on January 24, 2026, US President Donald Trump posted a tweet on TruthSocial denouncing al-Maliki's nomination and threatening that “That should not be allowed to happen again. Because of his insane policies and ideologies, if elected, the United States of America will no longer help Iraq. If we are not there to help, Iraq has ZERO chance of success, prosperity, or freedom. MAKE IRAQ GREAT AGAIN!” The US president's position created a new obstacle for Washington and Baghdad's relationship, one that both countries needed to adapt to in order to determine the direction of their future interactions. Iran has had to adapt to the new Iraqi reality as well.

The US insist that if Baghdad ignores Trump's threats, the US will retaliate directly. Washington's Middle East calculations do not now indicate that a total Iraqi exit from the US sphere of influence is one of its alternatives. However, if Baghdad complied with Trump's demands, the US would unavoidably withdraw entirely or partly from the economic and security pressures the administration has applied to change Iraq's direction over the past few years. Since US forces will then have to handle militarily with any potential security disruptions that may occur, this will become even more evident once the new Iraqi government takes complete power under US policy.

Iraqi political forces currently have no choice but to attempt to contain Trump's tweet in a way that saves face and buys more time until the consequences of the current Iran-US conflict become evident. Only then can a suitable decision be made, depending on how the situation develops. In the near future, four possibilities for the formation of the Iraqi government are beginning to take shape:

1. Possibility I: With Iranian approval, a compromise candidate will create an Iraqi government that is accepted both domestically and internationally. This would happen when the Iranian regime, either because of conflict or concessions made during negotiations, emerges with few casualties.
2. Possibility II: In the event that the Iranian political system deteriorates or falls apart, another possibility is the establishment of an Iraqi government that goes in line with Washington and is compatible with the new regional reality.
3. Possibility III: Direct involvement by the Sadrist Movement to preempt regional advances. Getting Maliki to resign and establish a balanced government or perhaps forcing Maliki to drop out of the race, would be the ultimate objective.

4. Possibility IV: Under the direction of the current Sudani's government or an interim government established for this purpose, the final possibility is to hold early elections in less than a year. It is hoped that the Sadrist Movement would run in the upcoming elections. Prior to early elections, some experts have proposed giving interim Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani the responsibility of overseeing a transitional government. However, this possibility is unlikely, given the existing disagreements among the Shiite blocs within the same coordinating framework.
5. Possibility V: finally, Maliki's calibrated resignation may present an opportunity for the coordinating framework to shift direction in a way that maintains credibility and aligns with US interests without compromising “Iraqi sovereignty.”

These five possibilities have been considered in all recent "Coordination Framework" coalition meetings and have a similar chance of happening, but the stances of the parties on their adoption have differed. The only constant in this scenario is the challenge of coming to an internal settlement that settles the matter without consideration of regional influences.

Three days after former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was selected by the "coordination framework" to form a new government on January 24, 2026, US President Donald Trump posted a tweet on TruthSocial denouncing al-Maliki's nomination and threatening that “That should not be allowed to happen again. Because of his insane policies and ideologies, if elected, the United States of America will no longer help Iraq. If we are not there to help, Iraq has ZERO chance of success, prosperity, or freedom. MAKE IRAQ GREAT AGAIN!” The US president's position created a new obstacle for Washington and Baghdad's relationship, one that both countries needed to adapt to in order to determine the direction of their future interactions. Iran has had to adapt to the new Iraqi reality as well.

Tensions Between Iraq and the US Over Maliki's Candidacy

In a statement released on January 28, amid rumors of mounting difficulties about his selection, Maliki boldly claimed that Trump's action amounted to "blatant American interference in Iraq's internal affairs." The future of the Iraqi presidency has been under considerable scrutiny due to this debate, as newly elected lawmakers are expected to select a president, a position that has historically been held by a Kurd. After that, the president will have to appoint the prime minister of the largest parliamentary bloc to form a government. Maliki claimed that Trump has been "misled" by opponents in the region and in Iraq in his first interview since being elected on February 3. Additionally, he maintained that he would only resign if the majority of leaders of the Coordination Framework did not back him.

Maliki's insistence on his selection, supported by public statements from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's office and a statement from Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani reiterating his prior position of non-interference in the formation of the government and his boycott of the political system in general, made the unexpected equation evident. Even though the coalition's formation agreement called for unanimous decision-making, these considerations pushed the "framework" forces to release a statement supporting the selection by a majority vote.

Trump's tweet denouncing Maliki's candidacy can be seen as a coercive U.S. action in response to a string of messages from Secretary of State Marco Rubio, which were communicated by US Charge d'Affaires Joshua Harris, as well as directly to current Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani and other political figures. In addition to thwarting Maliki's election candidacy, the tweet, which threatened to end US cooperation with Iraq, also damaged ties between the two countries. Moreover, the tweet hurt al-Sudani's chances because Washington had already been annoyed by his backing of Maliki.

At a meeting of the ruling Shiite coalition (coordinating framework) on January 26, Ammar al-Hakim, the leader of the Hikma Movement, read a letter from the US administration stating that the administration had rejected Nouri al-Maliki's nomination, according to the Washington Post. Al-Hakim reportedly refused to take part in any government headed by al-Maliki and boycotted the coalition's coordinating framework meeting on January 31 since he had opposed al-Maliki's selection from the beginning.

How Iranian Strategies Shape US Stance on Maliki’s Iraqi Candidacy

Tehran seems to have charmed Washington to take this stance at this particular moment for a number of reasons:

1. Iran's current concerns center on the possibility of conflict with the United States and the necessity of increasing the amount of leverage it always has at the bargaining table.
2. The intentional disclosure of the contents of a letter from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, which was taken to support Maliki's candidacy, is a clear and direct provocation of the US administration.
3. U.S. statements about their position on Maliki, which started through unofficial channels before moving to official ones, were disregarded by key Shia figures. Compared to earlier experiences with government formation, this disrespect was unusual. Trump's tweet with specific threats, which were later addressed in meetings between the US Charge d'affaires and other Shia officials, did not deter Maliki and some of his allies from sticking with his candidacy. During these meetings, the United States threatened to impose severe sanctions that may cause the Iraqi economy to collapse.
4. The Najaf religious authority kept silent, and the leader of the Sadrist movement, Muqtada al-Sadr—who is well-known for his strained ties with Maliki—refrained from adopting a firm position on the question at hand. This silence remains, despite Ali al-Sistani, the highest Shiite religious leader, directly and publicly urging Shiite political forces to stop Maliki from taking office for a third term in 2014. He also directly intervened in 2019 to force former Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi to resign after the October protests broke out.

These changes now take place in a wider political domain and go beyond the confines of internal Shiite political disputes. This implies that settling the conflict and installing a new government in Iraq will be contingent not only on the conclusion of the US-Iranian talks that started in Muscat, Oman, on February 6, but also on the stage of the conflict and its goals, particularly whether it aims to overthrow the Iranian regime's organizational structure.

Maliki’s Candidacy and Consequences for Iraq-US-Iran Dynamics

The US insist that if Baghdad ignores Trump's threats, the US will retaliate directly. Washington's Middle East calculations do not now indicate that a total Iraqi exit from the US sphere of influence is one of its alternatives. However, if Baghdad complied with Trump's demands, the US would unavoidably withdraw entirely or partly from the economic and security pressures the administration has applied to change Iraq's direction over the past few years. Since US forces will then have to handle militarily with any potential security disruptions that may occur, this will become even more evident once the new Iraqi government takes complete power under US policy.

The political groups on the Iraqi front, especially Shia groups, faced a challenging situation. The imposition of sanctions, the withdrawal of US military support, and the possibility of direct military attacks targeting Iraqi military and political objectives linked to the intensifying conflict with Iran were all consequences of insisting on al-Maliki's candidature, which, on the one hand, meant a change in relations with Washington from one of cautious balance to one of outright hostility. However, dropping the candidature in the face of the US's announced rejection and Iran's stated backing meant that Iraq had completely shifted from the Iranian domain of influence to the U.S. opposing side. This would cause Iran and its active militia proxies inside the state to use every tactic at their disposal, rekindling domestic turmoil and maybe starting a civil war.

The existing partnership, which offers a degree of agreement on the internal situation in Iraq and keeps the security situation from completely collapsing, is actually something that neither Washington nor Baghdad is ready or willing to end. Due to this relationship, the US administration can pressure Iraq to do whatever it wants. Depending on the course of events in the region, the Iranian regime's strategy following its conflict with the United States (through war or diplomacy), and the extent of that regime's influence in Iraq, this situation may alter in the near future.

Under the controversially extensive authority over US Ambassador to Turkey and Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack, which includes Iraqi, Lebanese, Syrian, and Turkish challenges, the Trump administration's regional strategy currently seems to be fully cohesive. The action would exacerbate Iraq's already delicate status as a battlefield for escalating Iran-US conflicts rather than improving regional ties. Furthermore, Barrack's adamant opposition to regional federalism would make things more challenging for Iraq's Kurds. The Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the two Kurdish ruling parties in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, are therefore unlikely to support any government headed by a person who has been openly rejected by Washington.

Five Potential Possibilities for Iraq’s Government Amid Iran-US Tensions

Iraqi political forces currently have no choice but to attempt to contain Trump's tweet in a way that saves face and buys more time until the consequences of the current Iran-US conflict become evident. Only then can a suitable decision be made, depending on how the situation develops. In the near future, four possibilities for the formation of the Iraqi government are beginning to take shape:

1. Possibility I: With Iranian approval, a compromise candidate will create an Iraqi government that is accepted both domestically and internationally. This would happen when the Iranian regime, either because of conflict or concessions made during negotiations, emerges with few casualties.
2. Possibility II: In the event that the Iranian political system deteriorates or falls apart, another possibility is the establishment of an Iraqi government that goes in line with Washington and is compatible with the new regional reality.
3. Possibility III: Direct involvement by the Sadrist Movement to preempt regional advances. Getting Maliki to resign and establish a balanced government or perhaps forcing Maliki to drop out of the race, would be the ultimate objective.
4. Possibility IV: Under the direction of the current Sudani's government or an interim government established for this purpose, the final possibility is to hold early elections in less than a year. It is hoped that the Sadrist Movement would run in the upcoming elections. Prior to early elections, some experts have proposed giving interim Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani the responsibility of overseeing a transitional government. However, this possibility is unlikely, given the existing disagreements among the Shiite blocs within the same coordinating framework.
5. Possibility V: finally, Maliki's calibrated resignation may present an opportunity for the coordinating framework to shift direction in a way that maintains credibility and aligns with US interests without compromising “Iraqi sovereignty.”

These five possibilities have been considered in all recent "Coordination Framework" coalition meetings and have a similar chance of happening, but the stances of the parties on their adoption have differed. The only constant in this scenario is the challenge of coming to an internal settlement that settles the matter without consideration of regional influences.