Double Check

The recent U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure mark a notable recalibration of Washington’s Middle East policy. The scale and nature of the attacks differ significantly from the January 2020 crisis following Soleimani’s assassination. This cannot be viewed merely as a show of force; they represent the actual use of it. After a period of visible restraint, such a dramatic escalation sends a clear signal—to both Tehran and Washington’s allies—that the U.S. remains willing to use military means when necessary.

The strikes on nuclear facilities, along with the assassinations of Iranian scientists by Israeli operatives, may delay the progress of Iran’s nuclear program. However, considering recent developments, Tehran, which has consistently maintained that its nuclear activities are purely peaceful, may come to the conclusion that only the acquisition of nuclear weapons can guarantee its national security. This could prompt a strategic shift toward further decentralization and concealment of its nuclear infrastructure, thereby making meaningful international oversight virtually impossible.

All in all, the strikes on Iran and the subsequent chain of events could usher the Middle East into a new phase of instability.

The recent U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure mark a notable recalibration of Washington’s Middle East policy. In recent years, the United States has sought to avoid direct involvement in armed conflicts. While maintaining a military presence and alliances with most regional actors, Washington aimed to reduce costs and redirect resources toward other strategic priorities. This approach was reflected in decisions such as halting support for offensive operations in Yemen, the withdrawal from Afghanistan, and efforts to scale back its military footprint in Iraq and Syria.

This strategy was accompanied by targeted operations including the elimination Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri (organization banned in Russia) and Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani, as well as temporary deployments of additional forces, such as carrier strike groups, to the Mediterranean and Gulf during periods of heightened tension.

However, this restraint did not equate to a retreat from regional influence. The U.S. continued to rely on political and economic tools while encouraging regional actors to pursue local agreements, ultimately aimed at reducing the need for direct U.S. military engagement. A prime example is the Abraham Accords, through which the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco normalized relations with Israel. Similarly, the concept of an “Arab NATO,” a collective regional security framework involving Israel and aimed at containing Iran, fit within Washington’s broader strategy of acting as a broker and moderator while shifting greater responsibility to its allies.

The latest strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure suggest a shift in this posture. The scale and nature of the attacks differ significantly from the January 2020 crisis following Soleimani’s assassination. This cannot be viewed merely as a show of force; they represent the actual use of it. After a period of visible restraint, such a dramatic escalation sends a clear signal—to both Tehran and Washington’s allies—that the U.S. remains willing to use military means when necessary.

A key element of the controlled escalation currently underway is the risk of triggering a chain reaction. Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has already declared that the Islamic Republic will not leave the U.S. attack unanswered. According to the IRGC, on June 23, Iranian missile strikes hit Tel Aviv, Haifa, Ashkelon, Ashdod, Acre, Safed, and other Israeli cities—and this may not be the end. Should Washington deem Iran’s retaliation excessive, it could prompt further U.S. strikes. Both sides may attempt to inflict meaningful damage without crossing what they each perceive as a red line that would provoke an overwhelming response. The danger lies in the fact that these red lines are not mutually agreed upon. Controlled escalation can quickly spiral out of control due to misjudgments or unpredictable events.

The threat of further escalation depends not only on political will but also on military capacity. Reports suggest Iran had around 2,000 surface-to-surface missiles at the onset of the conflict. With high-intensity exchanges, Tehran could rapidly exhaust its retaliatory capabilities. Such an imbalance could lead to one-sided escalation, increasing the asymmetry of the conflict.

Another risk is horizontal escalation—which is still limited for now, but remains potentially dangerous. It raises the possibility that Iran might expand its retaliatory actions to include U.S. bases in the Gulf. A historical parallel is the 2020 U.S. strike that killed Soleimani in Baghdad, followed by Iran’s missile attack on U.S. targets in Iraq. At the time, both sides signaled the end of that confrontation, and a wider war was averted.

Today’s situation is qualitatively different—both in scope and nature. Strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities are seen in Tehran not as a symbolic gesture but as a direct threat to national sovereignty.

This escalation occurs amid the weakening of Iran’s key allies in the so-called “Axis of Resistance.” After Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack on Israel, the ensuing conflict in Gaza significantly degraded the group’s military capabilities. Subsequent Israeli strikes in response to Hezbollah attacks from Lebanon further weakened Tehran’s most powerful regional partner. In December 2024, the Assad regime was overthrown in Syria, effectively eliminating Iran’s presence there. Concurrently, U.S. and UK operations in Yemen targeted the Ansar Allah movement, which had been attacking commercial vessels in the Red Sea.

Together, these developments represent a serious erosion of Iran’s regional position. Continued confrontation with the U.S. and Israel could lead to further strategic losses for Tehran.

Nevertheless, the limited capabilities of Iran’s proxies and affiliated groups do not exclude their participation in the conflict. Shiite militias in Iraq, such as Kataib Hezbollah, could target U.S. assets in the region. Recent reports indicate an Iranian-aligned attack on a U.S. base in Hasakah, northeastern Syria. Meanwhile, Ansar Allah may intensify its activities in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, increasing tension along a key global trade route.

Notably, Hezbollah—once considered a central pillar of the “Axis of Resistance”—has so far observed a ceasefire with Israel and avoided joining the conflict. This likely reflects the substantial losses it suffered in 2023. In addition, entering the war could provoke an overwhelming Israeli response that would engulf all of Lebanon—a scenario Hezbollah appears keen to avoid.

Iran’s own military capacity should also not be underestimated. The Islamic Republic retains the ability to strike U.S. bases in the GCC states. If Tehran chooses to take this path, it will likely attempt to do so in a calculated manner—enough to send a message but not trigger a disproportionate U.S. response or jeopardize ties with Arab governments. Even a limited attack, however, could shift regional perceptions of the U.S. military presence: once viewed as a security guarantee, it might increasingly be seen as a source of risk.

Additionally, Iran may seek to assert greater control over maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, if not fully block it. Even a partial disruption could increase volatility in global energy markets and invite a forceful U.S. reaction.

Another emerging trend is the narrowing window for a diplomatic resolution of the nuclear issue. Tehran’s skepticism toward negotiations with Washington intensified after the U.S. withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018. The latest strikes have only deepened mistrust. As a result, the negotiation process may now be effectively frozen, with little chance of sanctions relief in the near term.

That said, this does not necessarily imply internal upheaval in Iran. On the contrary, the external threat may foster national cohesion and strengthen the existing political order—a dynamic seen before in the Islamic Republic’s history. In 1980, during the early stages of the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam Hussein seemingly expected internal unrest in Iran. Instead, the population rallied around the regime, solidifying its power.

Finally, the strikes on nuclear facilities, along with the assassinations of Iranian scientists by Israeli operatives, may delay the progress of Iran’s nuclear program. However, considering recent developments, Tehran, which has consistently maintained that its nuclear activities are purely peaceful, may come to the conclusion that only the acquisition of nuclear weapons can guarantee its national security. This could prompt a strategic shift toward further decentralization and concealment of its nuclear infrastructure, thereby making meaningful international oversight virtually impossible.

All in all, the strikes on Iran and the subsequent chain of events could usher the Middle East into a new phase of instability.

The article was submitted to the editorial office on June 23, 2025.

First published in Izvestia.