U.S.-India Defense Framework: Implications for Strategic Stability in Indian Ocean Region

The announcement on October 31, 2025, of a new ten-year Defense Framework between the United States and India at Kuala Lumpur marks a decisive turning point in the Indian Ocean strategic landscape. This Pact comes as a culmination of earlier foundational agreements namely, the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA, 2016), Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA, 2018), the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Cooperation (BECA, 2020), and the reciprocal Security of Supply Arrangement (SOSA, 2024), among others. The agreement would, as announced by Secretary of War Pete Hegseth “enhance coordination, information sharing and tech cooperation and advance regional stability and deterrence". Hegseth’s Indian counterpart Minister of Defense Rajnath Singh, resorting to using X, also stated "It is a signal of our growing strategic convergence and will herald a new decade of partnership. Defense will remain as a major pillar of our bilateral relations. Our partnership is critical for ensuring a free, open and rules-based Indo-Pacific region."

Under this framework key features include, a long term strategic alignment manifested through high-level defense interactions, interoperability in joint operations, training and logistical support like in technology transfers, co-development of expanded joint production, and indigenous manufacturing of defense equipment leveraging U.S. technologies under the “Make in India” initiative across land, sea, air, space and cyber domains. It further includes intelligence and information sharing integrating processes for secure information exchange and intelligence cooperation and addresses regional stability and deterrence, positioning India and the U.S. as key stabilizers in the Indo-Pacific region, responding to maritime security challenges.

From a theoretical perspective the durability of strategic stability is based on credible deterrence, arms control or confidence building mechanisms and probability of adversary behavior. In South Asia’s naval realm, new U.S.-India framework risks disturbing that balance by having advanced technology flows and blue water operational dependencies. Moreover, the dependence on expanded U.S. logistical chains and ship repair access also means Indian naval missions can withstand longer operational reach and sustainability in distant waters. This means such agreements are supporting power projection rather than defensive application. In this regard, for Pakistan, strategic challenge is multifold including maintaining credible deterrence (both nuclear and conventional maritime) while preserving strategic independence, avoiding embroilment in a reactive arms race and seeking diplomatic-institutional avenues to stabilize maritime competition.

The announcement on October 31, 2025, of a new ten-year Defense Framework between the United States and India at Kuala Lumpur marks a decisive turning point in the Indian Ocean strategic landscape. This Pact comes as a culmination of earlier foundational agreements namely, the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA, 2016), Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA, 2018), the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Cooperation (BECA, 2020), and the reciprocal Security of Supply Arrangement (SOSA, 2024), among others. The agreement would, as announced by Secretary of War Pete Hegseth “enhance coordination, information sharing and tech cooperation and advance regional stability and deterrence". Hegseth’s Indian counterpart Minister of Defense Rajnath Singh, resorting to using X, also stated "It is a signal of our growing strategic convergence and will herald a new decade of partnership. Defense will remain as a major pillar of our bilateral relations. Our partnership is critical for ensuring a free, open and rules-based Indo-Pacific region."

Under this framework key features include, a long term strategic alignment manifested through high-level defense interactions, interoperability in joint operations, training and logistical support like in technology transfers, co-development of expanded joint production, and indigenous manufacturing of defense equipment leveraging U.S. technologies under the “Make in India” initiative across land, sea, air, space and cyber domains. It further includes intelligence and information sharing integrating processes for secure information exchange and intelligence cooperation and addresses regional stability and deterrence, positioning India and the U.S. as key stabilizers in the Indo-Pacific region, responding to maritime security challenges.

From India’s perspective the pact presents a major boost to its naval and maritime operational capabilities. By leveraging U.S. assets such as the MQ-9B Sea Guardian drones (a recent agreement for 31 of these platforms) and the six additional P-8I maritime patrol aircraft scheduled for delivery, Indian maritime domain awareness (MDA) across the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and critical chokepoints (Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb and Malacca) stands to be significantly enhanced by this agreement. Moreover, the combination of BECA enabled geospatial precision, COMCASA secure data links and SOSA/Supply chain assurances means that India will increasingly be equipped to act as a forward partner for the U.S. Navy, extending blue water reach and sustainment in the IOR.

For Pakistan such a development introduces pronounced strategic implications. The widening gap in India’s maritime ISR and undersea capabilities raises concerns about sea-based and second-strike deterrence stability in the South Asian nuclear dyad. Under the latest agreement and the ones already in place, Indo-U.S. industrial technological partnership means India’s acquisition and indigenous production of advanced maritime and undersea systems may accelerate, creating a qualitative capability edge. Secondly, the backdrop of renewed great-power nuclear competition further complicates the strategic calculus. On October 30, 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump publicly announced that the U.S. would immediately resume nuclear weapons testing for the first time since the 1990s, citing Russia and China’s advanced programs. Meanwhile, Russia tested its 9M730 Burevestnik nuclear powered cruise missile which reportedly flew 14,000 km over 15 hours.

Such developments echo a re-emergent arms race that undermines the nuclear strategic stability paradigm. In the IOR and South Asian region, the conjunction of advanced conventional maritime, undersea and aerial capabilities with intensifying nuclear promise exasperates mutual vulnerabilities. U.S.-China-India triangularity may convert into maritime competition. China has long seen the Indian Ocean as a theatre of strategic interest mainly through its “String of Pearls” maritime facilities and the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)’s growing presence. The U.S.-India ten-year pact will possibly lead China to enhance its own maritime footprint in IOR and expand maritime cooperation with Pakistan, thus increasing the chances of a second set of China-India-Pakistan tripartite contest. India’s efforts to strengthen its naval and undersea deterrence seen by Pakistan and China as security threat and can be prompted with counter responses which India then can interpret as escalatory and thus generating a cycle of action reaction. In such a scenario India may feel incentivized or forced to adopt a more hostile first use or counter force maritime posture especially against Pakistan. In reciprocation Pakistan may feel pressured to lower thresholds or expand kinetic and non-kinetic actions across several domains.

From a theoretical perspective the durability of strategic stability is based on credible deterrence, arms control or confidence building mechanisms and probability of adversary behavior. In South Asia’s naval realm, new U.S.-India framework risks disturbing that balance by having advanced technology flows and blue water operational dependencies. Moreover, the dependence on expanded U.S. logistical chains and ship repair access also means Indian naval missions can withstand longer operational reach and sustainability in distant waters. This means such agreements are supporting power projection rather than defensive application. In this regard, for Pakistan, strategic challenge is multifold including maintaining credible deterrence (both nuclear and conventional maritime) while preserving strategic independence, avoiding embroilment in a reactive arms race and seeking diplomatic-institutional avenues to stabilize maritime competition.

Pakistan, instead of being reactive must need a maritime strategy that emphasize rapid response combat systems with standoff engagement capabilities, integrated unmanned maritime systems filled with niche and disruptive technologies that synergize combat potential, exercise strong sea denial options and safeguard its nuclear second-strike credibility remains integral in sea-based form.

In today’s world conflicts, the existing global order has amply demonstrated its frequent lack of capacity and will to sustain such an uncontrolled escalation of arms race dynamics, mainly when military instruments take preference over diplomacy. The U.S.-India pact strengthens India’s operational capacities and aligns with U.S.’s Indo-Pacific strategy but also simultaneously increases regional tensions and ignites maritime competition fraught with mistrust and aggressive political rhetoric. Without associated mechanisms for transparency and de-confliction, arms control and crisis-management architecture, the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation grows significantly. The U.S.-India Defense Framework may boost India’s regional strategic posture well, but it poses significant implications for Pakistan signal heightened maritime competition and erosion of stability frameworks. For middle powers like Pakistan, being alert, agile and proactive is not a necessity but a compulsion to protect their national interest in an environment where military adventurism overshadows diplomacy.