The coup in Guinea-Bissau

In April 2012, the Republic of Guinea-Bissau went through a coup d'état that has brought the military to power, disrupting both the constitutional order and the election process. These events make just an episode of the persistent crisis engulfing a small West African state, a former Portuguese colony. The roots of the coup are manifold and distinctly reflect diverse facets of the nation's political, economic and social problems. But the internal factor is the only driver of the process. Overcoming the crisis and the post-coup developments will hinge both on the society of Guinea-Bissau and the political and economic realities in the region.

In April 2012, the Republic of Guinea-Bissau went through a coup d'état that has brought the military to power, disrupting both the constitutional order and the election process. These events make just an episode of the persistent crisis engulfing a small West African state, a former Portuguese colony. The roots of the coup are manifold and distinctly reflect diverse facets of the nation's political, economic and social problems. But the internal factor is the only driver of the process. Overcoming the crisis and the post-coup developments will hinge both on the society of Guinea-Bissau and the political and economic realities in the region.

Another Coup

In the recent years, international observers have invariably rated presidential and parliamentary elections in Guinea-Bissau as free and fair, whereas the candidates often claimed tampering. There was not a single elected president to complete his legitimate term, with three of them displaced, one assassinated and one deceased in office. Displeased with civilian authorities, the army several times toppled the head of state under the pretext of the need to restore constitutional order and democracy. In 2009, President Joao Bernardo Vieira was assassinated as a result of a routine coup. The military and the politicians are used to exchange appalling accusations that provoke reciprocal violence.

In January 2012, critically ill President Malam Bacai Sanha, seen by many as the stabilizing force, died in a Paris hospital to put a match to the never-ending political crisis and the power struggle, which resulted in the April 12 events in Bissau, the country's capital. At the presidential election on March 18, Carlos Gomes Junior, leader of the ruling African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde (PAIGC) and the then prime minister, received 49 percent of the vote and was going to assertively win the race. Running second was Kumba Iala, the leader of the oppositional Social Renewal Party and Guinea-Bissau president from 2000 to 2003, when he was removed by the military. Iala and some other opposition politicians refused to recognize the election results and claimed electoral fraud. By that time, the army was ripe for insurgency and many observers saw that the electoral process was under threat.

The second round was set for April 29 but did not take place. On April 12, the coup leaders, i.e. the military, arrested interim president Raimundo Pereira and presidential candidate Junior, who were later released and taken to Cote d’Ivoire. The junta announced the establishment of the Transitional Council. Some Guinea-Bissau politicians and international organizations including the UN, the Community of Portuguese Language Countries, the European Union, the African Union and ECOWAS condemned the junta and demanded the restoration constitutional order.

In May, national political forces, including the army and the opposition, adopted the transitional period pact of stability that provides for transfer of power to the civilians and new election. Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo, who also ran for presidency to finish third in the first round, was appointed interim president (the Constitution allots the post to the Speaker of the National People’s Assembly). Rui Duarte de Barros of the Social Renewal Party became acting prime minister.

The PAIGC, the nation’s most popular party that held parliamentary majority on the day of the coup, boycotted the pact negotiations. The party regards the appointment of Nhamadjo as unconstitutional and him personally as a junta puppet, and also condemns the ECOWAS approach towards Guinea-Bissau. PAIGC and several allied parties have set up National Anti-Coup d’Etat Front and accused the opposition, primarily Iala and the military in the person of army chief of Antonio Injai, of plotting the April takeover.

The setting of the events is as follows. To a great extent, the outburst grew out of the confrontation between the executive branch and the army leaders. In particular, it goes about the military’s aversion to prime minister Junior who had been planning an army reform under discussion in the country during several past years upon the insistence of international organizations. The reform envisages the creation of a professional army under full governmental control, the improvement of service conditions and logistics, better social protection of servicemen, and certain structural changes since there are too many officers in proportion to the enlisted men. At that, some officers and even top commanders are illiterate. The planned reductions in strength and demobilization of veterans cannot but cause dissatisfaction among the military.

There have been attempts to accuse Junior of pro-Angolan leaning, nepotism, various crimes and abuses. The military displayed an allergic response to the 200-men-strong Angolan contingent that came to Guinea-Bissau upon an agreement between Junior and Luanda with support of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries. They were reported to assist in the military reform and counter-drug operations. But the army saw the arrival of the Angolan contingent as part of a plot and a secret agreement aimed to provide Junior with a private guard and threaten the very existence of national armed forces. So, the coup was to save the country from foreign intervention.

In fact, the coup succeeded as the army and the opposition managed to oust Junior from the national scene and challenge PAIGC despite its popular mandate. The military have obtained a lever to influence the transitional government formed by the opposition. The Angolan force had to go, removing the threat that enhanced anti-drug operations depriving certain Guinean military and civilians of significant revenue. ECOWAS is planning to replace the Angolan contingent, which began withdrawing in June 2012, with 600 servicemen from Nigeria, Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso to maintain stability during the transitional period.

The move conceals the competition for Guinea-Bissau between Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal, on the one hand, and Angola, on the other. Proceeding from the long common record of the anti-colonial struggle and the leftist ideology of the ruling parties, i.e. Popular Movement for Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and PAIGC, in the past years Luanda has been expanding its presence in the Guinean military affairs and economy (investments in bauxite and oil exploration, banking, construction of deepwater port at Buba). Junior is also known to have personal business interests related to the activities of Angolan companies in Guinea-Bissau. The ECOWAS leader and West African power player, Nigeria, would not comply with Angola's growing influence. Also willing to hold back Angola is Cote d’Ivoire, another regional leader, in particular among the French-speaking states, despite its internal troubles. Ivorian president Allasane Outtara, who currently chairs ECOWAS, is sure to remember the Angolan help to his rival ex-president Laurent Gbagbo and would like to curb Luanda’s expansion in the region. And Senegal needs stability at its southern frontier because of Casamance separatism.

Due to pervasive political instability, Guinea-Bissau faces worsening socio-economic situation, as well as deteriorating climate for business and commerce, which may affect projects involving foreign companies including Russian firms. However, as compared to the Soviet period, bilateral cooperation is practically nonexistent and boils down to fishing agreements and cultural and educational programs. In 2011, the decision was taken within the Paris Club to write off the Guinean debt to Russia in amount of 283 million dollars. On the whole, the relationship is traditionally amicable, with special attention attached to joint work on preparation of the agreement on cooperation in countering illegal narcotics.

Poverty: History plus Geography

Troubled economy is a key reason for political instability in Guinea-Bissau, one of the poorest countries of the planet, which ranks 176th out of 187 states by the HDI index. Low living standards, short life expectancy, poor access to medical care and illiteracy (only about half of adults can read and write) – all that is Guinea-Bissau.

Around 80 percent of the economically active population is engaged in farming. But although agriculture and fishing are the key sectors, they fill only a half of the food needs and Guinea-Bissau has to import food. Harvests of main cultures, including cashew, are hardly stable generating fluctuation of the demand and the prices.

Industry is feeble. There are proven reserves of oil, bauxites and phosphates found with foreign participation but in absence of development projects they remain idle. The state budget is in chronic deficit compensated chiefly by international assistance. And the incoming finances from international bodies and individual states are funneled not only to humanitarian programs but also to the army, police and justice reforms, government officials’ salaries and even elections. The state indebtedness is permanently growing and has already exceeded the annual GNP, reaching 1.18 billion dollars. The World Bank and the IMF are considering the remission of Guinea-Bissau’s external debt within the initiative on relief for highly-indebted poor countries.

Vigorous population growth is outdoing the comparatively low economic expansion. Note that the momentous economic losses, infrastructure degradation and omnipresent human sufferings are to a great extent generated by political instability and military conflicts. The decades following independence obtained in 1974 have failed to bring either stable economic development or improved welfare.

At the same time, the Guinea-Bissau geography is great for drug traffic that constitutes major revenue for those involved. The shoreline is dissected to form well-located natural havens. Along with numerous littoral islands, they attract Latin American drug dealers to deliver cocaine to the African continent for subsequent transportation to Europe. Nigerian criminal networks are also known to control the cocaine flow in some other West African countries. Sources insistently connect the Guinean drug traffic boom with corruption and patronage of certain national civilian and military chiefs.

Backward economy, poverty, structural weakness of the state, inefficient management and the resultant dependence on external forces and political instability are both the causes and consequences of the coups, fueling replication of the crisis in all spheres of life. Some regard Guinea-Bissau as a failed state that is losing sovereignty and transforming into a narco-country.

A Small Country with a Large Army

Being the key driver of all coups, the army of Guinea-Bissau is a mirror image of the country, its history and problems. The national military are traditionally strong due to their decisive role in the struggle for independence. The People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces go back to early 1960s, when their formation began on the basis of guerilla units during the long and bloody fight against European colonizers.

With population of 1.6 million, Guinea-Bissau possesses comparatively numerous armed forces of 9,250 men including the army, the navy, the air force and paramilitary formations. The defense expenses constitute approximately three percent of the GDP (2005 estimate) making Guinea-Bissau the 38th largest military spender in the world (). At that, national economic and social troubles do affect the military. Among them permanent delays and stoppages in the prescribed meager payments which have often provoked discontent and disturbances.

The Guinean armed forces constitute a specific socio-professional group that is equipped with weapons, organized and united by common interests and ready to defend them. At the same time, the army is quite fragmented due to the presence of competing factions orientated to various political actors. The military are becoming the tool of the elite infighting, whereas divisions exist in the political parties, the government and the army.

In view of conflict generation, quite significant is traditional tribalism that corrodes the army, the civilian authorities and the entire society marginalizing the idea of national unity. Tribal strife is vividly exemplified by the unending use of the identity of the Balante people who constitute about one third of the country’s population. Tribalist rhetoric is widely employed to gain the votes of the Balante, Fula, Mandinka, Manjaco, Papel, Biafada, Mancanha and other communities, animists, Moslems and Christians.

Tribalism seems to be the key cause for instability and to a great extent defines the national political process, which is also specific for many other African states. Vieira is known to have gained power as a result of the 1980 coup under the flag of the struggle against the mestiqos, who come from the Cape Verde and had led the anti-colonial struggle, whereas the bulk of the rank-and-file fighters had consisted of black Africans. Later Vieira, a Papel, began warring against the politicians and the military of the Balante descent. The Balante traditionally dominate in the army, occupying the commanding positions since the presidency of Iala, their informal leader. And the latest coup took place against the background of the confrontation between Junior and Balante-orientated commanders and politicians.

Although the Guinea-Bissau constitution prohibits parties with names reflecting regional or ethnic motives, some of them widely use tribalist rhetoric in election campaigns. The phenomenon is vividly exemplified by the Social Renewal Party of Iala, the second most popular after PAIGC, which is considered a Balante organization. One more is the Guinea-Bissau Resistance Party (Bafata Movement, RGB–MB) supported by the Fula and Mandinka peoples in the northeast of the country, i.e. in Bafata and Gabu areas where PAIGC is traditionally weak despite the lead in the rest of the country.

PAIGC had been the political leader of the struggle against the Portuguese, the only and the ruling party until 1991. In the 1990s, the multi-party system emerged followed by Vieira’s political reforms, after which the organizational bonds between the armed forces and PAIGC were broken to discontinue the army’s dependence on the party. The military-government relationship was getting strained and led to the army’s quasi-autonomy within the state. The Iala’s rule added the intensifying Balanteization factor.

Back in the liberation war days, PAIGC declared the principle of national unity as a guarantee of victorious anti-colonialism struggle. Prominent country liberator Amilcar Cabral, the party founder and secretary general, was convinced that tribal differences should not overshadow the ideas of class solidarity and national unity during the liberation struggle. Currently, PAIGC also relies on rising above tribalism and obtaining the widest possible tribal and regional support base. However, political tribalism in Guinea-Bissau is dying hard being a key destructive force along with drug trafficking.

Fragile Democracy

The latest Guinea-Bissau coup has once again shown that forcible interference in politics is the army’s main tool to influence the civilian rule. The military go on with attempts to take over the functions unnatural within a law-based democratic system and to pose as the guarantor of law observance, which could be attributed to the weakness of civilian authorities. The military are deeply convinced about legitimacy of their approach due to the liberation struggle traditions when the army was the only force able to bring freedom from colonialism and political changes in the society.

Preservation of the military’s key role in the government system seems to reflect the deep-rooted problems, i.e. imperfection of the state institutions, violation of the constitutionally prescribed principle of separation of powers, underdevelopment of the civil society, divisions between the authorities and the people, as well as limitation of the political process by the defense of group (tribal, clan) and individual interests, and the elite competition for resources, quite scarce in the Guinea-Bissau case. Democratization should cover all spheres, including the military. High on the agenda today is the reinvigoration of the economy, the solution of humanitarian problems, the improvement of the court system, and the eradication of poverty, corruption and drug trafficking.

The establishment of a stable and legitimate political authority in the highly polarized Guinea-Bissau would require observance of the constitution and democratic norms by all the participants of the political process, fair elections on scheduled dates and respect for the will of the people, the citizens who come to the ballot boxes.