Russia–China: Twenty Proposals for an Economic, Scientific and Humanitarian Partnership
Short version
The 20 proposals presented here contain easy-to-implement ideas for making Russia more attractive for the economic, scientific and cultural circles of Chinese society. Cooperation in this sphere should above all seek to match the interests and aspirations of the partners, provide opportunities and improve career prospects for all those who contribute to Sino–Russian relations. Only the active involvement of people in Russia and China can invest the Sino–Russian strategic partnership and cooperation with concrete substance.
Full version
President Putin’s visit to China on May 20–21, 2014 was, to quote the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, “the main political event in Sino–Russian relations this year, and its results will mark a milestone in promoting all-embracing Sino–Russian partnership.” [1]
However, the visit took place under new conditions. The crisis in Ukraine has brought about a temporary complication of Russia’s relations with the West and lent greater priority to the Chinese vector for the country. China, by taking a reserved position on the Ukrainian issue, has managed to preserve good relations both with Russia and the West. This has given China certain advantages, as Chinese diplomacy still has great room for multilateral manoeuvres.
In this context, it is more important for Russia than ever to win sympathy in China’s economic, scientific and cultural circles. On the one hand, Russia enjoys warm feelings on the part of Chinese partners belonging to the older generation, based on the past Soviet–Chinese friendship and the common historical development of the two countries. On the other hand, the new generations of Chinese citizens have been weaned on Western – above all American – culture, have studied English, have little knowledge of Russia and will tend to see it as a country that tries to make up for its economic weakness by political aggressiveness and that in its “quarrel” with the West increasingly depends on China.
Chinese society today is fairly pluralistic and public opinion plays a greater role in political decision-making than is often believed. As seen from the political documents and statements following the 18thNational Congress of the Communist Party of China and the Third Plenary Session of the 18thCPC Central Committee [2], political reform in China will make state governance in China more transparent and open, giving the public a still greater say in politics. For years, Sino–Russian relations have had an official and occasionally formal character, with little backing of high-level intergovernmental contacts by people-to-people horizontal links. However, considering the likely social and political development of China, the opinion of the thinking circles in China can no longer be neglected.
The 20 proposals presented here contain easy-to-implement ideas for making Russia more attractive for the economic, scientific and cultural circles of Chinese society. Cooperation in this sphere should above all seek to match the interests and aspirations of the partners, provide opportunities and improve career prospects for all those who contribute to Sino–Russian relations. Only the active involvement of people in Russia and China can invest the Sino–Russian strategic partnership and cooperation with concrete substance.
Russia–China: Twenty Proposals for Economic, Scientific and Humanitarian Partnership
1. Strengthen the continuity of Sino–Russian humanitarian scientific cooperation
2. Step up the process of creating joint Sino–Russian scientific and educational centres
3. Increase the transparency of youth exchange programmes
4. Declare 2016–2017 the reciprocal years of education, science and innovation
9. Conisder the Issue of a Visa-Free Regime for Chinese and Russian Tourists
13. Use economic opportunities to export Russian agricultural produce to China
14. Take mutual interests in the energy field into account
16. Strengthen and promote joint efforts to protect the environment
17. Project a more humane image of Russia and its leaders
18. Take a responsible attitude to strategic cooperation on key international issues
20. Refocus the work of various international forums from political to economic aspects
1. Strengthen the Continuity of Sino-Russian Humanitarian Scientific Cooperation
Traditionally, the head institution for the study of society, politics, economics and law in modern China has been the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Far East Studies. Its Chinese counterpart is the Institute of Russian, Eastern European and Central Asian Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. In addition, both Russia and China have some other research centres, both independent and based at universities, specializing in Sino–Russian relations and mutual study of the societies of the two countries.
In recent years, Russia has seen the decentralization of research, as well as the creation of research centres at universities and tougher competition between alternative research centres. These are all positive processes. But the downside of the radical changes in Russian science is that the balance of traditional ties with the Chinese scientific community has been disrupted: there is a lack of funding and a shortage of young professional Sinologists. As a result, Russian experts admit, scientific cooperation often relies on Chinese money and the services of Chinese translators [3].
By contrast, the scientific sphere in China is stable, relatively open, well-funded and well-organized, remaining and even becoming still more attractive for young professionals, including those who have returned after studying in Russia and have perfect command of Russian. Considering the ongoing reforms and changes in Russian science and education, Chinese scientists often have problems finding research partners and building horizontal links. In planning Sino–Russian scientific links and their funding, one should remember that the Chinese mentality has always set great store by tradition and continuity. Chinese colleagues respect research institutions that have an established tradition. Trust in Chinese society emerges slowly and gradually on the basis of long-term and frequent contacts. The Chinese people feel that new scientific brands should rest on existing ones and young scientists should take their cue from their distinguished teachers.
That is why giving a new impetus to Sino–Russian scientific cooperation should begin with the thorough collection of data on existing institutions in the two countries, the initiation of joint projects and the preparation of a list of prominent scientists. In practice, this initiative could be implemented by creating an interactive database of Russian and Chinese scientists and organizations. The list of international scientists prepared by the Russian International Affairs Council could provide the starting point for creating such a base on the Russian side.
2. Step up the Process of Creating Joint Sino-Russian Scientific and Educational Centres
In order to achieve multifaceted and fruitful cooperation with China, Russia must deepen its understanding of every aspect of Chinese society: its language, culture, mentality, economics, law, and domestic and foreign policies. Traditionally, Russia has had an impressive school of China studies that was highly regarded in China. However, in recent years the number and quality of Sino–Russian scientific contacts has fallen short of modern trends. The paucity of Russian specialists and fundamental researchers may result in a lack of expertise in making political decisions. Without such expertise, the Chinese models of behaviour and decision-making may end up being calculated and predicted proceeding from the Russian, and not the Chinese, mentality. All this may lead to serious miscalculations and errors.
The problem, however, is not solely or largely the shortage of Sinologists in Russia: the number of Chinese studies programmes at Russian higher education institutions has been growing in recent years. Besides, for several years now China has been purposefully attracting foreign students and in addition to those who have learnt Chinese in Russia, there are many Russians who have studied Chinese or some other subject at Chinese higher education institutions. Finally, Chinese students studying in Russia provide an excellent pool of potential China scholars. The problem is rather in the prospects that Russia has to offer to young scientists. If it is to attract quality research personnel, Russian science should above all be adequately financed. Russia should not save on science and put Russian scientists in an embarrassing position because their Chinese colleagues have far greater opportunities and resources when studying similar problems. Russian business should be actively encouraged to finance the training of Sinologists and Chinese studies in Russia. Business will need more and more quality expertise as trade between the two countries grows. The development of science, however, is not all about money: to be attractive, Russian science must be more open to international dialogue. One recent trend has been the creation in China of joint research and education centres where foreign and Chinese colleagues work together. Examples of such research centres are the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy (the result of cooperation between the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Tsinghua University) [4], the Sino–French Research Centre at Tsinghua University (the result of cooperation between the network of French Research Institutes Abroad – IFRE– and Tsinghua University) [5], as well as the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China located in Hong Kong, where it is easier to set up such centres from the legal and organizational points of view [6]. The New York University Shanghai campus is an example of a successful educational project [7].
Judging from talks with Chinese colleagues, there is keen interest in China in such joint projects. Ambitious planned projects in this sphere are the Russo-Chinese University [8] and SCO University [9]. However, considering the cost and technical complexity of creating entire universities, it would perhaps make sense to start with pilot projects on a smaller scale. What matters is not the fact that the centres exist, but that they have enough financial and human resources to carry out quality joint research, hold conferences, issue joint publications and set up a quality and prestigious educational process.
Some early experience of organizing Sino–Russian centres at Chinese higher education institutions has been gained by Russkiy Mir (“Russian World”) centres. As of today, Russkiy Mir has centres at seven Chinese institutions of higher learning (six in mainland China and one in Macao), and there are four Russkiy Mir Cabinetsat four more institutions [10].
The activities of Russkiy Mir centres, which popularize the Russian language in China, could be expanded. To begin with, Russkiy Mir centres do not currently support research. But they could start supporting humanities studies, including in the sphere of Sino–Russian relations. In fact, the Chinese equivalent of Russkiy Mir, the Confucius Institute, is currently expanding its work to promote the Chinese language to include support for a broader range of humanities studies. Secondly, unlike the Chinese Confucius Institutes, which must have the positions of co-directors from the Chinese and (in our case) Russian sides, Russkiy Mir centres are limited to a single head who is usually (with one exception [11] ) a representative of a Chinese university. It would seem logical to institute the position of a Russian co-director who would accumulate experience of interacting with the Chinese colleagues in the sphere of education.
In the longer term, Russia will need an organization similar to the Carnegie Foundation or the French Institute of Foreign Research. Russkiy Mir may not be the most suitable outfit for coordinating a wide spectrum of humanities research outside the sphere of Russian studies. However, in the absence of an organization specializing in foreign research, a realistic step could be to assess the legal and organizational environment for the creation of Sino–Russian research and educational centres under the auspices of Russkiy Mir or in the framework of bilateral cooperation between universities. As a first step, young Russian scholars and postgraduate and undergraduate students who study in China could be involved in this work.
3. Increase the transparency of youth exchange programmes
The 2014–2015 academic year has been declared to be the year of Sino–Russian youth exchanges. However, very little information about the programme and the planned activities is publicly available.
The youth exchange programme should be prepared in a more active and transparent manner. Because youth exchange years belong to the humanitarian sphere, that is, to inter-personal contacts, it would be logical to scale down the role of the state in their organization, encourage personal initiatives and avoid formal bureaucratic activities.
However, state support is necessary to create and promote the platform on which initiatives could be put forward and promoted. On the Russian side, such a platform could be created on the internet and be affiliated with the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo). As a minimum, it would be possible to use this platform to apply for the inclusion of a project in the reciprocal years of youth exchanges. Needless to say, such applications must not be confined to requests for state financial assistance; it is necessary to encourage those projects that have independent sources of funding.
The next step could be forums, personal meetings and summer camps between young Russian and Chinese colleagues; however, participants in these events should be selected on the basis of services rendered to the common programme of youth exchange years.
4. Declare 2016–2017 The Reciprocal Years Of Education, Science And Innovation
If conducted successfully, the reciprocal youth exchange years 2014–2015 should increase mutual interest in Russia and China among the youth of the two countries. A growth of Sino–Russian student exchanges increases the important human resource pool for bilateral relations that includes Russians who have studied or interned at Chinese universities and Chinese students who have studied or interned at Russian universities. The next necessary step would be to offer young people realistic chances of pursuing their interests in the sphere of education, research and innovation.
The possible aims of the reciprocal years of education, science and innovation include: 1)involving in educational and research cooperation not only undergraduate students, but also those at higher-levels – masters and postgraduate students, and young lecturers and researchers; 2) programmes need to be developed for young scholars not only in linguistics, but also in other humanities and technical fields; 3) the exchange years should involve members of diasporas, for example, young Russian scientists, postgraduates and undergraduates who work or study at Chinese universities, as well as young Chinese scientists, postgraduates and undergraduates who work at research organizations in Russia or study at Russian higher education institutions.
5. Expand the mutual recognition of educational and scientific achievements, including revising the lists of Chinese hihger education and research institutions whose diplomas are recognized in Russia and establishing cooperation on scientific citation databases
There is a marked imbalance in the system of mutual recognition of degrees in Russia and China. Russia and China signed an agreement on mutual recognition of education documents and academic degrees in 1995. As a result, according to the data published by the Ministry of Education of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, China today recognizes the diplomas of 542 Russian higher education institutions. However, the 2013 version of the List of Foreign Educational Organizations that Issue Documents on Education and (or) Qualifications Recognized in the Russian Federation does not include a single Chinese higher education institution [12]. The 2012 version of the same list contained just 11 Chinese higher education institutions, including only 6 mainland universities, 4 in Hong Kong and one in Taiwan.
It would be appropriate to expand the range of Chinese universities and research institutions whose education diplomas and academic degrees are recognized in Russia considering the fairly high international ranking of Chinese universities and the set target of increasing Sino–Russian student exchanges to 100,000 a year, and the generally high priority of China in the programme to internationalize Russian higher education institutions. When making a decision about which degrees should be recognized, one can proceed first from the international rankings of universities. For example, the universities that are included in the top 500 higher education institutions by QS [13], Webometrics [14], etc. Second, it is absolutely necessary to take into account internal Chinese higher education development projects. For example, we may recognize diplomas granted by the higher education institutions included in Project 211 [15], which covers 112 universities, in order to pick the top 100 universities in China, and Project 985 [16], which covers 39 universities and is aimed at creating world-class universities in China. As a rule, Project 985 universities are also included in Project 211.
In addition, Russian and Chinese researchers face considerable problems with the mutual recognition of their scientific achievements and publications. Chinese research institutions encourage and recognize publications that are included in American scientific citation systems (for example, the Social Sciences Citation Index, or SSCI, in the humanities) [17]. The Russian Higher Attestation Commission uses as a criterion for inclusion in the list of peer-reviewed scientific journals and publications for publishing the main scientific results of dissertations, considering it sufficient if the periodical is included in a number of Western science citation databases [18]. However, there are Chinese science citation lists (for example, the Сhinese Social Sciences Citation Index, abbreviated as the CSSCI [19], and the Chinese Science Citation Database [0] ) and more recently the Russian Science Citation Index is being actively used and developed [21].
Agreements between Russia and China on the mutual recognition of their national science citation databases may be useful in several ways. First, they will strengthen the positions of Chinese and Russian scientific journals. Second, they will improve the career prospects for Russian scientists oriented toward China and Chinese scientists oriented toward Russia and will bring quality human resources into Sino–Russian scientific exchanges. The mutual recognition of scientific publications should occur against the background of an overall improvement of the quality of academic publications in Russia and China, a goal towards which both countries are actively working.
6. Intensify Efforts to Translate Modern Literature from Russian into Chinese and to Develop Joint Sino–Russian Projects in the Cinema and other Arts
Contemporary Russian literature and art are far less well known in China than classical Russian and Soviet literature and art. Although Russian and Soviet literature is still better known than the literatures of other foreign countries – including the United States and France – the passing of the older generation coupled with the absence of appropriate policies on the Russian side will ensure that this situation changes.
First of all, recognition should be granted by presenting awards to the outstanding Chinese translators of Russian literature published at various periods of time. These specialists have made an indisputable contribution to popularizing Russian literature in China. This is all the more important because tradition, consistency, continuity and gratitude are key values of Chinese culture.
Efforts must continue to translate modern Russian literature into Chinese and to acquaint the Chinese audience with contemporary Russian culture: film, music, painting, sculpture and photography. The Chinese audience has an interest in Russia: the film Stalingrad grossed $8.3 million upon its release in China [2], the best result ever achieved by a non-Chinese and non-Hollywood film in the history of Chinese film distribution [23]. The documentary series Born in the USSR and the feature films Metro, Six Degrees of Celebration and Six Degrees of Celebration2 have been translated into Chinese by a group of amateur Chinese translators.
The shortcut to introducing Russian films to the Chinese audience is to make joint Chinese–Russian films. China actively supports film co-productions.
One way to ensure that Russian films become more popular and reach out to a wider audience in China is to introduce Chinese elements in these films. We could take a leaf from the United States’ book: to break into the Chinese market of commercial films, the Americans have been introducing elements of Chinese culture and way of life in their plots. For example, in the cult youth series The Big Bang Theory, the characters constantly order Chinese food and the political series House of Cards, a massive hit in China, has a Chinese character – a multimillionaire by the name of Feng.
Sino–Russian art projects may also bring Russian culture closer to the interests of the Chinese audience. One has to bear in mind that Russian culture is, after all, comparatively far removed from Chinese society in terms of content, values and means on expression, which makes them more difficult for the Chinese audience to appreciate.
7. Revise the Priorities of Russian Regions for Cooperation with China to include European and Southern Russian Regions
Traditionally, Russia’s eastern regions have been more oriented toward cooperation with China. It is understandable and reasonable to seek to use China’s economic potential to give an impetus to the development of Siberia and the Russian Far East.
The aim of cooperation, however, is crucial: while Siberia and the Far East may attract, for example, Chinese extractive and energy companies, they are not very attractive for Chinese university professors and students because of the cold climate and their location far from the capitals and decision-making centres. This writer constantly faces situations when Chinese teachers and students, even having fellowships and cooperation agreements, shy away from exchanges with universities in Siberia, but are all too ready to go to universities in the European part of Russia. When planning regional cooperation, signing twin-city agreements and agreements between universities, it is first necessary to assess the factors that make the regions attractive in the long term, such as the level of infrastructure development, the climate conditions of the region, the scientific and educational potential of the education institution, etc.
While considering these factors it is necessary to draw the attention of the Chinese side to the regions in European and southern Russia. If these factors are taken into account, the agreements signed will become more workable.
8. Direct Cooperation to Economically Developed Regions and Rich Cities of China with a Special Economic Status
Traditionally, cooperation with Russia has been concentrated (in addition to Beijing and Shanghai) in three north-eastern provinces: Heilongjiang, Liaoning and Jilin. However, there is great potential for cooperation with other Chinese regions, especially with the rich and economically developed coastal eastern, south-eastern and southern provinces of Guangdong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Fujian. China’s economically developed regions have good infrastructure, are better managed and policed, and are more innovative and open to foreigners, all of which provides a good business environment.
For the last 25 years the southern province of Guangdong has been the leading province in China in terms of GDP [24]. According to preliminary data for 2013, the GDP in Guangdong Province (in current USD prices) amounted to 6.2 trillion yuan ($1 trillion) [25], approaching the GDPs of Indonesia, South Korea and Mexico [26].
According to 2013 statistics, per capita GDP (in current USD prices) in seven provinces and cities in China topped $10,000 (the cities of Tianjin, Beijing and Shanghai and the provinces Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Inner Mongolia and Liaoning) [27]. In Guangdong, Fujian and Shandong provinces, per capita GDP in current prices in 2013 topped the $9,000 mark [28].
In planning cooperation, one has to bear in mind that China’s economic development is focused not so much on regions as a whole, but on cities which have the character of enclaves: rich cities are surrounded by poorer neighbourhoods. This is part of the policy of creating Special Economic Zones that the People’s Republic of China has pursued since 1979 and which has been one of the drivers of the Chinese economic development model.
Another factor to be kept in mind is that political and economic centres in China are not always the same. The country’s economic, infrastructural and even cultural development is geographically spread all over the country and inside the provinces rather than being concentrated in Beijing and the provincial capitals.
That is why in planning cooperation, one should look not so much at the political status, population and geographical position of a city, but rather at its economic status. Thus, the richest city in Guangdong Province is Shenzhen, which is not the province’s capital (2013 per capita GDP in Shenzhen amounted to $22,198.03); the richest city in Jiangsu Province is Suzhou (with $19,922.19 per capita GDP in 2013);the richest city in Fujian Province is Xiamen (with $13,278.87per capita GDP in 2013), and so on.
9. Conisder the Issue of a Visa-Free Regime for Chinese and Russian Tourists
A feature of China’s visa cooperation with certain countries and regions (including Russia) is that visa-free regimes are in place not for the whole country, but rather for individual cities and regions. Thus, Russians can already travel to Hainan Island without a visa for stays of up to 21 days. Only the citizens of about 30 economically developed Chinese cities are allowed to visit Taiwan individually (not with a tourist group).
As part of the dialogue on the mutual easing of the visa regime between Russia and the People’s Republic of China, it would be helpful to abolish or significantly simplify the visa formalities for some economically developed Chinese cities.
In deciding which cities to start with, one should take into account, along with per capita GDP, real estate prices. The risk of migration is minimal if a person owns property in a Chinese city where there are expensive apartments. As of February 2014, for example, the five leading cities in terms of real estate prices were (in descending order): Beijing (average $6,130 per square metre), Shanghai ($4,671 per square metre), Shenzhen ($3,955 per square metre), Xiamen ($3,579 per square metre) and Sanya ($3,228 per square metre).
In exchange, China could consider further easing visa formalities for Russians. It would be useful to negotiate with the People’s Republic of China the same visa regime that Russia already has with Hong Kong (14 days visa-free for Russian tourists) or Macao (30 days). Precedents already exist. For example, citizens of Japan can stay in China for 15 days without a visa.
10. Coordinate Efforts to Ensure the Safety of Chinese and Russian Citizens and Create the Image of a Tolerant and Multicultural Russia in China
China is keeping a close eye on the life of its citizens in Russia. The Chinese as a nation are very particular about their image in the eyes of foreigners on one hand, and the safety of their fellow countrymen abroad on the other. Not surprisingly, the Chinese media and bloggers took notice of some Russian articles and reports that portrayed their fellow Chinese citizens in a negative light. As a result, there is a growing perception in China that Chinese people in Russia are mostly guest workers, illegal immigrants or farm workers – poor and uneducated people. Moreover, unfortunately many Chinese citizens have a sense that Russia is a dangerous country to live in where racism, xenophobia and corruption are rife. The most talked about topic remains skinheads, whose actions frighten and mystify the Chinese. Another much-discussed topic is corruption within the ranks of the Russian police, especially the soliciting of bribes when checking the documents of Chinese citizens living in Russia.
To create an image of Russia as a hospitable and tolerant country it is necessary to cooperate with Chinese journalists, diplomats, teachers, students and business people living in Russia. We should explain Russian immigration laws to them; the laws against discrimination; their rights and the rules of safe behaviour in a situation when they are faced with discrimination or a threat to their safety on ethnic grounds. The Russian media should carry more interviews with successful Chinese citizens, especially those who live in or visit Russia. These can be politicians, businessmen, students, scientists, diplomats, and Chinese celebrities visiting Russia.
At the end of the day, the image of a safe and tolerant Russia depends on how Russian society actually treats foreigners in general, and Chinese citizens in particular. Image-building policies or reports in the Russian media cannot mask the problems because the Chinese citizens who stay in Russia, when faced with discrimination and especially a threat to their personal safety, are sure to report it in the Chinese blogosphere, and their compatriots would tend to believe them rather than the official assurances of the Russian authorities and the media.
11. Strengthen The Climate Of Trust In Military-Technical Cooperation By Encouraging Joint Research And Development Projects With Chinese Investments
One likely consequence of the Ukrainian crisis is greater priority of military-technical cooperation with China.
Russia has traditionally exported arms to China. Its competitive advantage in military cooperation with China is that, traditionally, the Chinese military-industrial complex has mainly used imported Russian technologies. One salient example is Chinese military aviation, which is still almost totally dependent on Russian engines – even though it has started developing and using its own. That is why China has shown interest in buying Russian Su-35 fighter planes.
However, the Chinese defence industry has made great technological progress and the country has become a major arms exporter, outstripping Great Britain in terms of the total cost of exports. There are concerns that China is increasing its share of the global arms market mainly because it violates Russia’s intellectual property rights. However, experts point out that these risks are exaggerated because, first, China has acquired military technology not only through cooperation with Russia, but also through cooperation with European Union countries and Israel at earlier stages; second, the unlicensed copying of technology by China, even if it has happened, would often involve leaks from other CIS countries, notably Ukraine; and third, China’s current efforts to modernize its military will not drastically change the existing balance of forces between China and Russia as much as they could damage the development of the Russian military-industrial complex [29].
Expanding and deepening Russian- and Chinese-funded research and development projects can help to prevent the Chinese side from copying Russian technologies while at the same time giving impetus to innovations in the Russian military-industrial complex. Research and development may involve military technologies proper or peaceful uses of military technologies. U.S.–Israeli, U.S.–European and U.S.–Japanese cooperation can serve as models. Although the foreign policy and defence interests of Russia and China do not coincide on all matters and the two countries have not formed a military alliance, the deepening of joint research and development projects, especially in the use of military technologies for peaceful purposes, is a fairly safe policy that can best promote innovation in the Russian defence industry without jeopardizing the priorities of the country’s national security.
12. Attract more Chinese Investments into Infrastructure-Building in Russia, especially the Construction of High-Speed Railways
China has repeatedly shown interest in investing in Russian infrastructure projects and providing Russia with the technologies developed during the Chinese infrastructure boom. The Plan of Russia–China Investment Cooperation (adopted in June of 2009) welcomes Chinese investments in Russia’s transport infrastructure (railways, motorways, bridges and ports) [30].
Our Chinese partners are especially interested in the sphere of high-speed railways. China has built more than 14,000 km of high-speed railways within a brief space of time. The advantage of Chinese railway technologies is the relatively low cost, with the risk being that the quality of the technologies is not time tested.
In assessing and implementing joint projects in this sphere, tough requirements should be presented to the safety standards of Chinese technologies. At the same time, China is likely to take a highly responsible attitude to building railways abroad because breaking into the global market in this field is a long-term priority of its investment policy.
13. Use Economic Opportunities to Export Russian Agricultural Produce to China
Food security is a challenge for China because of environmental pollution and soil depletion. The acute shortage of high-quality dairy products in China was exposed in 2013, when the Hong Kong authorities, faced with the massive export of powdered baby milk to mainland China, made the unlicensed export of baby powder milk in amounts exceeding 1.8kg per day per person illegal [31].
The huge Chinese food market, especially fo rmilk and baby foods, is still a largely untapped potential for developing agricultural production in Russia for export to China. The bulk of imported milk comes from New Zealand, although imports from Australia, France, Switzerland, Italy and other countries are increasing. Experts predict that the imported milk market in China will grow in the coming years [32].
14. Take Mutual Interests in the Energy Fieldinto Account
Both Russia and China see cooperation in the energy field as a priority in their interaction. China assigns Russia a priority role among its ten partner countries in the industry. During President Putin’s visit to China on May 21, 2014, a contract was signed between Gazprom and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) on annual supplies of 38 billion cubic metres of gas to China over 30 years. The contract benefits both sides; for Russia, it ensures diversification of the export markets, the development of infrastructure and stable budget revenue, which is particularly relevant at a time when relations with the West have deteriorated as a result of the Ukrainian crisis. For China, Russian gas is important above all as an answer to its ecological problems: up until now the Chinese industry has mainly used coal, with the share of gas being only about 5 per cent [33], which has resulted in unprecedented air pollution. That is why China seeks to increase the share of natural gas in its energy mix as soon as possible.
China counts on deeper technological cooperation with Russia in the energy field. On the one hand, China hopes to get Russian support in developing nuclear technologies. On the other hand, in the sphere of energy engineering, China hopes to break into the internal Russian market of energy equipment because Chinese engineering companies seek to export their equipment to Russia [34] .
Following the18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the country has been pursuing a policy of developing private oil and gas enterprises, so we can expect private Chinese companies to become more active in the field of Sino–Russian energy cooperation. China is counting on Russia to provide a favourable environment for these enterprises.
For Russia, China is a large and promising energy market. In the nuclear energy field, it is a market for the supply of hi-tech products with high added value. It is necessary to exert active efforts to expand this market on mutually beneficial terms.
15. Coordinate Efforts to Reduce Financial Risks and Ensure Financial Security in order to Increase the Volume of Direct Trading Between the Yuan and the Rouble.
In 2013 trade between Russia and China was roughly at the same level as in 2012, reaching $89.21 billion. Meanwhile, Russian export to the People’s Republic of China dropped by 10.3 per cent. However, trade between the two countries is expected to grow, especially if agreements are reached on massive supplies of Russian natural gas to China.
To back up growing trade financially, Russia and China must step up their cooperation on the stock markets and in the banking sector. Their strategy should be aimed at further diminishing the intermediate role of the dollar in foreign trade transactions (which increases transaction costs for the trade partners) and at strengthening direct trading between the yuan and the rouble, which became possible in late 2010 and, according to the Moscow Exchange, is a promising and growing area in the development of the Russian financial market [5].
However, a number of problems persist. The first is the financial risks associated with exchange rate volatility and the insufficient sharing of information between the actors in the financial market. The second big problem is financial security, especially money-laundering and illegal banking institutions [36]. Part of the problem is that yuan cash is scarce in Russia and rouble cash is scarce in China, while the banks offer unfavourable exchange rates [37].
In addition to the inconvenience this causes for bilateral trade partners, this trend aggravates the crime situation and tarnishes the images of the two countries. Thus, the end of 2013 saw another scandal over the Moskva Trade Centre where, according to media reports, Chinese citizens were detained during a police operation to liquidate illegal financial institutions [38]. We have to bear in mind that even if the Russian police acts strictly within the law, each such incident receives bad press in China, with the local media reporting anti-Chinese sentiment in Russia.
To solve these problems, greater cooperation is needed between the Russian and Chinese financial institutions. Such cooperation should be aimed at reducing financial risks by forming a market exchange rate of the yuan against the rouble (this will be aided by China’s proposed policy of seeking the free convertibility of the yuan) and the creation of systems of exchange of information on risks between financial institutions. The struggle against illegal banking structures should involve not solely or largely law enforcement measures, but rather an effort to eliminate the underlying causes of money laundering and illegal services by making the roubles and yuan more available to the participants in bilateral trade.
16. Strengthen and Promote Joint Efforts to Protect the Environment
Environmental protection is a priority for both Russia and China. Russia declared 2013 to be the Year of Environment Protection, while progress in environmental protection was one of the main tasks set by the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in late 2012. China is already a leader in developing alternative sources of energy, notably solar energy.
The public perception of Russia in China is that it is a country with wonderful and well-preserved nature. There is a sense that Russia pays great attention to nature conservation and is much more advanced in this field than China. Incidentally, this perception is strengthened by the large number of wild birds in Russian cities; by contrast, there are hardly any birds in Chinese cities.
Russia and China are already cooperating in assessing the ecological consequences of economic and infrastructure projects, including cross-border projects, in preventing and clearing the aftermath of natural disasters, and in protecting Far Eastern wildlife – especially the Siberian tiger and the snow leopard. Such cooperation should be supported and increased, and properly promoted, because in addition to the environmental benefits, it builds up a positive image of the two countries in the eyes of the public.
17. Project a More Humane Image of Russia and its Leaders
In the 21st century, Russia should seek to project a more humane image in China to prevent it from being seen as drifting towards becoming an aggressive empire. In the long term, an image of Russia that cares about the wellbeing of its people and respects the neighbouring states will be more attractive for the young generation of Chinese citizens and will help to remove from Chinese public consciousness the emotionally explosive bilateral territorial disputes and the political twists and turns of the 1960s and 70s.
The personal popularity of President Putin is a significant factor in building a positive image of Russia in China. Only President Putin of Russia and President Obama of the United States have a high personal recognition factor in China (with Putin probably more popular than Obama). The majority of leaders of other countries are virtually unknown to ordinary Chinese citizens.
On the other hand, the image of Russia as a superpower still worries China. Russia is suspected of harbouring plans to seize new territories. Thus, while many ordinary internet users in China admired the efficient way in which Russia handled the Crimean referendum [39], Russian actions in the region prompted comparisons concerning the historical role of Russia and the USSR in the issue of independence of Mongolia from China [40].
If Russia is to project a more humane image in China, it must clearly formulate its position on the one hand and hand make a sustained effort to communicate this position through all the available sources of information on the other: joint events, Chinese-language versions of Russian media outlets, micro-blogging, films, literature, the arts, etc. It would help if Russian leaders referred more often to “Chinese elements”, i.e.China and its culture, in their speeches. The Chinese people are very proud of their ancient culture and appreciate it when foreigners show an interest in it. Russia should also explain to China the humanitarian and legal aspects of Russia’s position on those major international crises (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria) where it sees eye-to-eye with China.
The most successful “soft power” actors are known to be non-state actors [41]. That is why the members of the Russian community in China – businessmen, university professors and creative intellectuals – can play an important role in fostering a more humane image of Russia in China. Non-state actors can act spontaneously, without the state directing their actions. However, the Russian state may support them, for example, by mediating talks with the Chinese authorities on granting Russians a more favourable immigration status, organizing business project competitions among members of the Russian diaspora in China, internet projects contests in China, etc.
18. Take a Responsible Attitude to Strategic Cooperation on Key International Issues
Russia and China are strategic partners and their positions coincide on many key international issues. However, the recent Ukrainian crisis has put China in a delicate situation. While relations between China and Russia are officially described as a “comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction” [42], China’s relations with Ukraine are also defined as a “strategic partnership” [43]. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China has repeatedly stressed that it respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine [44]. The state-controlled media in China ruled out the possibility of a conflict between China and the West [45]. In this context, China’s abstention in the UN Security Council vote on the resolution on Crimea was probably a sign of China’s consistent adherence to the principle of non-interference in the affairs of foreign states and restraint in international relations [46], as well as its reluctance to spoil relations with Russia, rather than an expression of genuine support for Russia’s actions. Russia should not exaggerate the degree to which China shares its interests and interpret its silence as a sign of agreement. In spite of some differences with the West, China has strong economic ties with the United States and Europe. Politically, China’s attitude is pragmatic, as it seeks to maintain cooperative relations both with the West and with Russia. Therefore, in order to preserve and maintain profound relations with China, Russia should avoid situations in which China would be forced to publicly take sides between Russia and the West.
19. Adjust Russian Projects In The Field Of Public Diplomacy To The Interests And Expectations Of The Chinese Audience
We should take a long hard look at Russian public diplomacy to see if it corresponds to the interests and values of the Chinese audience. In order to get foreigners interested in Russia, it is necessary to find a point of entry into their sphere of interests. We should proceed not only from what we want to tell them, but also from what may interest them.
One useful idea would be to identify Chinese celebrities who are friendly towards Russia and invite them to become Good Will Ambassadors of some tourist landmarks in Russia. That measure would be the more effective the more popular the Ambassadors are. Ambassadors should be people who have millions of fans. For example, composer and intellectual Gao Xiaosong presents one of China’s most popular talk shows devoted to civilization, culture, and way of life in foreign countries on the Youku internet channel (an equivalent of Youtube). Gao has already devoted several episodes to Russia, one of them being about the Sochi Olympic Games. Such initiatives should be tracked down and ways should be found to cooperate with their creators.
We should make a list of Russian celebrities that are recognized in China and invite them to Russia-related events held in China. Many of the Russian stars known in China are athletes: Dmitri Sautin, Alina Kabaeva, Svetlana Khorkina, Maria Sharapova and most recently the new star Yulia Lipnitskaya. Russian Olympic diving champion Dmitri Sautin was again in the limelight in China in March–June 2013 when he took part (as a judge) in the Chinese version of the Splash TV show.
20. Refocus the Work of Various International Forums from Political to Economic Aspects
Fruitful cooperation with China within international formats would best be promoted by the de-politicization of alliances, reducing political risks for economic activities and shifting as much as possible to economic and humanitarian cooperation, which is more popular with the population.
The internal political dynamic of China gives prominence to the goals of improving economic performance and the quality of life, which prompts a foreign policy of limited involvement in issues that do not bring economic benefits. Although China temporarily deviated from this position during the rule of Mao Zedong – partly under the influence of communist ideas – Deng Xiaoping proclaimed a doctrine of priority development of the economy and restraint in international affairs.
China, of course, seeks to strengthen its influence, but it proposes to do so mainly by economic means. One proof of this is that China would like Russia to take part in creating the Silk Road economic zone. Through this project, China intends to invest heavily in major energy and energy infrastructure projects in Russia and Central Asia.
As China sees it, the BRICS Bank project will likely contribute to the reform of the current system of international financial institutions in order to give Russia and China greater influence in them, rather than competing with or gradually supplanting them. China has a fairly positive experience of cooperation with the World Bank, appreciating its support for China’s economic development. China’s representatives have risen to high positions in the World Bank Group. After Justin Lin who was Senior Vice President and Chief Economist of the World Bank in 2008–2012, a Chinese citizen, Jin-Yong Cai, became Executive Vice President and CEO of the International Financial Corporation, one of the institutions of the World Bank Group.
Conclusion
Arguably, the biggest risk in Sino–Russian relations is a lack of mutual understanding or misinterpretation. These stem from cultural differences, different interpretations of actions and intentions, words and symbols. Memories are still fresh in the minds of the two countries of the years of Soviet–Chinese friendship, when the two countries were closer to each other than they had ever been – the links that were severed overnight, partly because the Soviet leadership took an unrealistic view of the interests, aspirations and potential of its Chinese partners.
Considering such risks, these 20 proposals are designed not only or primarily to achieve high-profile results within a short space of time, but to tap the existing – and create new – potential for long-term and reliable development of Sino–Russian relations. At the end of the day, a Sino–Russian strategic partnership will only be truly successful if it retains its momentum over the next ten, twenty or even a hundred years.
1. China Daily Interview with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov // Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, April 15, 2014 // URL: http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/C0CE36DCDAABF0E444257CBB0020E494 (in Russian).
2. CC CPC Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms. Adopted on November 2013 by the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CC CPC // China Internet Information Center, URL: http://russian.china.org.cn/exclusive/txt/2014-01/15/content_31202914.htm (in Russian). (Chinese: 中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定 [zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian shenhua gaige ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding] (official text) // Xinhua Agency, 15 November 2013, URL: http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-11/15/c_118164235.htm).
3. Portyakov, V. Speech at the RIAC Roundtable Meeting Russia and China: In Search of New Ways of Cooperation. Moscow, May 20, 2014.
4. http://carnegietsinghua.org/
5. http://www.dir.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/iren/index.html
6. http://www.cefc.com.hk/rubrique.php?id=73
8. http://audit.msu.ru/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=41
9. http://uni-sco.com/?lang=EN
10. http://russkiymir.ru/rucenter/catalogue.php. Four Russkiy Mir Cabinets operate in addition to seven centres.
11. http://russkiymir.ru/catalogue/company_view.php?id=14451 (in Russian).
12. The List of Foreign Educational Organizations that Issue Documents on Education and (or) Qualifications Recognized in the Russian Federation as approved by Decree No. 1694-r of the Government of the Russian Federation dated September 19, 2013 // Rossiyskaya Gazeta, September 25, 2013 – URL: http://img.rg.ru/pril/85/46/78/1694_perechen.pdf. See also: Borevskaya, N. (et al) Internationalization of Russian Universities: The Chinese Vector. Moscow: RIAC, 2013, p. 31 (in Russian).
13. QS World University Rankings 2013. URL: http://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings/world-university-rankings/2013
14. Ranking Web of Universities. World Ranking. URL: http://www.webometrics.info/en/world
15. Borevskaya, N. (et al) Internationalization of Russian Universities: The Chinese Vector. Moscow: RIAC, 2013, p. 22. See also: List of 112 Universities Designated as Project 2011 Members (Chinese: “211工程”学校名单 [“211 gongcheng”xuexiaomingdan]) // Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China. URL: http://www.moe.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/moe_94/201002/82762.html
16. Borevskaya, N. Ibid. See also: List of 39 Universities Sponsored by Project 985 (Chinese: “985工程”学校名单 [“985 gongcheng” xuexiaomingdan]) // Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China.URL: http://www.moe.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/s6183/201112/128833.html.
17. Social Sciences Citation Index // Thomson Reuters.URL : http://thomsonreuters.com/social-sciences-citation-index/
18. On the List of Peer-Reviewed Scientific Journals and Publications for Publishing the Main Scientific Results of Dissertations // Higher Attestation Commission. URL: http://vak1.ed.gov.ru/ru/help_desk/list/ (in Russian).
19. Chinese Social Sciences Citation Index. URL: http://cssci.nju.edu.cn/ (in Chinese).
20. Chinese Science Citation Database. URL: http://sciencechina.cn/ (in Chinese).Chinese Science Citation Database is also available as part of Web of Science database as a result of partnership between Thomson Reuters maintaining the Web of Science database and the Chinese Academy of Sciences. URL: http://wokinfo.com/products_tools/multidisciplinary/cscd/).(The Chinese Science Citation Database is also available as part of the Web of Science database as a result of partnership between Thomson Reuters, whichruns the Web of Science database, and the Chinese Academy of Sciences. URL: http://wokinfo.com/products_tools/multidisciplinary/cscd/.)
21. Russian Science Citation Index. URL: http://elibrary.ru/project_risc.asp? (in Russian).
22. http://lenta.ru/news/2013/11/05/stalingrad/ (in Russian).
23. http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/russias-stalingrad-storms-chinese-box-652842
24. Guangdong GDP to top $1 Trillion // Invest in China (website of the China Investment Promotion Agency of the Ministry of Commerce), December 26, 2013. URL: http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_37_42595_0_7.html
25. Statistical Bulletin of the Economic and Social Development of the Guangdong Province 2013. (Chinese: 2013年广东国民经济和社会发展统计公报 [2013 nianguanddongguominjingji he shehuifazhantongjigongbao]) // Guangdong ProvincialBureauofStatistics, February 26, 2014. URL: http://www.gdstats.gov.cn/tjzl/tjgb/201403/t20140305_139764.html.
26. Value Line Magazine Publishes Ranking of Chinese Provinces and Provincial-Level Administrative Regions by GDP for 2013 (Chinese: 《价值线》发布2013年中国省级行政区GDP排名 [jiazhixianfabu 2013 nianzhongguoshengjixingzhengqu GDP paiming]) // Xinhua Agency, March 17, 2014, URL: http://news.xinhuanet.com/finance/2014-03/17/c_119806994.htm.
27. Welcome to the Club: GDP Per Capita Surpasses $10,000 in Liaoning Province(Chinese: 人均GDP万美元俱乐部将添新成员：辽宁已入列 [renjun GDP wan meiyuanjulebujiang tian xinchengyuan: Liaoning yirulie]) // Phoenix Finance, February 20, 2014. URL: http://finance.ifeng.com/a/20140220/11699631_0.shtml. (The article points out that the calculations were completed at the 6.0674 CNY/USD rate seen in February.)
28. GDP per capita amounts to 58,678 yuan in Guangdong Province, 58,058 yuan in Fujian province and 56,789 yuan in Shandong Province. The data are quoted based on the article: Value Line Magazine Publishes Ranking of Chinese Provinces and Provincial-Level Administrative Regions by GDP for 2013 // Xinhua Agency, March 17, 2014, URL: http://news.xinhuanet.com/finance/2014-03/17/c_119806994.htm.
29. Kashin, V. A Stable Source of Income for our Defence Industry // Voyenno-PromyshlennyKuryer (“Military Industry Courier”) weekly, No. 44 (512), November 13, 2013. URL: http://vpk-news.ru/articles/18136 (in Russian).
30. Sino–Russian Investment Cooperation Plan (as Approved by the Heads of the State of the two Countries in June 2009) // Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation. URL: http://www.economy.gov.ru/minec/activity/sections/investmentpolicy/doc091230_2011 (in Russian).
31. Powdered Formula Licensing Circular No. 3/2013. Export Licensing Arrangement for Transfer/Transit Air Passengers. May 13, 2013 // Trade and Industry Department. The Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. URL: https://www.tid.gov.hk/english/import_export/nontextiles/powdered_formula/pf032013.html
32. Wei, H. Dairy Product Imports ‘to Witness Sharp Rise’ // China Daily, March 5, 2014. URL: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2014-03/05/content_17322993.htm
33. Jinhua, W. China Should Not Miss its Oil and Gas Import Opportunities in 2014 (Chinese: 王锦华. 中国不可错失的天然气石油进口时机 [Wang Jinhua. Zhongguobukecuoshi de tianranqishiyoujinkoushiji] // Financial Information Portal Caixun.com, April 15, 2014, URL: http://economy.caixun.com/wangjinhua/20140415-CX03cglh)
34. China and Russia to Continue to Deepen Nuclear Cooperation(Chinese: 中俄两国继续深化核能合作 [zhong e liang guo jixu shenhua heneng hezuo]) // China Radio Network (Chinese: 中国广播网 [zhongguoguangbowang]), March 23, 2013, URL: http://finance.cnr.cn/gs/201303/t20130323_512214717_1.shtml
35. Yarovoi, V. Mishina, V. CNY/RUB Forex Market: Current Status and Prospects // DengiiKredit, No. 5, 2013, pp. 43–45 (in Russian).
36. Police and Federal Security Service Conduct Searches at Half a Dozen Russian Banks in Relation to “Illicit Asian Bankers” Case // Pravo.ru, November 20, 2013. URL: http://pravo.ru/news/view/94841/ (in Russian).
37. Interview conducted by the author with representatives of Sino–Russian business circles.
38. Two Foreigners Arrested Following Searches in Moskva Shopping Centre // RIA Novosti, November 21, 2013. URL: http://ria.ru/incidents/20131121/978798248.html (in Russian).
39. Sboyev, A. Chinese Blogosphere on Developments in Ukraine – “Putin is cool!” // RIAC Blogs, March 11, 2014. URL: /blogs/dvfu/?id_4=1029 (in Russian).
40. Ibid.
41. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia_don_t_get_about_soft_power
42. Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on Mutually Beneficial Cooperation, a More Intensive Comprehensive Partnership and Strategic Interaction Ties, March 22, 2013 (official text) // Official Website of the President of the Russian Federation. URL: http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/1423 (in Russian). (Chinese: 中华人民共和国和俄罗斯联邦关于合作共赢、深化全面战略协作伙伴关系的联合声明（全文)[zhonghua renmin gongheguo he eluosi lianbang guanyu hezuo gongying,shenhua quanmian zhanlve xiezuo huoban guanxi de lianhe shengming (quanwen)] // Xinhua Agency, March 23, 2013. URL: http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2013-03/23/c_124494026.htm.)
43. Joint declaration by China and Ukraine on the Intensification of Strategic Partnership Relations, December 5, 2013 // RenminRibao (“People’s Daily”) website. URL: http://russian.people.com.cn/31521/8476245.html (in Russian). (Chinese: 中华人民共和国和乌克兰关于进一步深化战略伙伴关系的联合声明 [zhonghua renmin gongheguo he wukelan guanyu jin yibu shenhua zhanlve huoban guanxi de lianhe shengming] (офиц. текст) // Xinhua Agency, December 5, 2013, URL: http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-12/05/c_118439894.htm.)
44. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China: China Respects the Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of Ukraine // Renmin Ribao (“People’s Daily”) website, February 28, 2014. URL: http://russian.people.com.cn/31521/8550801.html (in Russian).
45. Russia’s Path Not Suitable for China // Global Times, March 22, 2014. URL: http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/850019.shtml?utm_content=bufferca01e&utm_medium=
social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer#.U2IQGPQW2cs.
46. China Urges all Parties Concerned to Seek Political Resolution to Ukraine Crisis – Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China // Renmin Ribao (“People’s Daily”) website, March 16, 2014. URL: http://russian.people.com.cn/31521/8568055.html (in Russian).