Persian Lessons: How Middle East War Will Change Gulf Monarchies

The war in the Middle East has been going on for more than a month. While the U.S. and Iran exchanged ultimatums and conditions, other countries in the region and longtime U.S. allies have increasingly suffered from the fallout.

Primarily, the Arab monarchies can be expected to boost their efforts in diversifying military cooperation. It seems that these countries have reassured themselves that the U.S. bases in the region not only play role in ensuring security but also create serious risks as they may provoke attacks against the country hosting them.

The region’s countries can be expected to put an even greater emphasis on developing military alliances, relying not only on the extra-regional security providers but also on friendly states within the region itself. Furthermore, there may be more active use of proxy groups and other non-state armed actors to address security concerns. Theoretically, it is possible to imagine that the UAE might turn to other forces such as the Southern Transitional Council in Yemen, which it has supported in the past.

Another likely scenario are attempts by the Arab monarchies to specify measures for providing assistance to allies in new defense agreements more clearly. The example of the Saudi-Pakistani alliance showed that the treaty did not protect Saudi Arabia from the Iranian strikes. Although Pakistan did provide diplomatic support to Saudi Arabia by reminding Tehran of the defense agreement, this did not ensure full protection for the kingdom.

At the same time, despite active diplomatic efforts to encourage allies to ensure security, trust in external assistance may decline among all the Arab Gulf monarchies. In conditions when ground invasion is becoming an anachronism, and drones and missiles play a key role in wars, it turns out that countries must primarily rely on themselves. It can be expected that after the conflict ends, the Arab monarchies will pay more attention to developing air and missile defense systems and, more broadly, their own defense capabilities overall.

Despite the Iranian strikes, some Arab monarchies of the Gulf may attempt to normalize relations with Tehran and agree on “red lines” to avoid a recurrence of such upheavals. The Iranian strikes against the region’s monarchies will not leave relations within the region unaffected. However, countries may conclude that it is more advantageous to stick to a “cold peace” than to live in a state of sharp confrontation.

The current conflict will likely lead to diversification of policy and the economy under pressure. It is highly likely that the Arab monarchies will build a more balanced security policy while simultaneously reducing risks to their national economies with a wide range of tools.

The United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran have concluded a two-week truce. According to U.S. President Donald Trump, the United States has received a 10-point proposal from Iran that could serve as a working basis for negotiations.

Although the conflict cannot yet be considered resolved, and the ceasefire agreements may be temporary, it is already possible to recap interim outcomes including for the Gulf monarchies which managed to wait out the hot phase of the confrontation and avoid direct involvement in the hostilities.

The current conflict in the Middle East is significantly different from the 12-Day War of last year, with a bigger number of killings among Iran’s political and military leadership, strikes against the Islamic Republic’s energy infrastructure, and a number of other distinctive features. But perhaps the most unexpected development has been that Tehran’s retaliation has been directed not so much at Israel and the United States as at the Gulf monarchies. This has shown itself in missile strikes, drone attacks against the infrastructure, including civilian targets, as well as blocking the Strait of Hormuz, which has affected global oil prices.

It is already possible to assume what trends are highly likely to intensify in the near future for the Arab Gulf monarchies—Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and, to a lesser extent, Oman.

Military Cooperation and the New Security Architecture

Primarily, the Arab monarchies can be expected to boost their efforts in diversifying military cooperation. It seems that these countries have reassured themselves that the U.S. bases in the region not only play role in ensuring security but also create serious risks as they may provoke attacks against the country hosting them.

Amid this, the Gulf monarchies’ desire to develop cooperation in this sphere with other states will grow. At the same time, engagement with Russia and China has the risk of imposing sanctions and a revision of the military cooperation level with the United States, which remains the main extra-regional ally of the Arab monarchies. Therefore, special attention will be likely paid to the Middle East and South Asia countries.

In September 2025, just a few months after the 12-Day War, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan concluded a defense agreement. Under the treaty, an attack against one party is considered aggression against both countries. Bloomberg, citing its sources, reported that Turkey was considering the possibility of joining this alliance in the future.

Under current conditions, the region’s countries can be expected to put an even greater emphasis on developing military alliances, relying not only on the extra-regional security providers but also on friendly states within the region itself. Furthermore, there may be more active use of proxy groups and other non-state armed actors to address security concerns. Theoretically, it is possible to imagine that the UAE might turn to other forces such as the Southern Transitional Council in Yemen, which it has supported in the past.

Another likely scenario are attempts by the Arab monarchies to specify measures for providing assistance to allies in new defense agreements more clearly. The example of the Saudi-Pakistani alliance showed that the treaty did not protect Saudi Arabia from the Iranian strikes. Although Pakistan did provide diplomatic support to Saudi Arabia by reminding Tehran of the defense agreement, this did not ensure full protection for the kingdom.

At the same time, despite active diplomatic efforts to encourage allies to ensure security, trust in external assistance may decline among all the Arab Gulf monarchies. In conditions when ground invasion is becoming an anachronism, and drones and missiles play a key role in wars, it turns out that countries must primarily rely on themselves. It can be expected that after the conflict ends, the Arab monarchies will pay more attention to developing air and missile defense systems and, more broadly, their own defense capabilities overall.

This, however, does not mean a revision of military cooperation with the United States. For instance, UAE presidential advisor Anwar Gargash stated that Abu Dhabi intends to “double” its security cooperation with Washington. Thus, diversification may occur along with the expansion of cooperation across all key security directions.

“Cold Peace” with Iran

Turning to the diplomatic activity of the Gulf monarchies, the pre-war years showed that Iran and several Arab countries, despite the imperfect relations, were capable of building fairly constructive interaction. This applies not only to strong economic ties­—such as between Iran and the UAE, where trade turnover reached $27 billion in 2025—but also, for example, to military exercises, particularly with Saudi Arabia, which Riyadh and Tehran conducted in 2024.

Despite the Iranian strikes, some Arab monarchies of the Gulf may attempt to normalize relations with Tehran and agree on “red lines” to avoid a recurrence of such upheavals. The Iranian strikes against the region’s monarchies will not leave relations within the region unaffected. However, countries may conclude that it is more advantageous to stick to a “cold peace” than to live in a state of sharp confrontation.

Economic Diversification

Finally, changes can also be expected in the economic sphere, primarily in the structure of exports and supply routes. Important transformations may occur here, concerning Iran apparently is not ready for abandoning the use of the Strait of Hormuz as a tool of pressure and a source of budget revenue through transit fees. The situation surrounding the status of the strait will likely become clearer in the coming weeks.

After the war began, Saudi Arabia increased oil shipments from terminals located on the Red Sea coast. In the situation when the Yemeni Houthis have not yet blocked the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, limiting themselves to threats, this measure helps mitigate economic damage. In the future, both diversification of supply routes and, at least, infrastructure preparation for the rapid redirection of some flows are possible.

The consequences of the war extend beyond oil exports. Maritime shipping and logistics in general have also come under attack. Rising tensions have led to higher insurance and freight costs and reduced supply predictability. This, in turn, has undermined the transit potential of the Gulf countries. Even with the restoration of shipping, higher risk wage bonuses and lingering uncertainty will restrain investment and economic growth. The increasing complexity of logistics is becoming an independent factor putting pressure on economic dynamics.

During the active phase of hostilities, additional risks were associated with disruptions in the supply of other resources, including food and fertilizers, affecting food security in the subregion. Amid this the economic policies of the Gulf monarchies may place greater emphasis on supporting local production to reduce dependence on external supplies.

Furthermore, the course of economic modernization will likely intensify. The already evident trend toward reducing dependence on oil exports and building a more technologically advanced and diversified economy will probably become an even more important part of national policy. This includes the development of the “green” agenda. The region’s countries are already implementing large-scale modernization programs, such as Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 or the UAE’s Energy Strategy 2050, and the current conflict may serve as an additional factor accelerating them.

Thus, the current conflict will likely lead to diversification of policy and the economy under pressure. It is highly likely that the Arab monarchies will build a more balanced security policy while simultaneously reducing risks to their national economies with a wide range of tools.