Moon Fever 2.0

The Moon is increasingly beginning to resemble Alaska during the gold rush. For decades, it remained primarily an arena of scientific and technological competition among major powers, where achievements in space exploration served as markers of national prestige. The Moon seemed too distant, too expensive, and too risky to be discussed in economic terms. However, once its practical value became clearly defined, the situation changed fundamentally. Symbolic rivalry is being replaced by an economically driven race over technology, logistics, and rules of conduct. In today’s lunar version of “gold,” two resources are mentioned most often: helium-3, which is linked to hopes for the development of fusion energy, and water—the potential basis for turning the Moon into a kind of “refueling station” for deep-space missions.

The greater the volume of capital flowing into lunar projects, the faster a second race is unfolding—one that is no longer technological, but legal. Investors need regulatory clarity, whereas the current body of space law took shape in an era when resource extraction and commercial infrastructure on the Moon were considered science fiction. Today, the situation has changed fundamentally. The very fact that projects such as the U.S. startup GRU Space are already selling reservations in a “lunar hotel” with a target date of 2032 clearly demonstrates that the lunar economy is no longer a hypothesis and is entering a phase of practical implementation. When it comes to resource development, the core provision of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty is unequivocal. The Moon and other celestial bodies are not subject to national appropriation—whether by claim of sovereignty, by means of use, by occupation, or by any other means.

Washington is seeking to reconcile this ban with its exploration practices through the Artemis Accords. The U.S. approach is built around the concept of “safety zones.” In practice, this could mean that in areas where suitable sites are scarce and water is available, a “don’t interfere with our equipment” principle would apply—one that can easily turn into a de facto “better not come here.” The U.S. presidential executive order of April 6, 2020, states explicitly that Washington does not view outer space as a “global commons” and intends to encourage the extraction and use of resources with international support.

China and Russia, by contrast, rely on the United Nations framework and the primacy of the Outer Space Treaty rather than on “club” rules. Their own lunar project, the International Lunar Research Station, is presented as an open, partner-accessible initiative and as part of the peaceful exploration of outer space in the interests of all countries. The problem is that as the Moon’s economic attractiveness grows, so will the level of conflict. The dispute will not be over formal principles, but over where security ends and implicit ownership over the most profitable sites begins.

The Moon is increasingly beginning to resemble Alaska during the gold rush. For decades, it remained primarily an arena of scientific and technological competition among major powers, where achievements in space exploration served as markers of national prestige. The Moon seemed too distant, too expensive, and too risky to be discussed in economic terms. However, once its practical value became clearly defined, the situation changed fundamentally. Symbolic rivalry is being replaced by an economically driven race over technology, logistics, and rules of conduct. In today’s lunar version of “gold,” two resources are mentioned most often: helium-3, which is linked to hopes for the development of fusion energy, and water—the potential basis for turning the Moon into a kind of “refueling station” for deep-space missions.

On January 17, the U.S. Space Launch System (SLS) rocket and the Orion spacecraft were rolled out to the launch pad at the Kennedy Space Center in Florida for the Artemis II mission. This will be the first crewed expedition beyond low Earth orbit since 1972, involving a flyby of the Moon on a free-return trajectory. On January 12, China conducted its first-ever experiment in 3D printing metal components directly in space—an important step toward preparing to deploy infrastructure on other planets. On January 26, Oman joined the U.S.-developed Artemis Accords, which, among other things, propose the creation of “safety zones” around lunar bases and a collective approach to the extraction and use of space resources, becoming the 61st participating country; shortly before that, Portugal had also signed the accords.

Lunar Resources

Helium-3 is a rare isotope of helium, a light gas that is extremely scarce on Earth but has accumulated in the Moon’s upper layer of soil over billions of years due to solar wind. If fusion energy ever becomes industrialized, it is often seen as a potential fuel. Of course, this is not a vein or a deposit in the conventional sense. Helium-3 is dispersed throughout the lunar soil, which means that extracting economically significant amounts would require processing enormous volumes of regolith. The task is extraordinarily difficult and, at the current stage, not feasible. Moreover, there is no guarantee that by the time such extraction becomes possible, fusion reactors will be ready to consume the material in truly large quantities.

Despite all reservations, the flow of contracts and new companies in the U.S. suggests that they there are betting on an optimistic scenario. Under this logic, the lunar economy should quickly develop its own power generation, robotic equipment, and on-site regolith processing, meaning that extraction costs would decline as the Moon is explored. A clear illustration is Interlune. On May 7, 2025, the company signed an agreement with the U.S. Department of Energy to deliver three liters of helium-3 mined on the Moon no later than April 2029. At the same time, commercial agreements were reached with Bluefors for volumes of up to 10,000 liters per year in 2028–2037, and with Maybell Quantum for thousands of liters annually in 2029–2035. Together with the heavy equipment manufacturer Vermeer, the company has built a full-scale prototype of a lunar excavator designed for conveyorized operation. The machine is intended to continuously strip the upper layer of regolith and feed it into a processing system. The prototype’s stated capacity is about 100 tons of material per hour. In turn, the U.S. Department of Energy will provide NASA with several hundred kilograms of nuclear fuel as part of a partnership to develop nuclear reactors for the Moon. Earlier it was announced that the agencies would work together on the Fission Surface Power program, which aims to develop a nuclear reactor ready for delivery to the Moon by the end of 2029. All of this is consistent with Washington’s plans to deploy a lunar orbital station and ensure a sustained human presence on the Moon in the early 2030s.

Today, water on the Moon looks like a far more practical resource than helium-3. Lunar ice is a source of oxygen for breathing and, no less importantly, a key component of rocket oxidizer. That is why the Moon’s South Pole, where the largest reserves of ice are estimated to be located in deeply shadowed craters, is prioritized. If extraction and processing can be established, the Moon would become an intermediate “refueling stop” and a depot for long-range missions. In Elon Musk’s plans for Mars, large-scale flight operations are possible only with refueling and fuel production beyond Earth.

China and India are also actively participating in this race. As a key step in preparing for a future crewed landing at the Moon’s South Pole, China plans to launch the Chang’e-7 mission in 2026. The mission is designed to search for and study water ice in permanently shadowed regions. The follow-on Chang’e-8 program is linked to the development of technologies for the future International Lunar Research Station, a joint Russian-Chinese project.

For its part, India’s Chandrayaan-4 mission, scheduled for 2028, is supposed to deliver soil samples taken near the Moon’s South Pole. This will be followed by plans in New Delhi for a joint polar expedition with Japan. The objective is to determine how much water is present, in what form, and whether this resource can serve as a basis for future missions.

The greater the volume of capital flowing into lunar projects, the faster a second race is unfolding, one that is no longer technological, but legal. Investors need regulatory clarity, whereas the current body of space law took shape in an era when resource extraction and commercial infrastructure on the Moon were considered science fiction. Today, the situation has changed fundamentally. The very fact that projects such as the U.S. startup GRU Space are already selling reservations in a “lunar hotel” with a target date of 2032 clearly shows that the lunar economy is no longer a hypothesis and is entering a phase of practical implementation. When it comes to resource development, the core provision of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty is unequivocal. The Moon and other celestial bodies are not subject to national appropriation—whether by claim of sovereignty, by means of use, by occupation, or by any other means.

Washington is seeking to reconcile this ban with its exploration practices through the Artemis Accords. The U.S. approach is built around the concept of “safety zones.” They are described as a mechanism for notification and coordination, designed to prevent hazardous interference, with an emphasis on their temporary nature, their connection to specific operations, and the obligation to respect the principle of free access and show “due regard” for the activities of others. In practice, this could mean that in areas where suitable sites are scarce and water is available, a “don’t interfere with our equipment” principle would apply—one that can easily turn into a de facto “better not come here.” The U.S. presidential executive order of April 6, 2020, states explicitly that Washington does not view outer space as a “global commons” and intends to encourage the extraction and use of resources with international support.

China and Russia, by contrast, rely on the United Nations framework and the primacy of the Outer Space Treaty rather than on U.S. “club” rules. Their own lunar project, the International Lunar Research Station, is presented as an open, partner-accessible initiative and as part of the peaceful exploration of outer space in the interests of all countries. At the same time, work is under way in the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to bring regulation back into a universal framework (the latest intersessional online meeting was held on January 29, 2026). The problem is that as the Moon’s economic attractiveness grows, so will the level of conflict. The dispute will not be over formal principles, but over where security ends and implicit ownership over the most profitable sites begins.