Life After New START: Three Questions for the World

On February 5, 2026, the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms expires. There are much larger developments on the global agenda than the end of yet another arms control agreement. After all, the treaty has not been fully implemented for quite some time. However, the expiration of the central Russia–U.S. strategic arms reduction agreement with no successor in the works is indeed an extraordinary development for the relations between Moscow and Washington, the global arms control process, as well as the doctrinal and practical evolution of both countries’ nuclear arsenals.

The pact required its parties to reduce their strategic nuclear forces to no more than 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles (intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers), 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers for those systems (each bomber is counted as one launcher) and 1,550 warheads on deployed delivery vehicles. So it introduced new, lower ceilings on deployed strategic forces, but this no longer amounted to the ongoing, continuous reduction of legacy stockpiles (both Russia and the U.S. were in fact cutting their arsenals even more aggressively than required under START I and II), but a comfortable level at which both sides found they could remain for some time.

Both countries reached the agreed limits in late 2017–early 2018. Since then, for nearly a decade now, New START has not been about reductions or disarmament but about non-expansion of the two countries’ arsenals. Alongside on-site inspections, the parties maintained transparency through regular data exchanges on the status of their nuclear forces, including the deployment and removal of individual delivery vehicles from combat duty and, for example, the locations of heavy bombers. These notifications were sent continuously, averaging five to six per day. Twice a year, aggregate figures were made public, most often by the U.S. Department of State alone. Near the end of the treaty’s life, Russia’s Foreign Ministry began releasing this data as well.

It was precisely the requirement to report on the deployment of strategic aviation at a time when Ukrainian forces were striking Russian airbases with apparent U.S. intelligence support that became the final straw in Russia’s decision to suspend New START in late February 2023. Persistent U.S. demands to resume inspections also played a role, and Moscow considered them unacceptable both in the context of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and because of the practical difficulties in arranging inspections in the U.S. due to the flight bans imposed by the U.S. and the EU on Russian aircraft and visa restrictions.

Since then, data exchanges and all related information and diplomatic components of New START have come to a halt. At the same time, both countries have repeatedly stated that they continue to observe the treaty’s limits. According to the latest publicly available figures, as of September 1, 2022, Russia had 540 deployed strategic delivery vehicles, 759 launchers and 1,549 warheads on deployed delivery vehicles. The U.S. published its figures unilaterally: as of March 1, 2023, it had 662 deployed delivery vehicles, 800 launchers and 1,419 warheads on deployed delivery vehicles. Given how close the figures were to the treaty ceilings, both countries could, of course, have exceeded the limits over the past three years. But doing so in quantities that would have military significance and remaining unnoticed would have been difficult. Neither side apparently wanted to come across as an opportunist quietly building up its nuclear arsenal in violation of its own commitments.

One question that is probably heard most often in connection with the end of New START is whether a nuclear arms race will begin. The simplest answer is no—it will not… Because it is already under way, but Russian and U.S. efforts are focused, at least for now, on qualitative rather than quantitative modernization of their nuclear forces. Unconstrained by any treaty commitments, China has over the past decade rapidly expanded its forces both quantitatively and qualitatively in preparation for a deterioration in relations with the U.S. Since the mid-2010s, China’s nuclear arsenal has at least doubled—what is this, if not an arms race? This naturally affects Washington’s position, but U.S. actions, especially the announcement of an effective missile defense system “capable of defending against peer powers,” in turn will inevitably provoke a reaction from Moscow and Beijing. And that response will come preemptively, without waiting for the mid-2030s, when U.S. military planners, according to their latest statements, expect the Golden Dome to be deployed in an operational configuration.

All in all, the nuclear arms race has been going on in the world for years, and for now its pace will only increase. The end of New START opens the door for Russia and the U.S. to expand their arsenals quantitatively, and there is some potential for it. Still, it is quite possible that none of this will materialize. Russia has proposed maintaining the status quo of the past three years: no inspections, no data exchanges, but also no buildup of forces—at least for one year, though the term matters little as the outcome of this effort depends on Washington. If the U.S. chooses to deploy additional forces, the moratorium will end immediately; conversely, if within a year the sides are at least engaged in basic discussion about the future of this domain, neither would walk away from a moratorium in the middle of such talks. The Golden Dome is, of course, a major source of friction looking ahead, but over the next few years it will amount to little more than a research program, and any conclusions about its future can only be drawn after the next U.S. president takes office.

Of course, it would be an overstatement to suggest that on Thursday, February 5, 2026 [[1]], we will wake up to a new reality. There are much larger developments on the global agenda than the expiration of yet another arms control agreement. After all, the treaty has not been fully implemented for quite some time: Russia suspended its participation in February 2023, and on-site inspections stopped back in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic. Without inspections or data exchanges, the treaty was effectively reduced to good-faith commitments not to exceed the agreed numerical limits on deployed strategic nuclear weapons, at least for the duration of the treaty.

However, the end of the central Russia–U.S. strategic arms reduction agreement with no successor in the works is indeed an extraordinary development for the relations between Moscow and Washington, the global arms control process, as well as the doctrinal and practical evolution of both countries’ nuclear arsenals.

What exactly have we lost?

New START is formally titled the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The pact required its parties to reduce their strategic nuclear forces to no more than 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles (intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers), 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers for those systems (each bomber is counted as one launcher) and 1,550 warheads on deployed delivery vehicles. There are no caps on the number of warheads not mounted on delivery vehicles (whether held in storage or awaiting dismantlement) or missiles in storage. Aircraft ordnance, such as strategic cruise missiles for bombers and aerial bombs, is not subject to quantitative limits either.

Internationally, the treaty is known as New START (START I was signed in 1991 and START II in 1993). In Russian discourse, however, the shorthand SNV-III has taken firm hold, although it is not entirely accurate—both because it invites confusion with START III, a treaty discussed in the late 1990s but never concluded, and because New START was more of a reset of the arms control process than a direct successor to START II. While START I was an exceptionally complex and comprehensive agreement primarily aimed at the orderly, equal and verifiable reduction of the massive arsenals accumulated by the end of the Cold War, and START II built on it by adding new reduction thresholds and banned land-based multiple-warhead ICBMs, New START was a treaty of a new historical period.

It is true that New START introduced new, lower ceilings on deployed strategic forces, but this no longer amounted to the ongoing, continuous reduction of legacy stockpiles (both Russia and the U.S. were in fact cutting their arsenals even more aggressively than required under START I and II), but a comfortable level at which both sides found they could remain for some time. Both countries reached the agreed limits in late 2017–early 2018. Since then, for nearly a decade now, New START has not been about reductions or disarmament but about non-expansion of the two countries’ arsenals. In this respect, it is closer to the Soviet–U.S. SALT I and II agreements, which were meant to put the brakes on an arms race that was costly for both countries. New START is even more permissive than those treaties: while SALT included restrictions on the development of new missile types and the modernization of existing ones, New START left the parties free to manage their nuclear forces as they saw fit within the overall numerical ceiling.

In addition, strategic aviation got a more permissive counting rule. Under earlier agreements, warplanes were counted as carrying their maximum load (or an approximate average) of nuclear warheads against the overall limit, but New START counts each heavy bomber as one warhead. Without this provision, the lower ceilings would likely have forced the parties to abandon the air leg of the nuclear triad.

Alongside up to 18 on-site inspections per year, the parties maintained transparency through regular data exchanges on the status of their nuclear forces, including the deployment and removal of individual delivery vehicles from combat duty and, for example, the locations of heavy bombers. These notifications were sent continuously, averaging five to six per day [[2]]. Twice a year, aggregate figures were made public, most often by the U.S. Department of State alone. Near the end of the treaty’s life, Russia’s Foreign Ministry began releasing this data as well, fixing an awkward asymmetry (it looked odd when the U.S. was issuing reports on Russia’s compliance as if it were a junior party).

It was precisely the requirement to report on the deployment of strategic aviation at a time when Ukrainian forces were striking Russian airbases with apparent U.S. intelligence support that became the final straw in Russia’s decision to suspend New START in late February 2023. Persistent U.S. demands to resume inspections also played a role, and Moscow considered them unacceptable both in the context of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and because of the practical difficulties in arranging inspections in the U.S. due to the flight bans imposed by the U.S. and the EU on Russian aircraft and visa restrictions.

Since then, data exchanges and all related information and diplomatic components of New START have come to a halt (for example, regular meetings of the Bilateral Consultative Commission to address mutual complaints). At the same time, both countries have repeatedly stated that they continue to observe the treaty’s limits. According to the latest publicly available figures, as of September 1, 2022, Russia had 540 deployed strategic delivery vehicles, 759 launchers and 1,549 warheads on deployed delivery vehicles. The U.S. published its figures unilaterally: as of March 1, 2023, it had 662 deployed delivery vehicles, 800 launchers and 1,419 warheads on deployed delivery vehicles.

Given how close the figures were to the treaty ceilings (Russia in terms of warheads, the U.S. in terms of delivery vehicles and launchers), both countries could, of course, have exceeded the limits over the past three years. But doing so in quantities that would have military significance and remaining unnoticed would have been difficult. Neither side apparently wanted to come across as an opportunist quietly building up its nuclear arsenal in violation of its own commitments. At least, both countries, seemingly unwilling to undermine what little was left, stopped short of openly accusing each other of violating the quantitative limits despite a wide range of mutual grievances.

Has it ever happened before?

There are quite frequent claims that Moscow and Washington now find themselves without any functioning strategic arms control agreements for the first time in a long while, supposedly since the 1970s. Of course, this is not the case. Treaties in this area were in continuous force from December 5, 1994, when START I came into force after a delay in ratification caused by Ukraine’s position. Its practical implementation began even earlier.

START II never came into force, and it is often claimed that this was because Russia failed to ratify it. However, this is inaccurate: Russia ratified the agreement in May 2000, but it came with a number of additional conditions. Moscow was ready to adhere to START II provided that the Soviet–U.S. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) remained in place and insisted that the U.S. Congress ratify a package of agreements on shared understandings on missile defense issues and related constraints signed in 1997. Republicans in Congress refused to ratify any treaties restricting U.S. missile defense, and in June 2002 the George W. Bush administration withdrew from the ABM Treaty. Even though START II never took effect, the U.S. nonetheless unilaterally eliminated its land-based multiple-warhead missiles: partly to encourage Russia to follow suit and partly because it was simply more convenient for them to do within their nuclear force structure.

At that time, Moscow and Washington, by today’s standards, were very amicable and constructive toward each other, and in May 2002, they signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), which effectively extended START I through the end of 2012 while setting new limits three times lower. Even before SORT expired, New START was concluded and came into force in February 2011. So the START I / SORT / New START string of agreements was in continuous effect for 31 years and two months. Interestingly, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty lasted exactly one day longer [3], while the ABM Treaty remained in effect for just under 30 years. It is tempting to turn to numerology or look for some overarching pattern in the evolution of strategic weapons and arms control, but in every case, there were too many chance factors for this to be anything other than coincidence.

The first Soviet–U.S. agreement to limit strategic arms was SALT I, concluded in 1972 for a five-year term. By 1977, no successor agreement had been negotiated, so Moscow and Washington said that they would continue to stick to the SALT I limits. SALT II was signed in 1979 but was never ratified because of the U.S. position—many point to the Soviet Union’s decision to move troops into Afghanistan, but it would be more accurate to pin this on the domestic political climate in the U.S. Presidential elections were next year, and, in addition to Afghanistan, opponents of the Jimmy Carter administration amplified the controversy over a Soviet military presence in Cuba, the Iran hostage crisis and other incidents, which were meant to demonstrate America’s weakness on the international stage. Against this backdrop, pushing an arms control agreement through Congress was politically disadvantageous, and the incoming Ronald Reagan administration had even less intention of doing so. SALT II was supposed to remain in force until the end of 1985, and the parties largely adhered to its provisions during that period, with occasional inconsequential deviations.

Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, the Soviet Union and the U.S. engaged in negotiations on strategic stability and attempted to work out solutions in this area. These efforts were interrupted for several years in late 1983. There is no such process now: the last sustained and intensive series of Russian–U.S. negotiations in this field was probably in 2020, when Moscow discussed extending New START with the first administration of Donald Trump, and those talks were unsuccessful. Despite Russia’s flexible position, the demands made by Trump’s team were unrealistic, and the treaty was extended for five years only because Joe Biden won the presidential election.

So we are not in a “situation that has not been seen since the early 1970s”; it actually looks more like the mid-1980s. There is, of course, little comfort in the fact that it was one of the heights of the Cold War.

Compared to that period, the entire framework of strategic stability agreements today has effectively been dismantled—back then, at least the ABM Treaty was in force. Yet even then, the U.S. was openly and publicly developing strategic missile defense, which makes Trump’s Golden Dome initiative only add to the historical parallels.

Will a nuclear arms race begin?

This is probably the question heard most often in connection with the end of New START. The simplest answer is no—it will not.

Because it is already under way, but Russian and U.S. efforts are focused, at least for now, on qualitative rather than quantitative modernization of their nuclear forces. For Russia, the lifetime of New START has been more than productive in this respect. The U.S. is also set to begin receiving new delivery vehicles soon: the new B-21 bombers are already in testing, along with the LRSO strategic cruise missiles for them; Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines are under construction; and the new Sentinel land-based ICBM is moving forward, although with considerable difficulty.

Unconstrained by any treaty commitments, China has over the past decade rapidly expanded its forces both quantitatively and qualitatively in preparation for a deterioration in relations with the U.S. Since the mid-2010s, China’s nuclear arsenal has at least doubled—what is this, if not an arms race? This naturally affects Washington’s position, but U.S. actions, especially the announcement of an effective missile defense system “capable of defending against peer powers,” in turn will inevitably provoke a reaction from Moscow and Beijing. And that response will come preemptively, without waiting for the mid-2030s, when U.S. military planners, according to their latest statements, expect the Golden Dome to be deployed in an operational configuration.

All in all, the nuclear arms race has been going on in the world for years, and for now its pace will only increase. The end of New START opens the door for Russia and the U.S. to expand their arsenals quantitatively, and there is some potential for it. Some elements of U.S. planning are already known. A provision in the previous National Defense Authorization Act requires the Department of Defense to decide not later than a month after the expiration of New START whether 30 of the 76 B-52H bombers, which had been modified in 2015–2017 to carry only conventional weapons, should be reconverted to nuclear-capable status. There is also active discussion about rearming half of the operational ICBMs with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) carrying three warheads (the other half were modified to carry W87 warheads taken from decommissioned MX ICBMs, and the older W78 warheads no longer physically fit three per missile). Outfitting roughly 200 ICBMs will take much time, certainly more than a year, and it is unclear how many serviceable W78 warheads remain. At the same time, the U.S. has already carried out demonstration tests of Minuteman III carrying three test warheads.

The most powerful leg of the U.S. nuclear triad is the sea-based component, comprising 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, each carrying 20 Trident II missiles (with four additional launch tubes on each boat deactivated as part of New START), and accounts for around 1,000 deployed warheads. Trident II missiles are clearly not loaded to full capacity—otherwise they alone would comfortably eat up the country’s entire New START limit. It is hard to determine how much additional loading is possible, as much depends on the number of serviceable W76 and W88 warheads that remain in storage. In any case, this amounts to several hundred warheads that could be gradually mounted on missiles as submarines call at missile depots. In addition, the Navy’s FY2026 budget request [4] outlines plans to return four deactivated launch tubes to service on 12 of the 14 Ohio-class boats. The document justifies this as a stopgap to offset the retirement of the two oldest submarines amid delays in the Columbia-class program, but if carried out quickly, it would result in a meaningful increase in the number of delivery vehicles and warheads.

When it comes to Russia’s potential steps toward a rapid “military and technical response,” it is impossible to make even similarly cautious assumptions. Beyond the obvious considerations, the scarcity of factual information compounds the situation. For better or worse, such matters have never been discussed in the open portion of the Russian budget. That said, given the ongoing modernization of the strategic forces—for example, the completed phase-out of single-warhead Topol missiles and the ongoing transition from single-warhead Topol-M systems to MIRVed Yars-class missiles—even amid the uncertainty surrounding the heavy R-36M2 ICBMs (whose replacement with Sarmat was clearly planned to take place earlier but is constrained by the technical condition of the new system), Russia’s land-based force likely retains substantial upload potential. As in the U.S., Russia’s submarine-launched missiles are evidently not loaded to full capacity. The Aerospace Forces have started receiving new Tu-160M2 bombers, albeit in token numbers so far, and there are reports of new cruise missiles.

Still, it is quite possible that none of the scenarios outlined above will materialize. Russia has proposed maintaining the status quo of the past three years: no inspections, no data exchanges, but also no buildup of forces—at least for one year, though the term matters little as the outcome of this effort depends on Washington. If the U.S. chooses to deploy additional forces, the moratorium will end immediately; conversely, if within a year the sides are at least engaged in basic discussion about the future of this domain, neither would walk away from a moratorium in the middle of such talks. The Golden Dome is, of course, a major source of friction looking ahead, but over the next few years it will amount to little more than a research program, and any conclusions about its future can only be drawn after the next U.S. president takes office.

U.S. strategy for the next year or two should become clear fairly soon. For now, it appears that Washington is not planning to deploy additional forces immediately—had that been the case, a massive media campaign with accusations against Russia would already be in motion, much as it was ahead of the collapse of the INF Treaty. The latest National Defense Authorization Act makes no mention of New START at all (perhaps Republicans are reluctant to dictate anything to Trump, while Democrats prefer not to antagonize him on an issue that has traditionally been more important to them). Moreover, increasing the loading of legacy delivery vehicles would offer Washington little in practical terms, while encouraging retaliatory steps by Moscow and a dramatic acceleration of Chinese efforts, as Beijing would reasonably see such moves as primarily directed against itself.

In the coming days, we will most likely see the two sides trading accusations over the collapse of the treaty and declaring that they are ready to unilaterally adhere to the existing numerical limits on strategic arms—up until the other party breaks them. Any breach, of course, would be met with a tit-for-tat response, while the full burden of responsibility for reversing three decades of Russian–U.S. efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals would be laid at the door of the counterpart.

Naturally, in both countries there are advocates of expanding nuclear arsenals, and their reasoning is far from illogical. In Russia, the case is made primarily in terms of responding to the Golden Dome; in the U.S., in terms of deterring both Russia and a rising China simultaneously. Their view may ultimately prevail, but for now it does not seem dominant: for practical considerations (both countries’ arsenals are sufficient for them—if New START’s caps were too low for Russia, it would not stand 160 delivery vehicles short of the treaty’s ceiling, while the U.S. could add 100 more warheads and remain within the limits), as well as political and economic reasons. After all, one of the core objectives of strategic arms control since the 1970s has been, among other things, spending military budgets on weapons that are actually used.

1. U.S. Department of State figures show that the two parties exchanged a combined total of 25,449 notifications between February 5, 2011, and February 1, 2023.

2. From June 1, 1988, to August 2, 2019.

3. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2026 BUDGET ESTIMATES. JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES. June 2025 Operation and Maintenance, Navy. P. 334.