Indonesia’s Strategic Maneuver: How Prabowo Subianto Is Shaping a Multi-Vector Foreign Policy Amid a Global Crisis

Prabowo Subianto’s visit to Moscow on April 13, 2026, marked his fifth personal meeting with Vladimir Putin and his third trip to Russia as head of state. The composition of the delegations and the agenda appeared largely identical to those of the December visit; however, the shifting geopolitical context has introduced important adjustments. Since then, Jakarta’s diplomatic course has become more proactive in developing deeper and more substantive ties with great powers.

Prabowo Subianto’s visit to Moscow and the subsequent series of diplomatic engagements with key global players reflect a fundamental transformation of Indonesia’s foreign policy amid the rapid reconfiguration of the global order. What previously amounted to a gradual cultivation of ties with various centers of power has now evolved into an intensive, simultaneous effort to consolidate strategic partnerships across all areas. The energy crisis triggered by the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has acted as a catalyst, accelerating the implementation of the bebas-aktif principle in its most ambitious form.

In this configuration, Russia plays not merely the role of an emergency energy supplier, but also a key element in the system of multipolar ties that Jakarta is building. The successful resolution of urgent energy security challenges demonstrates the practical value of the Russia–Indonesia strategic partnership; however, the sustainability of this cooperation will depend on both sides’ ability to overcome logistical and technological challenges, as well as Indonesia’s readiness to withstand potential pressure from its Western partners.

The strategy of maximal hedging pursued by the Prabowo administration carries inherent risks, yet it represents a rational attempt by a regional power to preserve its autonomy in an era of growing instability. Its success, however, is far from guaranteed. As global rivalries deepen, the room for maneuver will inevitably narrow, while the costs of balancing will rise. Indonesia’s ability to maintain equilibrium among its key partners will become one of the central foreign policy challenges in the coming years—one that may shape not only the country’s own trajectory, but also the prospects for other non-aligned states seeking to preserve their strategic autonomy in an emerging world order.

The Moscow Visit as Part of a Broader Balancing Strategy

Prabowo Subianto’s visit to Moscow on April 13, 2026, marked his fifth personal meeting with Vladimir Putin and his third trip to Russia as head of state. The composition of the delegations and the agenda appeared largely identical to those of the December visit; however, the shifting geopolitical context has introduced important adjustments. Since then, Jakarta’s diplomatic course has become more proactive in developing deeper and more substantive ties with great powers.

On closer examination, the Moscow visit appears to be part of a broader and highly ambitious diplomatic maneuver that can be described as bebas-aktif-maxxing—the maximal realization of the principle of an “independent and active” foreign policy originally articulated by Indonesia’s founding figures, Sukarno and Hatta.

Within the emerging diplomatic configuration, Russia is assigned an important role as a major power and a strategic partner with which the Prabowo administration intends to develop multifaceted cooperation—from energy and nuclear construction to agri-industrial cooperation, food security, military-technical ties, and tourism. At the same time, it was the acute need to ensure energy security that became the decisive factor behind organizing the visit on such short notice, as under the current circumstances Moscow remained the only partner capable of promptly addressing this problem for Jakarta.

The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz confronted Indonesia with serious energy challenges, effectively disrupting supplies from its Middle Eastern partners. Given the high level of domestic fuel and energy consumption in this densely populated republic, the country’s strategic reserves could have been depleted within just a few weeks after the onset of the U.S.–Iran confrontation in the absence of alternative sources of supply. Other ASEAN states faced similar difficulties. The Philippines, for example, swiftly concluded a contract for a large shipment of Russian oil after the Trump administration authorized such transactions, designating them as exemptions from the sanctions regime in order to stabilize global energy markets. As with President Joko Widodo’s visit during the global food crisis several years earlier, the current trip by the Indonesian leader demonstrates that the country’s political leadership recognizes the timely establishment of direct contacts with Moscow on specific issues as a practical tool for stabilizing critical situations.

At the same time, Jakarta explored alternative scenarios. The escalation of the U.S.–Iran confrontation coincided with Prabowo’s visits to Japan and the Republic of Korea, traditionally key partners for Indonesia in the energy sector. During talks with both countries, a number of agreements were reached in the field of renewable energy, as well as in other high-tech areas. However, the long-term nature of such projects objectively limits their usefulness in addressing the immediate energy shortfall. It appears that, following interagency consultations and a comprehensive assessment of the situation, as well as taking into account the president’s own position, Moscow was ultimately identified as the priority partner for addressing urgent energy security needs.

As a result, during Prabowo’s subsequent visit to Moscow, Indonesia’s Minister of Energy, Bahlil Lahadalia, reached an agreement with his Russian counterpart Sergey Tsivilev on supplies of crude oil and liquefied petroleum gas to the republic. The meeting was attended by representatives of major Russian energy companies, including LUKOIL, Rosneft, Ruskhim, and Zarubezhneft, as well as Indonesia’s Ministry of Energy and the state-owned company Pertamina.

Despite the urgency of the visit, the agreement was concluded relatively quickly given the continuous coordination between relevant agencies on both sides. Since the signing of the Strategic Partnership Declaration at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in 2025, the two governments have maintained an ongoing dialogue, including regular interagency commission meetings and working visits by delegations at both expert and state levels.

Particular attention was also placed on the development of oil storage facilities and refineries in Indonesia, as well as cooperation in electricity generation, including a possible future shift toward nuclear energy—an area of particular interest to Prabowo and his circle. Significant focus was placed on joint refining projects, including the previously suspended construction of a refinery in Tuban. At the same time, issues of technological compatibility between Russian crude and Indonesia’s existing refining system, as well as logistical challenges related to supply routes, continue to pose serious obstacles, even in the context of advanced partnership ties and a shared political will to deepen bilateral cooperation.

The key challenge for energy cooperation between the two countries lies in transforming current agreements into a sustainable long-term partnership. It is crucial to avoid a scenario in which Russia is perceived merely as a tool for addressing immediate problems, after which concerns over sanctions risks and the constraints imposed by the international system once again override the logic of strategic engagement. Jakarta will undoubtedly continue its multi-vector balancing policy, as any significant deepening of cooperation along one track inevitably requires compensatory steps in other directions in order to maintain a balance of interests and preserve strategic autonomy.

Further Steps in Strengthening the Balancing Strategy

The countries of the Persian Gulf have long been—and remain—ideal energy partners for Jakarta due to their political neutrality, which has allowed Indonesia to build relations with both the United States and Russia from a position of flexibility, while covering the bulk of its domestic needs. A similar approach has been evident in the search for “third-party” partners in military-technical cooperation, where engagement with France and Turkey has enabled Indonesia to mitigate U.S. pressure regarding the procurement of F-15EX fighter jets and other defense-related items.

Previously, Indonesia tended to approach one strategic area or direction at a time, allowing it to focus fully on one partner and then another. However, the current situation, marked by the U.S. and Israeli attack on Iran, has compelled Jakarta to undertake unprecedented efforts to consolidate its existing level of engagement simultaneously with all key partners, in line with its national interests. In Indonesian diplomacy, the ideological principle of non-alignment is often combined with a pragmatic approach to addressing concrete national priorities.

Thus, while Prabowo was holding talks in the Kremlin on strategic partnership and energy security amid the Middle Eastern crisis, Indonesia’s Minister of Defense, Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, thousands of kilometers away in Washington, was signing an expanded bilateral defense cooperation agreement with U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth. After Moscow, the presidential aircraft did not return home, as had often been the case in the past, but instead headed to Paris, where Prabowo met with Emmanuel Macron to discuss deepening defense cooperation with France and strengthening ties with the European Union.

Such intense diplomatic activity reflects Jakarta’s serious concern over the destabilization of both regional and global security architectures. Indonesia clearly fears that the escalation of the Middle Eastern conflict and the growing confrontation between the United States and China could sharply narrow the room for maneuver available to non-aligned states. In this context, Prabowo’s strategy is to consolidate, as quickly as possible, the existing level of relations with all key actors while the window of opportunity remains open. Jakarta is effectively seeking to build a kind of “safety net” of multi-layered partnerships that would allow it to preserve its foreign policy autonomy even amid increasing global polarization. Notably, since the onset of the crisis, Prabowo has not yet visited China—although such a visit may well be under consideration. High- and top-level engagement with Beijing has been notably absent—despite significant economic ties and ongoing coordination at the level of the two countries’ foreign ministries. This pattern may be explained by several factors. First, lingering territorial disputes in the Natuna area. Second, Indonesia’s consistent support for a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, a position Jakarta has repeatedly articulated on international platforms. In addition, the administration of Prabowo Subianto appears to be pursuing a different approach to external economic cooperation compared to that of his predecessor, Joko Widodo, placing greater emphasis on attracting investment from Western countries—primarily the United States, the United Kingdom, and EU member states—rather than deepening economic ties with China, partly due to implicit concerns over growing economic and political interdependence.

The synchronization of visits serves as a signal to both domestic audiences and external partners: Indonesia does not intend to become a “junior partner” to any major power and will continue to diversify its external ties. This is not merely about symbolic gestures, but about concrete economic and military-technical projects. Energy cooperation with Russia is intended to offset the instability of supplies from the Persian Gulf. French technologies and defense systems help reduce dependence on both U.S. and Chinese platforms. The agreement with the United States, on the other hand, contributes to strengthening Indonesia’s position within the regional security architecture.

Domestic Challenges and Risks of Active Hedging Amid Limited Resources and Capabilities

The domestic political context also plays an important role in shaping this diplomatic strategy. Prabowo’s participation in the “Peace Council” and the planned deployment of peacekeepers to Gaza—presented by the president as a diplomatic success—have sparked sharp criticism from Islamic organizations, career diplomats, and a significant segment of the public. Critics accuse the Prabowo administration of deviating from Indonesia’s traditional pro-Palestinian stance and its foreign policy neutrality. The tragic deaths of three Indonesian peacekeepers in Lebanon following an Israeli artillery strike have only intensified this discontent. Prabowo has had to hold several high-profile meetings with religious leaders, intellectuals, and academics, as well as give interviews to major media outlets, in order to explain his position to civil society. In this context, the visit to Moscow and the demonstration of trust with Vladimir Putin serve as a way to rebalance the foreign policy agenda and signal that closer ties with Washington do not imply a one-sided orientation toward the West.

However, this strategy of “simultaneous engagement” also carries significant risks. As global confrontation between the United States and its rivals deepens, pressure on Jakarta to “choose a side” will only intensify. Even now, discussions about the possibility of granting the United States overflight rights for military aircraft through Indonesian airspace have provoked mixed reactions in the region, particularly from China. If such an agreement were to be reached, it would effectively turn Indonesia into an element of the U.S. containment strategy in the Asia-Pacific, inevitably cooling relations with Beijing and, likely, with Moscow—despite all assurances of adherence to non-alignment. Moreover, U.S. efforts to “probe” the boundaries and red lines of cooperation have already generated internal disagreements within Indonesian institutions. According to some media reports, Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a letter to the Ministry of Defense warning against “unilateral bold steps,” particularly with regard to the provision allowing U.S. Air Force overflights through Indonesian airspace. Such a move, it argued, could already pose risks to the country’s own security, given Washington’s interest in conducting reconnaissance flights over the maritime areas of Southeast Asia.

Moreover, maintaining equal distance from all major centers of power requires enormous diplomatic resources and a high degree of political flexibility. Judging by the intensity of Prabowo’s visits and the number of parallel negotiating tracks, Indonesia appears to be operating at the limits of its capacity. Any major crisis or sudden shift in the position of one of its partners could disrupt the fragile balance that Jakarta is carefully trying to sustain. This strategy seems particularly vulnerable in the context of a potential escalation in the South China Sea, where Indonesia has its own territorial disputes with Beijing in the Natuna area and may be compelled to adopt more clearly defined positions if tensions rise.

Nevertheless, Jakarta’s current diplomatic activism demonstrates a considerable degree of strategic maturity and a willingness to act proactively amid growing uncertainty. Rather than passively waiting for events to unfold, Prabowo is seeking to shape the most advantageous strategic configuration for Indonesia by leveraging all available instruments. The success of this approach will largely depend on the Indonesian leadership’s ability to accurately anticipate the moves of its partners and adjust course in a timely manner, while preserving domestic political stability and maintaining public support for its chosen foreign policy through sustained and inclusive dialogue with all segments of society.

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Prabowo Subianto’s visit to Moscow and the subsequent series of diplomatic engagements with key global actors reflect a fundamental transformation of Indonesia’s foreign policy amid the rapid reconfiguration of the global order. What was previously a sequential cultivation of ties with different centers of power has now evolved into an intensive, synchronized effort to consolidate strategic partnerships across all directions simultaneously. The energy crisis triggered by the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has served as a catalyst, accelerating the implementation of the bebas-aktif principle in its most ambitious form.

In this configuration, Russia serves not only as a supplier of emergency energy resources but also as a key element in the system of multipolar ties that Jakarta is building. The successful resolution of urgent energy security challenges underscores the practical value of the Russia–Indonesia strategic partnership. However, the long-term sustainability of this cooperation will depend on both sides’ ability to overcome logistical and technological challenges, as well as Indonesia’s willingness to withstand potential pressure from its Western partners.

The strategy of maximal hedging pursued by the Prabowo administration carries inherent risks, yet it represents a rational effort by a regional power to preserve its independence in an era of mounting instability. Its success, however, is far from assured. As global rivalry deepens, the room for maneuver will inevitably narrow, while the costs of balancing will rise. Indonesia’s ability to maintain equilibrium among all key partners will become one of the central foreign policy challenges for the region in the coming years, potentially shaping not only the country’s own future but also the prospects for other non-aligned states seeking to preserve their strategic autonomy in an emerging world order.