Attack on Iran: A Gamble that U.S. Cannot Afford
Prof. Engr., Founding Chair GSRRA, Sinologist, Diplomat, Editor, Analyst, Advisor, Consultant to Global South Economic and Trade Cooperation Research Center, and Non-Resident Fellow of CCG, Islamabad, Pakistan
Short version
For the past several weeks, the possibility of a military attack on Iran has dominated political debate, media coverage, and strategic calculations across West Asia. Whether such an attack has been delayed, postponed, or quietly shelved remains unclear. What is clear, however, is that any military action against Iran—by Israel, the United States, or both—would not be a limited or contained event. It would unleash consequences that would engulf the entire region, destabilize global markets, and further fracture an already fragile international order.
An attack on Iran would not merely target a single country; it would trigger political unrest, economic shocks, soaring oil prices, disrupted trade routes, and a sharp rise in regional militancy and terrorism. For countries across the Middle East and South Asia, such a conflict would amount to a living nightmare—one whose costs would far outweigh any perceived strategic gains.
The delay or hesitation surrounding an attack on Iran should not be interpreted as indecision or weakness. Rather, it reflects a sober recognition of reality. The strategic, political, economic, and diplomatic costs of war far exceed its uncertain benefits.
In today’s interconnected and multipolar world, brute force no longer guarantees outcomes. Dialogue, deterrence, and regional diplomacy—however imperfect—remain the only viable paths to stability.
An attack on Iran would not bring security to the Middle East; it would bring chaos. Increasingly, leaders across the world appear to understand that some wars, once started, cannot be controlled—and cannot be won.
Full version
For the past several weeks, the possibility of a military attack on Iran has dominated political debate, media coverage, and strategic calculations across West Asia. Whether such an attack has been delayed, postponed, or quietly shelved remains unclear. What is clear, however, is that any military action against Iran—by Israel, the United States, or both—would not be a limited or contained event. It would unleash consequences that would engulf the entire region, destabilize global markets, and further fracture an already fragile international order.
An attack on Iran would not merely target a single country; it would trigger political unrest, economic shocks, soaring oil prices, disrupted trade routes, and a sharp rise in regional militancy and terrorism. For countries across the Middle East and South Asia, such a conflict would amount to a living nightmare—one whose costs would far outweigh any perceived strategic gains.
A Changed Iran, A Changed Region
Iran's New Identity: Patriotism vs. Islamism
One of the most dangerous miscalculations policymakers could make is to assume that today’s Iran resembles the Iran of mid-2025 or earlier. It does not. Iran has drawn lessons from recent conflicts, internal crises, and external pressure. It is militarily more prepared, diplomatically more connected, and strategically more cautious—but also more capable of retaliation.
While Israeli and U.S. military power unquestionably surpasses Iran’s in conventional terms, warfare in today’s Middle East is no longer decided by sheer firepower alone. Iran’s deterrence strategy is built on layered retaliation: missiles, drones, cyber capabilities, maritime leverage, and regional allies. Any strike on Iranian territory would almost certainly be met with a wider and more forceful response than many in Washington or Tel Aviv may anticipate.
More importantly, the regional political environment has fundamentally changed. Unlike in past decades, no major regional country appears willing to provide airspace, logistical corridors, or political cover for an attack on Iran. The era when U.S. military operations could rely on near-automatic regional cooperation is fading fast.
Regional Reluctance and Rising Anti-U.S. Sentiments
Across the Middle East, governments are increasingly wary of becoming entangled in another large-scale conflict. Gulf states, already navigating economic diversification, energy transitions, and domestic reforms, fear that war with Iran would directly threaten their stability, infrastructure, and long-term development plans.
Public opinion has also shifted sharply. Anti-U.S. sentiments in the region have reached levels not seen in years, driven by prolonged conflicts, humanitarian crises, and perceptions of selective international morality. Any government openly supporting an attack on Iran would face severe domestic backlash and regional isolation.
This reluctance severely limits operational feasibility. Without regional airspace access, forward logistics, and political backing, even the most powerful militaries face serious constraints. War planning cannot ignore geography—and geography is no longer cooperative.
U.S. Strategic Overstretch
At the global level, the United States is confronting an undeniable reality: strategic overextension. Washington is already deeply engaged on multiple fronts. From Venezuela to renewed tensions over Greenland, from commitments in Europe to the Indo-Pacific, U.S. military, diplomatic, and economic bandwidth is stretched thin.
This over-engagement weakens U.S. capabilities to initiate and sustain another major conflict—especially one as complex and unpredictable as a war with Iran. The U.S. economy, though resilient, is not immune to prolonged instability, inflationary pressures, and energy market shocks. A spike in oil prices following any disruption in the Strait of Hormuz would hit U.S. consumers and global markets almost immediately.
Furthermore, U.S. relations with its traditional allies are not as solid as they once were. Growing policy differences with the European Union and internal strains within NATO mean that Washington cannot count on unconditional Western unity. Many European states, still grappling with economic pressures and security fatigue, are unlikely to support another Middle Eastern war.
Domestic Politics: A Powerful Restraint
JCPOA Crisis: Balance of Power Returns
Domestic political realities in both the United States and Israel are acting as powerful brakes on military adventurism.
In the U.S., President Donald Trump faces intense scrutiny ahead of the November mid-term elections. Public appetite for another overseas conflict is low, and bipartisan skepticism about unilateral military action is growing. Large-scale protests, political polarization, and economic anxieties make war a politically risky proposition.
In Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is confronting his own political storm. With general elections scheduled for October, deep internal divisions, sustained public protests, and growing criticism over governance and security priorities, Netanyahu’s room for maneuver is limited. A prolonged or inconclusive conflict with Iran could prove politically disastrous rather than advantageous.
History shows that leaders under domestic pressure sometimes seek external confrontation—but it also shows that such gambles often backfire.
The Multipolar Reality: Russia and China Will Not Stay Silent
Perhaps the most significant change in the global landscape is the transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world. The United States no longer operates in an uncontested strategic environment.
Russia and China have both deepened their political, economic, and diplomatic engagement in the Middle East. Iran occupies a critical position in this evolving order. Any attack on Iran would not occur in isolation; it would reverberate through great-power politics.
While neither Moscow nor Beijing may seek direct military confrontation with the United States, both possess ample means to complicate, counterbalance, and diplomatically challenge U.S. actions. From the United Nations to energy markets and regional mediation efforts, their influence would be felt immediately.
For China and Russia, an attack on Iran could also be seen as an opportunity to fill the power vacuum created by perceived U.S. recklessness—strengthening their roles as alternative partners and security brokers in the region.
Economic Fallout and Global Shockwaves
What Can We Counter Brute Force With? Three Models
The economic consequences of a war with Iran would be severe and immediate. Iran sits at the heart of one of the world’s most vital energy corridors. Any disruption to oil and gas flows would drive prices sharply upward, fueling inflation across Asia, Europe, and North America.
Global trade routes would face new risks, insurance costs would surge, and fragile post-pandemic supply chains could fracture again. Developing economies, already under strain, would bear the heaviest burden.
For a global economy struggling to maintain stability, this is a risk few policymakers can justify.
A War Without a Clear Endgame
Perhaps the most compelling argument against attacking Iran is the absence of a credible endgame. Even a successful initial strike would not eliminate Iran’s strategic capabilities or regional influence. Instead, it would likely lock the region into a prolonged cycle of retaliation, proxy conflict, and instability.
Iran’s ability to respond asymmetrically—through regional allies, maritime pressure, and non-traditional warfare—means that escalation would be difficult to control. What begins as a “limited” strike could quickly spiral into a multi-front confrontation.
Restraint Is Not Weakness
The delay or hesitation surrounding an attack on Iran should not be interpreted as indecision or weakness. Rather, it reflects a sober recognition of reality. The strategic, political, economic, and diplomatic costs of war far exceed its uncertain benefits.
In today’s interconnected and multipolar world, brute force no longer guarantees outcomes. Dialogue, deterrence, and regional diplomacy—however imperfect—remain the only viable paths to stability.
An attack on Iran would not bring security to the Middle East; it would bring chaos. Increasingly, leaders across the world appear to understand that some wars, once started, cannot be controlled—and cannot be won.