... competing ideology or narrative of their own regarding their notions of world order since their unilateral withdrawal from “ideology” in general and “universalist ideology” in particular.
Today, there is no peace movement or antiwar movement in the West. This is because the Eurasian core states are caught in an ideological pincer today: their adversaries see them as on a continuum with the Cold War communist enemies, in their allegedly totalitarian, authoritarian or repressive/unfree forms of state and/or regime, while their potential supporters, the intellectuals , artists and idealistic youth, see them no longer as incarnations, however ...
... his own unique interpretation on how political theories evolved in both Russia and the West. A special interest (and my personal sympathy) is aroused by his view on the theory of liberalism and on such concepts as postmodernism, post-structuralism and eurasianism itself.In the first chapter Kisoudis puts forward the thesis about the beginning of the new (i.e. the second) Cold War between Russia and the West. The Ukrainian conflict of 2014 is its starting point. Defining Russian-Western relations in this way the author tries to discover some differences and similarities with the first Cold War that took place from 1945 to 1991 between USSR and USA. In ...
... driving force behind it has been the rise of non-Western powers that are pushing the West toward a closer political and economic union.
At the same time, Russian-Chinese... ... “good” and global “evil”, reminiscent of the decades of the Cold War. Needless to say, the United States and China appear to be the centers of gravity... ... on ‘objective’ realities. It is often argued that the Atlantic and the Eurasian civilizations have opposed each other from the days immemorial, that ‘land’...
