... blocking Azerbaijan’s maximalist aspirations.
Jens Stoltenberg’s visit to Baku, Yerevan and Tbilisi in March 2024 was quite revealing in this regard. Brussels believes now is the time for geopolitical homogenization of the region. The crisis in Russian-Armenian relations, Georgia’s desire to monetize its status as a NATO “aspirant” as soon as possible, the bolstered cooperation between Baku and Ankara (NATO’s second largest army) – all these factors work to promote the West’s agenda. However, the mosaic in ...
... opportunities remain for the supply of their products to Russia through Kazakhstan without the sanctions regimes being violated. Their skilful implementation will benefit the country. Like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan is benefiting from rising energy prices.
Armenia, Georgia and Kazakhstan can be considered the main beneficiaries from migration from Russia. At the same time, the question of the stability of such a flow remains open. The Russian government has sent two important signals. The first is that the country does not plan to turn into a repressive state with a mobilisation and a command economy,...
... and difficulties seem to stem from weak institutions, with an enforced political repetition compulsion [
4
] by elites and citizens alike, rather than from external threat(s) [
5
]. Nonetheless, the external threat is presented as the main one (e.g. Russia in Georgia and Turkey/Azerbaijan in Armenia), while the problems seem to be mostly domestic, having a lot to do with corruption or difficulties to accept the change of borders in the post-Soviet order.
Towards the effective implementation of a Blue Ocean strategy in the South Caucasus
A ...
... differences between Moscow and Tbilisi run too deep today.
Forecast: The Region Will Remain Divided
In the long and medium-term, the Trans-Caucasus will remain a divided region. The “three countries — three different strategies” principle will remain. Armenia will attempt to remain an ally of Russia, while Georgia will try to stay an ally of the “collective West in general” without forgetting to diversify its foreign political ties. Both Erevan and Tbilisi will have internal and external restrictions. Moscow will hardly welcome Erevan expanding its ...
... launched in 2009 for developing relations with six eastern countries of the former socialist bloc. The collaboration program with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine was primarily intended as a means for introducing these countries to the European experience and approaches to developing their economies, political institutions and civil society. Given current events, however, Russia has a highly negative perception of the EU's policies concerning the Eastern Partnership, viewing them with an utmost mistrust,...
... hypothetical and unlikely scenarios as destabilization in the Russian North Caucasus, the war of Russia and Turkey, etc. Another defrosting mechanism can be a regional war, which arose initially due to the escalation in Nagorno-Karabakh — Turkey, Russia and, less likely, Iran may be involved into a full-scale war of Armenia and Azerbaijan. This may also involve Georgia in these catastrophic processes. In this sense, the key to peace in the South Caucasus lies in Nagorno-Karabakh. The settlement or at least a deep freeze of this conflict can mitigate most of the regional military risks.
1
. Military Balance 2018....
... journalists and anyone interested in studying the future and analysing long-term global trends.
The opinions presented in these articles reflect the personal views and research positions of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Russian International Aairs Council.
RIAC scientific and editorial support:
I. Timofeev, Ph.D. in Political Science; T. Makmutov, Ph.D. in Political Science; I. Sorokina, M. Smekalova, R. Mayka; with participation of D. Khaspekova and N. Mukhin.
... corridors between Russia and Georgia, which are crucial both for Armenia and the whole region. "Armedia" IAA presents an exclusive interview with the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin on the implementation of the 2011 Agreement, the Russian-Georgian relations and Armenia's possible role.
At the end of 2017 discussions on the implementation of the Russian-Georgian Agreement signed in 2011 were rather intensified. The agreement envisages the creation of alternative corridors between Russia and Georgia, which are ...
... volumes of production and export between the two countries cannot make Russia see Azerbaijan as a potential opponent at the European market.
The South Caucasus region cannot be regarded as a vital oil and gas market for the Russian Federation. Currently Russia provides only its strategic partner with energy – Armenia, while Georgia is partly dependent on Azeri exports, and Azerbaijan is self-sufficient. Even if Georgia decides to reject Azeri exports in favor of Russia, the region will not account for any vital part of the Russian export ratio.
Russia does not export its ...
... with the centre of former military, economic and political power, which is now embodied by the Russian Federation as the legal successor to the USSR. Of the 15 former republics of the Soviet Union, four have no diplomatic relations with one another (Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russia and Georgia). Unregulated border disputes are the bane of practically all Central Asian states. Russia and Ukraine have not broken diplomatic relations formally, but relations between the two countries are at their lowest ebb since December 1991.
The new ...
