... provider. Russia might fit the bill, though the conflict in Ukraine throws this into question.
The GCC countries expect Moscow to influence Iran, limiting the dangers it poses. The possibilities of Moscow’s influence on Tehran remain limited, though Russia is trying to show GCC countries its ability to influence the implementation of the Iran Nuclear Deal. The resumption of the JCPOA as a whole is in the interests of all Gulf countries, including Iran. This is also important for Russia since it considers ensuring security in the Gulf a key regional goal. By expanding the dialogue between ...
... Iran, without whose support countries like Russia and Turkey cannot imagine a successful future for the region, has certainly found itself excluded from such formats.
Another proposal calls for the creation of a format that would bring together the GCC, Iran and Iraq (so-called GCC+2) [
48
]. In the initial phase, this new format might require the participation of external actors, such as the U.S. and Russia. Under its auspices, direct dialogue between the Gulf states could reduce the level of mutual negative rhetoric and strengthen confidencebuilding measures in the region. This is believed to be necessary to free regional policies from the ineffective ...
... studying further the issue of creating a security architecture in the region.
Yulia Sveshnikova:
Iran’s Presence in Syria: Is It There for the Long Haul?
Moscow, Beijing and Washington could suggest setting up a security system in the Persian Gulf in the GCC+2 format (adding Iraq and Iran). In addition, Russia traditionally maintains working contacts with Saudi Arabia [
32
] and Iran [
33
]. Moreover, China is a key trading partner for these countries [
34
].
Efforts to reduce tensions between Riyadh and Tehran and strengthen trust between them will ...
... historian of Arabia, whose work on Abdel Wahab has been translated into English and published in the United States. Even genealogical and confessional affinity could not prevent the rift between the Arabian monarchies.
Aleksandr Aksenenok, Omar Mahmood:
Russia – GCC Relations After the Signing of the JCPOA with Iran
I still believe that the parties will manage to reach an agreement, since no one wishes to incite a conflict involving the world’s leading oil and gas producing nations. Yet the pressure on Qatar is not lessening, and the concessions demanded from ...
... critical to emphasize that Russia
does not support
the policy of regional hegemony in world affairs and particularly in the Gulf region. Given these considerations, it is not realistic to confront Russia with an «either-or choice»: either Iran or the GCC. And though Russia and Iran have many common interests and their cooperation looks promising, their relationship is not without challenges. Moscow's and Tehran's foreign policy objectives coincide in some areas, but diverge in others, depending on the concrete circumstances....
... change and would pose some very real threats; not only to Russian forces in Syria but to its own domestic audience which has felt the real brunt of economic sanctions and low oil prices.
Reuters
Gurgen Gukasian, Abdulaziz AlDoseri:
The Economics of the Iranian Nuclear Deal:
Russian and GCC Perspectives
To many of the key states involved in the conflict in the region, directly and indirectly, this, like many other issues in the region, has become a zero-sum game. To the GCC states, Bashar is an extension of Iran, and will aggressively ...
... production and its ability to influence the market. During OPEC’s November 2014 meeting, the organization officially abandoned its role as a swing producer by refusing to cut production and support oil prices.
Some analysts speculated that a Saudi-led GCC decision in OPEC was targeted against Iran and Russia. Saudi Arabia has had its own experience with such market conditions in the 1980s and does not want to repeat the same mistake for the sake of other producers’ benefits. Saudi oil minister Ali Al-Naimi was very clear in explaining Saudi oil ...
