... their national strategy, that is now causing the greatest concern.
However, we have no reason to think that the changes taking place in the world will be rapid and dramatic - revisionism by its nature does not imply sudden movements. We see how cautious Russia and the United States are about the likelihood of an escalation of their differences in Eastern Europe. China and the United States are also showing serious restraint and skilfully resolve their differences without bringing them into direct conflict. The fact that thousands of human lives become the price for general revisionism is a huge tragedy. But in ...
... will never become anyone’s client-state. This is impossible in principle. This is the first point.
Secondly, all the people who say things like that don’t see where the world is going. New continents, civilizations, and centers are rising. How can China dominate this emerging world if there will be great India, great Russia, great Persia, great Turkey, and strong Arabs next to it? Such a situation is impossible! Maybe some parts of Europe will rally around the United States, but I am sure that in ten years parts of crumbling Europe will also drift towards the East. This can already be seen in the case of Hungary and many political and economic movements in Europe. This is just the ...
... is prevented from developing into a free and sovereign country, within a free and sovereign Europe of nations, a Europe of fatherlands. For only as an “EU of technocrats” can the US’s geopolitical plaything remain under its tight control. And Europe remains the venue of future conflicts between the US, China, and Russia.
Coercive societies, centralism, and the fanaticism of equality
Centralism, like socialism and communism, and coercive societies, like today’s “EU of technocrats” and the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), are based on one and the same ...
... international order. With the behaviour of great powers, especially nuclear ones, everything is more or less clear: they will ensure their own security by relying on their unique military capabilities. In addition, the continental mutual understanding between Russia and China and their lack of prerequisites for an objective clash of interests also create some certainty. The same goes for the US and its European allies: they will, in the face of dwindling resources, remain on the defensive to protect all their post-World War II privileges. But we cannot say anything similar in terms of clarity about the World Majority. Therefore, by the way, many of ...
... reason to doubt that even now, the author of the concept of “political change” would not question the main cause of the European crisis — the selfish behaviour of the Western countries, which forced Russia to switch to a revolutionary method of solving the problem of its security in the western direction. However, this does ... ... we now see how conflicting the behaviour of the United States and allies is becoming in relation to the growing ambitions of China. Diplomatic pressure on Beijing and the creation of military infrastructure in Asia look like military preparations much ...
... whose main goal was to preserve the monopoly position of the West. However, this required the appearance of formal signs of justice in the form of international law as well as participation in the highest body of the UN, the Security Council (UNSC), of Russia and China, which are immanently hostile to the interests of the USA and Europe.
The institutional form of Western dominance by force has become its final incarnation, and now the main question is whether it is possible to preserve the form following the inevitable disappearance of its content and main function. Therefore,...
... Asian countries over the past 10 years. Relations between Moscow and Beijing are of a strategic nature, they are united by a common vision of a just international order, in which there will be no place for the dominance of a narrow group of states. Russia and China are jointly responsible for the stability of a huge part of Eurasia.
Bilateral trade and economic relations are developing with the understanding that at some point Russia and China will indeed have to complement each other; as Chinese authors put it, “stand back to back” and jointly resist the attempts of ...
... international order proved to be short-lived. First, because the largest of the countries outside the narrow community of the West — China, India and Russia — were not ready for their own desovereignisation. For them, following the proposed path would be disastrous for internal ... ... of resources that could be exchanged for the sovereignty of small and medium-sized countries. As a result, the US and Western Europe are increasingly forced to resort to extremely repressive measures — sanctions and special trade regimes — in order ...
... (Kulintsev et al., 2020).
However the problem is not only China’s power or its “creeping expansion” as such. There are systemic contradictions regarding preferred formats for linking integration initiatives. While the most advisable approach for Russia is institutional (EAEU-China dialogue, in which the EAEU would act as a single political and economic entity), China prefers a flexible “project” approach, which implies bilateral agreements between inpidual countries participating in specific projects (Mikhailenko, 2018,...
... Will Russia become more dependent on China?
«There is no question about that: we will be more integrated and more dependent on China. It has positive elements but overall we will be much more dependent. I am not very much afraid of becoming a pawn of China like some EU states became pawns of the US. First, Russians have a core gene of sovereignty. Second, we are culturally different from the Chinese, I don’t think that China could or would like to overtake us. However we are not happy with the situation, because I would have preferred to have better relations ...