... Russia, against which a significant amount of financial and trade sanctions have been imposed by the United States and its allies. It is Russia today that is most interested in diversifying global finance. Long-term stakeholders include China. So far, sanctions against China are incomparable with restrictions against Russia. In addition, we are talking mainly about American export controls in the field of high technology, and not about financial sanctions. The latter have so far been used only against a small group of Chinese officials in connection with human rights ...
... depreciate. However, in Moscow, apparently, they do not believe in the prospect of any agreements anyway, at least in the near future.
The situation with China is different. Between January 2019 and April 2023, there have been more legislative initiatives on sanctions against China than against Russia—103 versus 99 (again, only those bills that propose specific restrictive measures are counted). Four bills have reached the stage of laws—two on Hong Kong and two on ethnic minorities in the PRC. After the start of the SVO, not a single bill ...
... about the transformation of the yuan into a universal means of payment for Russia in transactions with third countries. However, given the growing Western pressure on the Russian financial sector, the yuan has every chance to strengthen its role in Russian transactions both with China itself and with other counterparties. However, Chinese banks fear secondary US sanctions or the loss of Western markets. It will not be easy for Russian individuals under Western sanctions to make settlements with third countries, even with the help of the yuan. Such caution was observed even before the onset of the SMO. The Chinese ...
...
It will be critically important for Russia to arrange payments in alternative currencies to the dollar and the euro. The Chinese yuan has become the most sought-after option. The main reason is the volume of the Chinese market and the high density of Russian-Chinese trade. In addition, China itself is increasingly the target of US sanctions. In recent years, Beijing has been energetically pursuing technological independence from foreign countries. Sanctions on major Chinese telecommunications companies are only fuelling China's efforts. The creation of channels of financial and ...
... imperial organisation in the future under certain circumstances.
Ivan Timofeev:
Closing Loopholes: Outlining the U.S. and EU Sanctions Policy Onward
The characterisation of the modern US and EU as empires gives rise to two risks at once. There is an intellectual ... ... identity are both the despotisms of the past and some modern states that rely on autocracies. First and foremost, these include Russia and China. The superiority of capitalism and the market is also part of the Western identity. It is opposed to non-free economies,...
... conflict. If the “driving a wedge” policy involved separating China from Russia by tempting the latter, now the US uses direct pressure and threats. Washington attempts to force Beijing to join the anti-Russian side and join the US and the EU’s sanctions against Russia.
Relations with the United States are of great political, economic and security importance to China. At the same time, Washington views Beijing as its main competitor. There are already many problems in their bilateral relations; China wants to develop its China–Russia relations, but also wants to avoid deteriorating its relations with the US....
... “preferential trade regime with ASEAN” was emphasized by EEC Minister Sergei Glazyev back in 2021 (EEC News, 2021).
The EAEU countries obviously fear to lose competitiveness if they open up to the enormous Chinese market, but in the current situation China, too, will be extremely careful not to fall under secondary sanctions.
Until 2022, in relation to Central Asia in general and the EAEU countries in particular, Russia could afford to act more on the strength of its geopolitical vision of the situation, “wishing to isolate itself from it [Central Asia – Ed.] as much as to become part of Europe,” even though both of these tasks were equally unsolvable (Bordachev,...
The decline of the Russian economy is not beneficial to China
The large-scale sanctions that have been slapped on Russia by the “collective West” naturally raised the question of its deepening and expanding economic relations with China. According to a number of parameters, Russia has no alternatives to cooperation with the PRC, or at least these are the most ...
As eight years ago, in the wake of the “post-Crimea” wave of sanctions, China’s principal calculation is that Russia would supposedly offer “special and privileged” terms of operation to Chinese business
On 20 March 2022, Chinese Ambassador to Russia Zhang Hanhui
said
that Chinese business in Russia should “seize the opportunity to fill the void in the ...
... Russia has only temporarily captured China’s seemingly entrenched role as a major U.S. (not international) villain. Restraining China’s foreign policy ambitions is not off the agenda for Washington, but America’s European partners were always more moderate.... ... operation” in Ukraine. This level of coordination gives Kremlin the justified confidence that “the World is big” and no sanctions can tip Russia. We already see the contours of the West deeply humiliated and Russia succeeding with it objectives in Ukraine. Like Russia ...
