... as well, thus the KRG move towards independence is a direct threat triggering internal movements inside of Turkey and Iran. Syria might also join the Turkish-Iranian camp cooperating against the KRG referendum and its consequences on the whole Middle-East.... ... Kurdish card to pressure on Ankara, further complicating its regional and internal affairs -Despite of being two close allies in NATO. On the other hand, both Moscow and Washington fear the current timing of independence poll, as the fight against ISIS is tensing and progressing. A crack between Baghdad and Erbil would badly alter the progress made in the fight against ISIS....
... or heavy weapons, which are difficult or impossible to hide. Hezbollah, Assad, and ISIS have enough on their hands to devote much to any “response” to the U.S. Finally—and... ... government, and this not long after the disillusionment of the experience of Libya’s post-NATO-intervention problems (although I still would say that the intervention was successful... ... being prolonged, but more on that another time); no other major power had intervened in Syria and thus owned the conflict, to speak, and that was another solid argument Obama...
... humbled New Orleans, a great American city, and did nothing to prevent the onset of the greatest global financial and economic crisis since the Great Depression (barely managing to address it in time to prevent a possible total meltdown of the global financial ... ... importantly, leadership from the United States. Since then, it has failed to effectively deal with conflict in Libya, Ukraine, and Syria, all within or near its periphery. The situation in Syria has led to refugee and migrant crises unseen in the world or Europe ...
1. More cohesion in NATO?
According to the balance-of-threat assumption the lack of unambiguous threat decreases cohesion of military alliances, whereas the free-rider problem increases in inverse proportion. Even if one doesn't consider the geostrategical mischief ...
