... blocking Azerbaijan’s maximalist aspirations.
Jens Stoltenberg’s visit to Baku, Yerevan and Tbilisi in March 2024 was quite revealing in this regard. Brussels believes now is the time for geopolitical homogenization of the region. The crisis in Russian-Armenian relations, Georgia’s desire to monetize its status as a NATO “aspirant” as soon as possible, the bolstered cooperation between Baku and Ankara (NATO’s second largest army) – all these factors work to promote the West’s agenda. However, the mosaic in the Caucasus is multicolored. And the Alliance ...
... what they perceived as “historical goal” of the nation – to become member of the Western world, meaning integration to NATO and EU. Thus, Tbilisi experienced a move from the post-Soviet space to an area politically and economically dominated by the West; for example, USA, EU member states and Ukraine. The same changes took place at Georgian universities and academia. Armenia as a strategic ally of Russia as well as other states, for example, in the Central Asia simply fell out. This detachment ...
... emerged after Russia recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia is not confined to the rhetoric of public officials. What is far more critical is that Georgia is building up its military and political cooperation with NATO, the US and the EU, and even without Georgia’s official accession to NATO, this cooperation creates additional security risks in the region.
The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Karabakh has, for many years, been swinging like a pendulum. Armed incidents alternate with rounds of talks between just Erevan and Baku, or talks with the participation of international intermediaries. The result is the same: ...
... legal successor to the USSR. Of the 15 former republics of the Soviet Union, four have no diplomatic relations with one another (Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russia and Georgia). Unregulated border disputes are the bane of practically all Central Asian states. Russia and Ukraine have not broken ... ... European Union (and individual European countries), the People’s Republic of China, Japan, Turkey, Iran, integration structures (NATO) and transnational corporations have indicated that they have interests in the former USSR. Their presence is prompted not ...
