... order was complete. The takeover of Crimea and support for separatism in Donbass did not presage a policy of reconquering Eastern Europe, as many in the West feared, but it clearly set Ukraine and other former Soviet republics off limits to any future NATO enlargement. The security buffer was back. If the use of force in Ukraine, from the Kremlin’s standpoint, was essentially defensive, Russia’s intervention in Syria in 2015 was a risky gambit to decide geopolitical outcomes in the Middle East — a famously treacherous area for outsiders vacated by the Soviet Union at the time of the Persian Gulf war of 1991. Since then, the results of the military operation and diplomatic maneuvering have not only confounded early critics but ...
... Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), aimed to discuss four topics central to U.S.-Russian relations: the conflict in Ukraine, the future of the European security order, the war in Syria, and the question of interference in other states’ political ... ... useful to all parties. At a minimum, it would be necessary to define what the “substantial” combat forces mentioned in the NATO-Russia Founding Act look like. Moreover, new weapons and military technologies must be integrated and geographical constraints ...
... engage in deeper reductions and international inspections?
What if there was a mutual NATO-Russia agreement of "no first use" of nuclear weaponry or other forms... ... and radar systems in Poland and Romania, as well as in Japan, South Korea, and the Middle East.
How might the 2013 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear accord... ... systems is not aimed a developing a first strike capability?
Russia–Crimea–Eastern Ukraine
In June 2017, just after the U.S. re-imposed sanctions on Moscow, the U.S. State...
