Russia can do quite a lot at the political level, but it cannot replace Europe as a potential driver of Iran’s economic and social development
On May 8, 2019, Iran sent a message to Germany, Britain, China and Russia that it was suspending the fulfilment of certain obligations under the “Iranian nuclear deal” – the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA. In particular, Tehran refuses to comply with restrictions that were placed on the ...
An increased American pressure on Iran makes Tehran even more dependent on major US geopolitical adversaries — China and Russia
The Trump administration has decided to designate
Iran's Islamic Revolution’s Guard Corps (IRGC)
as a foreign terrorist organization. It is the first time when Washington includes into its list of terrorist organizations an official institution of a foreign state. Moreover, the IRGC is not just another ...
... all parties to the conflict and the Assad regime uses force to suppress its opponents, then it is unlikely that international institutions will provide aid or investments in the post-conflict period.
Russian experts believe that, given the fact that China, Iran and Russia are building up cooperative ties, the sides could define their areas of responsibility both on the restoration of Syria, and on the Middle East as a whole.
China has already expressed its intention to take part in the restoration of Syria ...
... mutual payments due to the United States reinstating sanctions against Iran. The Minister mentioned cooperation in several areas, such as tax regulation in bilateral trade, housing construction and, curiously, investment in rebuilding Syria, for which Iran has no money.
Tehran is forced to act with regard to Russia and China’s support, given the unwillingness of European investors to invest in post-war rebuilding of Syria.
Like Minister Hatami, Teimur Bashirgonbadi spoke about the indispensable role that Iran’s private business plays in developing bilateral cooperation ...
... Corporation, is currently laying a gas pipeline with an annual capacity of 12.4 billion cubic metres from a terminal in Karachi to Lahore. Although the actual entry point for the pipeline is Gwadar, it is possible that Karachi will be used to transit gas to China.
Iran’s energy partnership with China could transform into a political partnership, effectively cutting India off from Central Asia and Afghanistan.
India’s possible withdrawal from the project could also have a number of negative consequences for ...
... the framework of the meeting: current dynamics of the sanctions regime of the Western countries towards Russia and prospects for the settlement of the Ukrainian crisis, the issues of the EU-the U.S. relations in connection with the situation around Iran, possible measures and mechanisms for mitigating sanctions, as well as scenarios for the development of foreign policy economic instruments in the U.S., EU, Russia, and China.
Leading scientists and experts in the area of international relations, world economy, conflict resolution, as well as representatives of law firms took part in the event.
According to the new findings of the ongoing research project, Asian investors continue to increase direct investments in the EAEU. During the monitoring period (2008–2016), FDI stock originating from 12 Asian countries (China, Japan, Turkey, India, Israel, Mongolia, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iran, Singapore, and Vietnam) has increased from $32 billion in 2008 to $75.6 billion in the beginning of 2017.
China continues to expand its economic presence in EAEU countries and other CIS states, retaining its leadership among Asian countries in terms ...
... are in favor of early cancellation of the Iranian deal. It can not be stated that the United States will “block the deal” — the development of the situation depends on the reaction of other countries, in particular “what will happen in Russia, China, Europe and other countries.” Ilya Kravchenko noted that the Iranian problem is similar to the North Korean problem: “if you press on the regime, the regime will want to possess nuclear weapons.”
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... may be there along with them.
How likely is the escalation of US sanctions? What is the difference between sanctions against China and sanctions against Russia? How far will Washington go?
The American policy of sanctions in its current form differs from ... ... large volume of the American market. Any company can be faced with a choice: either the American market, or, for example, the Iranian one. Such a game was quite successful against Tehran. At least in the United States it is commonly believed that sanctions ...
... Poland and Romania, as well as in Japan, South Korea, and the Middle East.
How might the 2013 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear accord with Iran impact U.S. Missile Defense deployments in Europe — particularly given the fact that Iran’s presumed nuclear weapons program and its missile program primarily justified those deployments.
Can the U.S., Russia, China and Japan find ways to at least freeze North Korea’s nuclear missile capabilities through diplomacy rather than through U.S. military threats and U.S. Missile Defense deployments that are opposed by both China and Russia?
Are these MD deployments ...
