... serious aggravation of relations with China, Russia, or any other country. However, this may happen in the future. This is clear from the experience of secondary sanctions over Iran, which have had a much stronger impact on US–Chinese relations.
Iranian Nuclear Problem: The Fallout in US–China Relations
Georgy Bulychev:
Are Sanctions Conducive to Korean Settlement?
Sanctions against Iran are very similar to restrictions against North Korea. In order to contain Iran’s nuclear programme, the UN Security Council has adopted a number of ...
... others? These are the questions addressed in the RAND think tank's recent
report
"
Fighting Shadows in the Dark. Understanding and Countering Coercion in Cyberspace
". The authors discuss cyber operations conducted by four states — Russia, China, Iran and North Korea — and try to determine whether those activities amounted to cyber coercion.
Starting with the study findings, we will highlight the following points. Cyber operations intended to coerce are a small subset of overall cyber operations ...
... a major transportation and logistical hub there, trade with Iran may continue to grow.
At the same time, the agreement with Iran entails certain political risks. In September 2019, the United States imposed sanctions on the Central Bank Iran and 25 Iranian companies. The United States also demands that its allies and the entire global community accede to these sanctions. Mostly likely, sanctions against Tehran will continue to expand.
Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation with China
Zachary Paikin:
Orders Within Orders: A New Paradigm for Greater Eurasia
The Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the Eurasian Economic Union and the People’s Republic of China was signed on 17 May 2018, and will enter into force ...
...
’s exports. These countries can make up for the shortage in three ways. First, they can use their own strategic reserves (China’s reserves alone are
estimated
at about 700 million barrels, however, there is no historic precedent for such steps); ... ... can import heavier/lighter grades of oil, including
Arab Medium
and
Arab Heavy
; finally, they can increase shipments from Iran either directly, or by producing new mixes, similar to what happened in the coastal waters of Malaysia in July–August 2019....
... Begets a New Bank
As a default mode, China should also beware that “the sanctioned objects in the mirror are closer than they appear.” In other words, China may also be a subject to sanctions at one point partially or fully.
Tristan Kenderdine:
US–Iran Conflict Would Strengthen China’s Position in the Middle East
China, Russia, India, Brazil, and South Africa are the founding members of the
New Development Bank
. NDB’s 2017–2021 general strategy clearly highlights the bank’s commitment and intention to be new in three ...
... coalition. For the same reason, an international operation, at least at the initial stages, cannot be led by the navies of any regional powers already involved in a confrontation. It is also difficult, given the situation, to imagine that the navies of Iran and Saudi Arabia could interact effectively.
Ivan Timofeev:
Tanker Incidents: Who Blinks First?
India, China, and Russia could offer their patrolling services, since both India and China are critically dependent on the energy sources transported through the Strait, and Russia could carry out such work thanks to the special role that Moscow plays in the ...
... Venezuela. Until recently, these countries were important suppliers of oil to China.
US Sanctions against Iran
The international agreement known as the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) lifted international sanctions previously imposed on Iran. China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK, the US, and the EU were parties to the JCPOA. Iran promised to curb its nuclear program in exchange for lifting the economic sanctions. On May 8, 2015, however, US President Donald Trump announced the US’s withdrawal ...
... the most sensitive sanctions was the ban on the import and transportation of Iranian oil, which the Americans extended to all buyers. That is, the sanctions were declared extraterritorial again.
The EU and the parties to the nuclear deal (UK, Germany, China, Russia, France, and naturally Iran) reacted harshly to Donald Trump’s demarche. For the EU, the undermining of the JCPOA was a sensitive issue both politically and economically. Brussels has long promoted the idea of multilateral diplomacy. Furthermore, when the main sanctions against ...
... government-to-government institutional linkages between China and Iran will be strengthened by any US-led conflict? Perhaps most importantly in terms of institutional history, would be the institutional relationships of the people within Iran who were there for Iran-China arms trade and military support in the past. Like the picture of Rumsfeld with Saddam, who from Iran was buying Chinese arms in the Iran-Iraq war who is still reasonably relevant to the current Iran administration? Similarly, with China’s economic ...
... traction, along strategic sea lanes of communication. If US policy forces principal oil buyers, such as India, to totally blank oil purchases from Iran, (moreover, the chances seem remote as long as Trump helms affairs), then the potential forsaking of Iran from India allows peer competitor China to exploit the situation and trigger an Iranian tilt to its side, in pursuance of Beijing’s tangible offers of Iranian incorporation within the infrastructural ambit of the robustly fording Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Iran portfolio also ...
