European Think Tanks reflect on the challenges of emerging military technologies
The following points are the fruit of a particularly rich and constructive
roundtable meeting
in Istanbul on 8-9 April of the Task Force on Cooperation in Greater Europe. The points are intended as material for policy discussion by Task Force participants with their authorities not definitive research. But we believe that they offer a useful perspective on the challenges presented by emerging military technologies...
... nuclear component. Such technologies are used or planned for use in order to optimize logistics, improve the efficiency of material and technical services, enhance the capabilities of the Missile Attack Warning System, and increase the sustainability of nuclear weapons control circuits, up to and including direct combat operations. It is difficult to talk about any external restrictions in such conditions, however communication about intentions between the various actors involved in introducing AIMA ...
... discuss and search for solutions to topical issues in the area of non-proliferation, control, deterrence, and safety of the use of nuclear weapons.
The keynote speakers at the conference were Stephen Biegun, U.S. Special Representative for North Korea; Adam ... .... House of Representatives Armed Services Committee; and Andrea Thompson, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security.
The conference included several discussions on current issues of nuclear security, arms control, and Russia-the ...
... Nuclear Forces Treaty (the INF Treaty) signed by the USSR and the United States in 1987. Once again, contrived pretexts are being put forward that fail to convince anyone and yet again show that Washington continues to openly disregard the interests of international security, including the security of its closest allies in Europe, Asia and throughout the world.
It is perfectly clear that the withdrawal of the United States from the INF Treaty will only accelerate the deployment of that type of missile ...
... agreements that are subject to ratification—which have long constituted the structure of arms control—are also on their way out. Not only is it difficult and perhaps even impossible to ratify any national agreement today, especially with regards to nuclear weapons, the ongoing U.S.-Russia confrontation further complicates this process. Under such strained conditions, whether either side is able to guarantee compliance remains an open question. But the fates of the INF and ABM treaties suggest that ...
... President
, Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2008, p. 95.
16.
Gawdat Bahgat, “A Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East: Myth or Reality?”,
Mediterranean Quarterly
, Vol. 22, No. 1 (2011), p. 38.
17.
Mustafa Kibaroğlu and Aylin Gurzel, “US Nuclear Weapons in Turkey: Yankee Go Home?”,
Security Index: A Russian Journal on International Security
, Vol. 14, No 3.86 (2008), pp. 77-82.
18.
Rizwan Ladha, “A Regional Arms Race?: Testing the Nuclear Domino Theory in the Middle East",
Al Nakhlam
, at
https://alnakhlah.org/2012/05/01/a-regional-arms-racetesting-the-nuclear-domino-theory-in-the-middle-east-by-rizwan-ladha-2
...
... for early missile warning systems and assessing the probability of a missile launch could give the military command of a nuclear power extra time to decide on a retaliatory strike and its scale. New technologies could also increase the precision of nuclear weapons and the effectiveness of missile defence, improve the security of nuclear facilities, and provide better intelligence information.
Leonid Kovachich:
China Missed the Industrial Revolution, But It Won’t Miss the Digital One
At the same ...
... the Russian Federation have a shared responsibility to work together along with other nations to clarify our differences and mitigate these risks. Progress can only be made through the engagement of leaders. Moreover, in every country that possesses nuclear weapons, anything relating to nuclear policy is inherently “presidential.”
The reality today is that we have entered a new era, in which a fateful error—triggered by an accident, miscalculation, or blunder—could trigger a nuclear catastrophe....
... risking further proliferation of weapons grade highly enriched uranium (HEU).
Furthermore, Kazakhstan is an example of how a country that willingly denuclearizes can prosper economically and politically. After Kazakhstan got rid of its large repository of nuclear weapons and closed down the world’s largest testing site, both inherited after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the country became a mecca for foreign and multilateral investment. It was also better able to equip its conventional army
and ...
... there was a certain system and a culture of dialogue about the nuclear sphere. At some point the status quo has changed dramatically, apparently not only as a result of a worsening political situation, but also due to a newly emerging attitude towards nuclear weapons in general.
Strategic nuclear weapons are perceived as something abstract and incapable of causing real harm, because they will never be used, at least not intentionally. On the other hand, the psychological barrier for using tactical ...
