... associate the notion of “the Indo-Pacific” with U.S. endeavours to preserve its strategic hegemony in the Pacific and Indian oceans in the face of China’s growing power. However, India has a somewhat different perspective on this, believing “the Indo-Pacific” to be an opportunity to expand its political and economic presence east of the Strait of Malacca. As far as this standpoint goes, the central place in the emergent mega-region is assigned to the ASEAN nations rather than the U.S.
Obviously, India will not give up on fostering closer ties with its numerous partners in the Asia-Pacific, ranging from Japan and South Korea in the north up to Australia and New Zealand to the south, and this will be ...
... the U.S. or Chinese superpowers in the newfound Age of Complexity that characterizes the present phase of the global systemic transition to multipolarity since COVID-19 and the onset of Moscow’s special operation, so too can it do the same with its ASEAN Indo-Pacific partner as well. After all, ASEAN just like Russia doesn’t want to be coerced into becoming either superpower’s junior partner even if some of its members independently decided that choosing one or the other is in their objective national ...
... catch-up in terms of trade and supply chains, hoping to contain China (which is
picking up steam
in the context of its
rapid recovery
from the acute phase of the pandemic), it is more proactive when it comes to investment, trying to ensure that the Indo-Pacific market continues to be highly dependent on U.S. investments (especially in the ASEAN countries, where U.S. foreign direct investment exceeds that of China, Japan and South Korea).
The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity is designed to promote and strengthen partnerships within the Quad of the United States, Japan, India ...
... it should be of operational and performative nature rather than a doctrinal one. Certainly, it might not be as tendentious as Indo-Pacific strategies or guidelines produced by European states. It is imperative, however, to define the unique niches and ... ... such areas is the interest in relatively inexpensive opportunities to train specialists and engineers in Russia. The idea of
ASEAN centrality
could also facilitate the acceptance of Russia in the Southeast Asian subregion, which forms the core of the ...
... possible for Moscow to narrow down its differences with other regional perspectives. As Russia’s dialogue with ASEAN countries and Vietnam, in particular, shows, Moscow
is ready
to “explore promising areas of interaction” in the framework of ASEAN Indo-Pacific Outlook. India’s vision, as should be well realised in Moscow, does not contradict Russian convictions and leaves much space for engagement in a wide range of spheres. By making an exception from its stance and embracing India’s Indo-Pacific ...
... accomplish task No. 1, ASEAN will need some negotiation flexibility. It is expected that the organization will not raise uncomfortable issues, in the form of involving China and Russia in the Indo-Pacific.
Thus, it is worth noting that the question of ASEAN in Indo-Pacific initially looked like some kind of test for the political suitability of an organization that it did not pass successfully. The organization’s position was twice late on the impulses of the discussion: first in 2007, then in 2017. The situation ...
... Mongolia.
The Quad also complements the role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and ASEAN-led regional architecture, such as the East Asia Summit. As committed ASEAN dialogue partners, all four Quad countries are strong supporters of ASEAN-centrality.
Chinese is now the second most spoken language in Australia after English
China is strengthening its position in the Indo-Pacific and Oceania. At the same time, Australia has very developed ties with China. What do you think: is China mainly a partner or a competitor to Australia?
China is an important partner for Australia, and one with which we share a wide range ...
