... each other in trilateral or other multilateral formats. An alternative approach—namely, balancing Beijing and New Delhi against each other—may give Moscow some situational advantages, but would not serve Russia's long-term strategic interests.
Moscow could offer India and China new opportunities for trilateral cooperation in the Arctic, in Central Asia and in the Russian Far East. It could seek to involve its two strategic partners in triangular IT and cyber initiatives, where the three countries complement each other ...
... serve as a bridge between them as well as a balancing force within each against their most radical elements.
Managing Bi-Multipolarity
It is for this reason that India has sought to play leading roles in multilateral platforms the Quad, BRICS, and the SCO. The first one serves as its means for balancing China’s rise in what India hopes will be a friendly, gentle, and non-hostile way compared to the new AUKUS alliance’s non-friendly, harsh, and hostile one. BRICS and the SCO, meanwhile, are complementary platforms for reforming the international system as it transitions ...
... Russian Far East. Agriculture and food processing might represent another area for trilateral cooperation. The three countries could consider working together in pharma and health sector, where they also complement each other.
In sum, decision-makers in Moscow should not regard China and India as two parallel foreign policy priorities that Russia has to choose between and/or keep separate from each other. They should rather approach Beijing and New Delhi as partners, which will become more valuable for Russia if they find ways to work ...
... the Kremlin retains with CARs. A calibrated Indian-Russian coordination in Central Asia can also help overcome the latent dissonance that has lately crept in their strategic outlook.
Meanwhile, given the Wuhan Spirit-led ongoing positive momentum in India-China ties, the SCO can be a platform for India to reset ties with China. Beijing’s ongoing and unpredictable standoff with the U.S. can be leveraged to build greater Chinese sensitivity to India' core concerns since a confrontation with New Delhi can further muddy ...
... and increase India’s role in regional and global affairs, which is the object of the country’s progressively growing desire. These developments also open new opportunities for broad cooperation within BRICS and the consultative mechanism of three SCO members — Russia, India, and China (known as RIC). The next RIC meeting is scheduled to take place alongside the upcoming BRICS summit in Osaka in late June 2019, which will be held concurrently with the next G20 summit.
Another important positive factor in the further improvement ...
... second, to show India that it was ready to defuse tensions and willing to embark on a rapprochement following the Dolam incident that had taken place a few months prior.
Mikhail Konarovsky:
Bonus for the “Big Eight” in Qingdao: Some Thoughts on the SCO Summit
Islamabad was concerned about China’s support for India’s statements. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan Khawaja Muhammad Asif
said
that Pakistan needs “to break our false image […] We need to accept the history and correct ourselves.” Asif noted that “We need to tell our friends that ...
... remains rather vague and lacking in real content. The Qingdao Declaration drew particular attention to this fact.
Russia and other SCO states (with the exception of India, a fact also reflected in the meeting’s final document) generally support the One Belt One Road concept, while actively ... ... involvement with other economic projects in the region. The signing of an agreement on economic cooperation between the EAEU and China as a first step towards removing restrictions on the development of economic interaction among the participants in the process ...
... (post-)communist world: the two countries share the British colonial legacy and have a completely different experience of statehood and political development (incidentally, the SCO’s official languages have always been Russian and Chinese, not English). The SCO must also contend with the complicated relations between India and China.
Alexander Vorobyov:
China and Central Asia: Growing Friendship at Russian Borders
At the present time, it is difficult to predict how the SCO’s expansion will affect its operation. Most likely, it will now be much more difficult to find a common ...
... the officially financed Indian IDSA,
wrote
that “India joining the SCO has largely a symbolic meaning.” He adds that “there is lack of clarity about what it means for India in terms of any specific function and benefits.”
China agreed to let India (and Pakistan) join the SCO because China itself now largely sees the SCO in symbolic terms. China, for a number of years, tried to get Russia to agree on a greater economic focus within the SCO. But Russia refused, and instead continued to push its idea of — in the words of Luzyanin ...
The basic foundation of the relationship remains strong. A rising India would be a valuable partner of Russia in Asia and beyond
Kanwal Sibal
Not enough ... ... this has given a certain stability to the relationship, it has also constricted its scope. At the state level the two countries have recognised that the relationship is... ... issues have caused confusion. The fact that Pakistan has begun to tout a Pakistan–China–Russia axis against an India–US axis in the region speaks of the diplomatic...
