... population of Idlib province is about 4 million people). In this regard, Guterres
called
for a one-year extension of cross-border operations. Ankara, Washington and a number of Western countries need to extend the mechanism of cross-border operations in Idlib through Turkey. Syria itself, as well as the states supporting it, including Russia, believe that all the necessary humanitarian aid can proceed through interaction with the de jure Syrian government in Damascus. The main task for Damascus, on the one hand, and healthy ...
... sufficiently meet needs on the ground, will place even greater responsibility on Turkey, and will increase the prospect of Western confrontation with Russia and the Syrian regime.
Importantly, this proposal could also create space for wider political talks on Idlib’s fate. It could lead to a renewed track between Russia, the US, Turkey and Europeans to address the province’s fate in a way that accounts for Syria’s territorial integrity and state sovereignty on the one hand and the needs and security of the local population on the other hand. After ten years of devastating conflict, a humanitarian compromise in Idlib will not represent a huge victory. ...
... but also due to Turkey’s desire to avoid a severe confrontation with Moscow in Syria. This would be against Ankara’s interest, given its support for Azerbaijan’s offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Igor Matveev:
The Caesar Act: A New Challenge for Syria?
To sum up, we can conclude that Idlib remains valuable for Turkey, yet, unlike the security zone in Northern Syria, it cannot be called a “red line” in the architecture of Turkey’s national interests that Ankara intends to protect to the bitter end.
A Military Scenario or a Political Compromise?
We do ...
... YPG from the 30-km zone along the entire Syrian-Turkish border, patrol the 10-km-wide strip and transfer border protection to the Syrian border guards. A ceasefire in the northwest eased Washington's pressure on Ankara.
In general, the situation in Idlib and northeast Syria is frozen. The agreements between Russia and Turkey restrain the threat of escalation. However, in the long run, the deals may fail.
Ruslan Mamedov:
Troubled Partners: What Russia and Turkey are Dividing Up in Syria
Recent attacks in Tel Abyad testify the difficulties of implementing the second ...
...
informed Putin about the plans to launch an operation against the Kurds in the northeast of Syria. One might surmise that Turkey sees the solution in shifting the emphases in its “Syrian” policies and in concentrating on the Kurdish threat, since Turkey’s current policy in Syria is conducted in two areas: Idlib and the Trans-Euphrates region. Unwilling to be tied solely to the Astana format, Turkey is also building an appearance of collaboration with the United States. The operation in the Trans-Euphrates region today is the key point for Ankara. This ...
... Russian-Turkish relations. These negative connotations will be exploited by the provocateurs responsible for the tragic death of Russia's ambassador Andrei Karlov.
In the selection of the date of the next summit, the upcoming March municipal elections in Turkey were likely taken into account. Assad's offensive in Idlib can undermine the rating of the Justice and Development Party.
Increasing understanding of the real danger and the likelihood of the Russian-Iranian-Syrian campaign formation and solidification, may soon lead Turkey to acknowledge that it is better to be a part of this operation rather than retaining a passive observer status. On the way to Turkey, from the board of his plane, Erdogan admitted a joint ...
... this will conclude the active stage of the confrontation and mark a turning point in the Syrian campaign. But this will only be possible if the government and the Kurds, which have up to 50,000 troops, come to an agreement and settle the problem of Idlib.
It is believed that Turkey is willing to stop its operations in northeast Syria if the Syrian government and its allies do the same in Idlib. Ankara has faced problems carrying out its plans in Idlib, which has hindered the implementation of the agreement reached by the Russian and Turkish presidents in Sochi in September 2018,...
... opposition-controlled territories. Camps are being built in Northern Aleppo that can take in over 150,000
forced migrants
. Nonetheless, the Turkish “protectorate” areas in Northern Aleppo may not be enough. Therefore, the de-escalation zone in Idlib could become the principal region for returning Syrian refugees from Turkey once the required infrastructure is in place. However, it will only be possible if the danger of Syria’s governmental troops conducting a military operation there is averted and if the issue of terrorist groups present there is resolved.
Has ...
... impression that Ankara is currently manoeuvring between Moscow and Washington in a desperate attempt to secure a foothold in Syria. This much was evident at the summit on Syrian settlement between Russia, Turkey and Iran held in Tehran. On the one hand, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan appears to have successfully staved off the planned massive offensive in Idlib by the Syrian Army with support from Russia and Iran. On the other hand, Ankara has finally put Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra, a.k.a. Al-Qaeda) on the list of terrorist organizations, something that it was unwilling to do before. To all appearances,...
... addition, the Turkish population is increasingly hostile towards the Syrian migrants in the country, and there are many problems in need of solution, as resent research, for example, by the
International Crisis Group
, shows. There are about 3.5 million Syrians now in Turkey, and Idlib will only compound the situation.
Turkey is unlikely to want obtaining a “splinter” of Syria, it would rather seek agreement with the central government of the country. In such a situation, Idlib cleared of the radicals can become a trump card ...
