... Architecture and the OSCE?»
The meeting, timed to the middle of the Italian Chairmanship in the OSCE, was devoted to the current state and possible areas for the development of the Organization, the prospects for convergence of the positions of Russia and the West on issues of European security, the correlation of the OSCE potential with the capabilities of other organizations dealing with security issues in Europe (NATO, the European Union).
Aleksey Gromyko, RIAC Member, Director of the RAS Institute of Europe, Andrey Zagorsky, RIAC Member, Director of IMEMO RAS Department of Disarmament and Conflict Resolution, Andrey Kortunov, RIAC Director General, and several experts: ...
... repeat declarations about a ‘common European home’, in which its role was becoming increasingly secondary.
The dynamics in Western Europe were totally different. European integration has become a powerful incentive for further economic growth and improvements ... ... of life in the EU member countries. The EU became a meaningful benchmark for all post-communist states, including Russia. The European Union developed an integration and partnership model that could appeal to some and displease others, but no other force ...
... and oppose chaos and instability. Its willingness to reach compromises with partners, however, will not imply a readiness to make unilateral concessions or to deviate from a consistent pursuit and defence of its national interests.
Relations with the West will remain one of the most important dimensions of Russian foreign policy. Here, one can foresee a cautious relaunch of political dialogue between Russia and the leading West European countries. There is mutual interest in such a dialogue because ...
... a review of external affairs — both in theory and in practice. The upcoming elections are likely to bring a similar rethink. Russia faces a number of forks in the road, which could determine the direction of its foreign policy.
Relations with the West are a priority. The United States and the European Union this year will increase pressure on Russia via sanctions, military deterrence and information warfare. Russia will respond in kind, though the balance of power is significantly skewed in the West’s favor.
Broadly speaking, the aim of ...
... relatively low compared to risks that might emerge from attempts at changing the status quo. The margin of safety of both the Russian political system and its economy is still quite significant. On the other hand, the trend towards a new consolidation of the West is still very fragile and arguably reversible. There are many political, social and economic problems, to which neither the United States, not the European Union, have found credible solutions.
The status quo-focused foreign policy does not exclude trial balloons, tactical adjustments, incremental concessions, and situational collaboration. All these are important in 2018 and in years to come. However,...
... acknowledgement that Russia is part of the very same liberal world order – no matter how difficult it may be for the sides – opens up opportunities for negotiation and mutual compromise. This will require efforts from both Moscow and Brussels. The West/European Union will need to adopt certain views towards Russia from the practical as well as the theoretical points of view. This is particularly important in terms of Russia’s place in the global system. Moscow in turn will need to go beyond its current ...
... demonstrated that Russia’s economic dependence on the West made it a much-diminished actor on the global scene, while giving foreigners every opportunity to meddle in Russian politics and economics.
Russia made two more attempts to “dock” with the West. After 9/11, it pledged support to the United States and sought an alliance with NATO, based on counter-terrorism, even as it proclaimed its “European vocation” and a desire to integrate with the European Union.
Toward the end of the decade, it proposed a “common defense perimeter” with the U.S. and its allies, built around joint missile defenses, and worked with the EU on modernization partnerships.
These attempts have failed, essentially ...
Igor Ivanov:
In Search of a Common Home
Just six months ago, predictions of imminent revolution in world politics were all the rage in Russia and beyond. Observers saw plenty of signs of impending cataclysms: the UK’s decision to leave the European Union, the victory of a political outsider in the U.S. presidential election, the rise of far-right populism and anti-globalism in the West, and the wave of migration threatening to engulf Europe.
It seemed as if it wouldn’t take much for the entire current system of world politics to come tumbling down like a house of cards. The future of the EU was the subject of the largest number ...
...
principle
of “equality” in relations with Russia meant that Moscow
could
get the best terms possible for collaborating with the triumphalist West. The West was more than generous in offering
Ru
ssia a “special arrangement” with the European Union and a
se
at at the NATO-Russian Council. Moscow had to play by the Western rules, because these rules were supposed to be clearly
bet
ter for the new, democratic Russia than any other alternative, if
such
an alternative ever existed in the 1990s.
H
owever, this was definitely not how they understood “equality” ...
... Carlsson, Deputy Head of EU Delegation to Russia. The participants discussed the results of the last parliamentary elections in Russia, the development dynamics of the Russian political system, the state and prospects of relations between Russia and the European Union and the West as a whole and possible interaction between Russia and the EU in crisis situations in the Middle East and other regions of the world.