America seems reluctant in accepting the fairly benign fact that countries do not like to be dictated to and thus misses opportunities for creating new dialogues. This is especially prominent in explaining the poor relationship at the moment with Russia. There seems to be an element of purposeful animosity in the way Russia is viewed, analyzed, and engaged, especially at the so-called expert level and most prominently within the now Republican-controlled United States Congress. Perhaps one of ...
... Wales, United Kingdom, to discuss all of the supposedly egregious and disconcerting Russian maneuvers against Ukraine and demanding that Russia stop inviting further sanctions... ... the crisis in the East). He desperately wants NATO to give him arms, training, and intelligence support. And while NATO clearly talks lovingly and embracingly about the... ... American President compared to official French and German policy? I have a bridge to Crimea to sell you if you believe that. Which is an interesting segue come to think...
The interplay between Ukraine and Russia when it comes to gas geopolitics goes far beyond economic negotiations and development. It lies at the heart of what has ... ... immediately connected to the bilateral agreement Russia and Ukraine had signed earlier about the presence of the Russian Navy in Crimea. That agreement was already in place and allowed the Russian Navy to be housed in Crimea for 96 million dollars per year ...
... inevitable with their own attacks. This is clearly what has NOT happened in eastern Ukraine. Russia did not invade. Whatever Russian intelligence or special operation forces happen to be in eastern Ukraine at the moment, they are decidedly and some might say ... ... situation on the ground in eastern Ukraine. In several media interviews I gave in the United States following the referendum in Crimea, I warned that the greatest possible danger in Ukraine would be civil groups in major eastern Ukrainian cities looking ...
... great distance just hoping an autocratic regime would fall one way or another. In the Maidan revolution this was not the case: Russia was very much interested in the long-term geostrategic consequences of regime change, and it was the blind laziness of ... ... calls. Obviously, this has proven to be a rather large mistake.
A second aspect to play out from the Maidan revolution (the Crimean referendum) is also rather unique and an academic ‘special case study’ worthy of greater attention that as ...
