... touches on the Vladivostok-Chennai Maritime Corridor (VCMC) that was rechristened as the Eastern Maritime Corridor (EMC) last year. These Eurasian connectivity corridors ensure that Russia has enough options not to become disproportionately dependent on China in the economic sense and therefore risk the Sino-U.S. bi-multipolarity scenario that was described.
Furthermore, the VCMC’s evolution into the EMC could expand into the Arctic’s Northern Sea Route (NSR) to provide a safe way of facilitating Indian-European trade without having to risk transit through the ...
The hope for a new type of international relations based on mutual benefit, unfortunately, is unlikely to materialise in the foreseeable future
The People's Republic of China has appointed a new foreign minister. Qin Gang, a career diplomat who went through all the key stages of the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has become the head of the Foreign Ministry. His predecessor Wang Yi was appointed head of the Office ...
The European-Chinese diagonal in the geometry of world politics is no less important than U.S.-China, Russian-American or Russian-Chinese relations
European-Chinese relations have been on pause since the end of 2020. The politicisation of interaction, caused both by objective disproportions in the development of trade and investment partnerships,...
... geostrategic position of having stakes in both blocs, which explains why it closely cooperates with them in order to advance its goal of becoming a third pole of influence in the bi-multipolar transitional phase of the global systemic transition to multipolarity. Regarding the Western bloc, it shares these countries’ concerns about China’s rise, especially considering its summer 2020 clashes with the People’s Republic over their disputed Himalayan border. As for the non-Western bloc, it agrees with Russia, China, and others that international relations must diversify from their ...
... present analysis attempted to compellingly make the case that this emerging scenario will represent a much more complex version of multipolarity than the current one. Trump’s U.S.-Chinese trade war, which in turn provoked the new Cold War between these two ... ... recalibrate America’s grand strategy away from its hitherto unsuccessful attempts to simultaneously “contain” both Russia and China. The resultant outcome could fundamentally transform the geostrategic situation in Eurasia, both by providing the U.S. with ...
... triple attribute of bipolarity is an important theoretical presupposition in the analysis of bipolarization and a logical starting point for understanding the cognitive and theoretical differences between China, Russia and the West on this issue. In China, there is a tradition to emphasize the material dimension of bipolarity (or multipolarity). For the Chinese, the international structure has a natural attribute initially. Whether it is unipolar, bipolar or multipolar, these structures merge as a pure reflection of existing asymmetries in international players’ material potentials....
... recognize and accept the bipolarity. In fact, not accepting China as an equal power is the main reason for the conflict between China and the United States. Actually, what the United States is pursuing is to prevent the emergence of bipolarity, and prevent China from rising to a power equal to the United States. In other words, the United States will be happy neither with multipolarity nor with bipolarity. Thus what the United States is insisting on is the unipolarity.
In this regard, the current bilateral relations between China and the United States is significantly different from that between the United States and the ...
... inevitable multipolarity is an obvious truth. This state of affairs is not typical only of Russia. In the meantime, both groups omit some important details that were clearly pronounced in 2018, when the picture became more complex.
Igor Ivanov:
Russia, China and the New World Order
It is difficult to argue against the idea of multipolarity if we look at it from the realistic (neo-realistic) point of view. In Russia the school of realism and its derivatives has remained the most influential up to now and is a landmark for many experts on international affairs abroad. In effect,...
... multi-format and pluralistic nature of today’s international relations. Active discussions in such a format confirm the relevancy of multipolarity and the current processes of reconfiguring the world. In such circumstances, Russia can most fully implement its ... ... primarily interested not so much in meetings of heads of EU states, but in meetings with the participation of the leaders of Russia, China and the United States, meaning that EU representatives were running second in the newsfeeds of many news agencies. Thus,...
... several decades, the multipolar world should have finally taken shape as a new global political system with relevant norms, institutions, and procedures.
Yet something clearly went wrong. The world is not behaving as the founders had predicted.
Elusive Multipolarity
Igor Ivanov:
Russia, China and the New World Order
In October 2016, twenty years after Yevgeny Primakov’ policy article was published in the journal International Affairs, President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin gave a speech at the Annual Meeting of the Valdai ...
