... most important of which is the regional confrontation with Turkey. An arc of instability across the Mediterranean, in which Turkey and the UAE stand on opposite sides of the barricade, is helping Damascus gain the attention of the Gulf monarchies and ... ... Idlib at the same time. It seems that this is exactly what Abu Dhabi could ask Damascus. However, such an operation would harm Russian-Turkish interaction in Idlib. Apparently, the awareness of the need to preserve the ceasefire during this period and the ...
... policies by Cyprus and Greece. Moscow, then, must struggle to undermine widespread anti-Russian propaganda. Hence it seems to Russophile Greeks of Cyprus and Greece that Russia should also contain its own “Turkey problem.” For during the current Russia-Turkey manifold embrace, President Erdogan's behavior could damage Moscow's own image and international prestige.
This article will revisit Erdogan's characteristic foreign policy decisions, actions, and claims in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and ...
... internationalization of the conflict.
NATO and the West: Getting to the Roots of the Libyan Chaos
Grigory Lukyanov, Ruslan Mamedov:
Playing Pick-Up-Sticks in Libya
The
meeting
on the Libyan settlement held in Moscow in January 2020 under the auspices of Russia and Turkey and the international conference held in Berlin that same month stirred, at least somewhat, the morass into which the process of political settlement had sunk, but did not introduce any radical changes into the dynamically deteriorating military ...
... warring parties cannot find a political solution to the conflict, Libya will remain a country divided into two parts for a very long time
On June 15, 2020, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlut Cavusoglu
stated
there are no disagreements between Russia and Turkey on the fundamental principles of the Libyan settlement. Moscow and Ankara are continuing negotiations at the technical level to develop a mechanism for establishing a ceasefire and start the process of political settlement of the Libyan conflict....
... the West for influence over the geopolitical space stretching from the South Caucasus to the Balkans. However, this familiar picture requires a certain touch-up.
In recent years, one of the dominant features of the rivalry on the Black Sea – namely Russia–Turkey relations – has changed significantly. In the past, the Russian and Ottoman empires found themselves on opposite sides in no fewer than 12 wars (if you count the Turkish front in the First World War). And today, relations between Moscow and Ankara,...
... is very interesting. Turkey shot down a Russian SU-24 jet in 2015, after which we witnessed very tense relations between Turkey and Russia. Soon after this, Russian tourists stopped visiting Turkey, which resulted in a substantial financial loss to Turkey. Russians tourists are top of the list of any other nationality visiting Turkey with 6.9 million visitors and a 16 per cent share in total foreign tourists. Therefore, Turkey should keep in mind that any major confrontation with Russia severely affects ...
... transferred to Crete. Again, Turkish interests took precedence. Russia does, of course, have its red line: when a resolution on the Annan unification plan was discussed in 2004, Russia vetoed it, since the plan as a whole was essentially NATO- (and Turkey-) friendly.
Russian foreign policy is not as a rule aggressive, such as the US’s and Turkey’s. In the case of its relations with Greece, Moscow is happy to watch Greek-Turkish tensions causing problems for NATO, and influence Turkish foreign policy in the Middle ...
... finally
ratified
by the Kosovo parliament in March 2018.
Economic, energy and communications forecasts have also been reflected in the current stabilization processes. We are talking primarily about agreements among the Balkan states, as well as with Turkey and Russia on building a gas pipeline as part of the TurkStream project, the first stage of construction of which has already completed. The project was named the Balkan Stream. Per the
agreements
achieved, the pipeline branch from the Krasnodar Region via ...
... nominate themselves for presidential elections against Erdogan in the coming elections.
Erdogan is playing all political games with regional and international powers that serve him and his party. He is cautious when dealing with Russia, but in 2020 Russia will become Turkey’s key ally, though Ankara had been keeping Moscow before as Plan B for next scenarios against any American threat against political regime. Cooperation of Moscow and Ankara will intensify shaping a kind of alliance that limits Western opportunities ...
... current situation must fall on the member states of NATO, which intervened militarily in Libya in 2011. In the context of the internationalization of the conflict and the absence of preliminary agreements at the regional level, as well as the EU and Turkey’s preservation of their positions, Russia will continue its policy of maintaining contacts with all intra-Libyan actors. This work is considered to be enough to secure Russian interests in the region.
First published in the
ISPI
.
