... infrastructure in Central Asia? Yet, no matter how important these and other questions might be, they should not distract Moscow’s attention from strategic collaboration with the principal regional actors in Afghanistan. The preliminary results achieved by Russia in Syria give us grounds to hope that the Kremlin might well succeed in avoiding obvious miscalculations in Afghanistan.
First published in the
Republic
.
... campaign to its own ends, openly accusing former “partners” of inadequacy.
The decision to engage in the Syrian file was based on several factors, and none of them was truly perceived by the West. The first and the most important was terrorism. For Russia, Syria was too close to the borders for comfort to allow terrorist activities to go unimpeded. It was imperative not just to put an end to groups like ISIS and JN but to eliminate the most active terrorists physically so that they would not be able to ...
... convoys to Idlib across the contact line and in cooperation with the Syrian government. In this regard, it may be helpful to advance discussion on the details of this approach. The difficulty is that neither humanitarian convoys nor the military of Syria, Russia, Turkey or the United States will be protected from provocations by terrorists. Although Turkey has close relations in Idlib with a number of anti-government Syrian groups affiliated with the so-called “Syrian National Army”, these are weak ...
... pressed to choose, Russia should side more with Egypt and the UAE, especially since the latter can open doors for Russia in other regions if their partnership reaches the strategic level through cooperation here and elsewhere.
Levant: Resolving the War in Syria
Russia must somehow resolve the Syrian dilemma, ideally by pairing an Iranian withdrawal with the nuclear deal, sanctions relief for Syria, and some form of decentralization that is acceptable to Damascus. Moscow must also ensure that Turkish influence ...
... autonomy through a complicated profit-sharing formula between that region and the central government—similar to what Iraqi Kurdistan has with Baghdad. Turkey, more than anything, does not want to be threatened by PKK-aligned militants there, but a joint Russian-Syrian patrol of the border could possibly prevent that. The U.S., however, might stand in the way since it does not want to withdraw without leaving a lasting geopolitical legacy behind.
Andrey Kortunov:
Meeting Security Challenges in the Gulf: Ideal ...
... transparency on wider support across Syria. The alternative—bilateral cross-border support—will not sufficiently meet needs on the ground, will place even greater responsibility on Turkey, and will increase the prospect of Western confrontation with Russia and the Syrian regime.
Importantly, this proposal could also create space for wider political talks on Idlib’s fate. It could lead to a renewed track between Russia, the US, Turkey and Europeans to address the province’s fate in a way that accounts for Syria’s ...
... word from X.”
The New York Times
, 2 May 1998.
nyti.ms/3qkt6Lr
.
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (UK). “Libya: examination of intervention and collapse and UK’s future policy options,” 14 September 2016.
tiny.cc/r8ufez
.
HRW. “Russia/Syria: war crimes in month of bombing Aleppo,” 1 December 2016.
tiny.cc/wu4ksz
.
ICJ. “Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo.” 2010.
bit.ly/3aJzu8E
.
Karatnycky, Adrian and Alexander ...
... who have nothing in common with the Western values. Ten years after the conflict broke out, the US maintains a largely symbolic military presence in Syria’s northeast regions, while the European Union is plainly unable to settle on a new strategy in Syria.
Should Russia be considered a winner? Tactically—yes. Russia’s successful and relatively low-budget military operation quickly made Moscow the principal external actor in Syria. As far as we can see, though, Moscow has failed to design any exit strategy ...
Report 65/2021
Report 65/2021
The report analyses the application of foreign sanctions against Russian citizens, companies and economy sectors. It also considers global trends in the use of sanctions and restrictive measures against Russia within individual areas (the “Ukrainian package,” sanctions against pipeline projects, “cyber sanctions,...
... that the US is capable of significantly increasing its military presence in Syria at any given moment and within a short span of time puts it in a position of being a potential spoiler of any military or political/diplomatic initiative or deal that Russia, Iran, the Syrian government or Turkey may undertake. Besides, recent
reports
indicate that the US is constructing a new military base with airfield facilities near al-Omar oil field in Deir ez-Zor. Its runways are 2.5 km-long, which allows it to host heavy military ...