... hours ago said exactly the opposite. This is not the way emerging superpowers are treated. Trump, for instance, can’t afford to do the same with China. He treats Beijing with more respect.
As an aside, the concept of superpowers dates back to the Cold War and is outdated. Even if we think of the United States or even China as superpowers today. Russia certainly isn’t one, because it lacks resources. And even the United States is losing its status.
What I see unfolding is something else entirely. What I see is an attempt by Western officials, particularly in the U.S., to use Russia as ...
... relationship—the only one to have featured strategic arms control—is no longer central to global strategic stability. While Sino-American relations are not nearly as dominant in terms of the rest of the world as U.S.-Soviet relations were during the Cold War. Thus twentieth-century methods of dealing with the issue of strategic stability, such as arms control, are insufficient.
The U.S.-Russia strategic relationship—the only one to have featured strategic arms control—is no longer central to global strategic stability. While Sino-American relations are not nearly as dominant in terms of the rest of the world as U.S.-Soviet relations ...
How likely is a new arms race to begin? Are the latest actions of Russia and the U.S. going to lead to a new Cold War or will they become a starting point of the negotiations on a new strategic arms reduction treaty?
On April 6, 2018 the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) hosted a webinar devoted to Russia – US security relations. Richard Weitz,...
... hope to regain absolute military superiority, even if it decides to bleed itself dry in an arms race, as the Soviet Union did.
Preliminary assessments that my colleagues and I recently carried outsuggest that even if the US decides to wage a unilateral Cold War, its chances against Russia, China, and other emerging powers would not be very good. The balance of military, political, economic, and moral power has simply shifted too far away from the West to be reversed.
Nonetheless, a new Cold War, even if largely one-sided, would ...
On February 26, 2018, Copenhagen hosted an international conference «The New Cold War between Europe and Russia» under the auspices of the Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti).
On February 26, 2018, Copenhagen hosted an international conference «The New Cold War between Europe and Russia» under the auspices of the Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti)....
... crime, energy security and even cyber security. The regimes model can also work on the sub-regional level: for example, it has long been applied effectively in the Arctic.
In the current situation, the regimes model could efficiently complement the old Cold War model in Russia's relations with the West. As distinct from the inherently rigid Cold War model, which requires strict codification of agreements reached, the regimes model is flexible, often making it possible to do without burdensome negotiations over technicalities ...
... scenarios?
Karaganov:
During the late Cold War such threats were virtually nonexistent. Naturally, when the Cold War ended, the level of threat went further down. But the West greedily decided to grab former Russian and Soviet assets. This unleashed a new Cold War between Russia and the West, which we are witnessing now. But it has also started between the United States and China, because the U.S. is tightening its grip on China, trying to prevent it from expanding its zone of influence in the Pacific.
What should Russia ...
... personal sympathy) is aroused by his view on the theory of liberalism and on such concepts as postmodernism, post-structuralism and eurasianism itself.In the first chapter Kisoudis puts forward the thesis about the beginning of the new (i.e. the second) Cold War between Russia and the West. The Ukrainian conflict of 2014 is its starting point. Defining Russian-Western relations in this way the author tries to discover some differences and similarities with the first Cold War that took place from 1945 to 1991 between ...
... “manage the rise of the new,” now it seems to be giving way to the need to manage “the decline of the old.”
These crises have coincided with the revisionist intentions of “the new powers”—voiced discreetly by China and India, and openly by Russia—to change the rules of the game that were imposed in the 1990s by the West after its seeming victory in the Cold War. The United States, acting together with some European countries, tried to take revenge for its defeats of the last decade and regain the balance of power it was beginning to lose. This has led to an extremely explosive clash between “revanchists” ...
... two eras: the Cold War between the two blocs, which some have unsuccessfully been trying to revive, and the “unipolar moment”—the West’s hegemony—that followed it. While it was generally believed that Russia had lost the Cold War (although Russians never thought so, believed that they had overthrown communism themselves, and under no circumstances admit defeat), the “unipolar moment” was lost in the 2000s by the West which tried to expand its sphere of influence and control ...
